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ABSTRACTS

Does High Income Promote Democracy?

By JOHN B. LONDREGAN and KEITH T. POOLE

The authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors, such as the historical context, various features of the institutional setting, and simultaneity with the process of leadership change. Even after correcting for these many other influences, the democratizing effect of income remains as a statistically significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions. The authors go on to find that leaders' risks of losing power rise during their time in office and that these risks are higher in more democratic countries.

The authors confirm the finding by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck that the democracy-promoting effect of income is stronger among the European countries. They suggest that high income has a more powerful democratizing effect among the Southern European countries because it interacts with pressure from major trading partners to democratize. This suggests a revaluation of policies designed to foster the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones through free trade.

Rightful Resistance

By KEVIN J. O'BRIEN

How is one to understand contentious acts that open channels of participation while also making use of existing channels? Rightful resistance is a partly institutionalized form of popular action that employs laws, policies, and other established values to defy power holders who have failed to live up to some ideal or who have not implemented a popular measure. Analysis of opposition to cadre misconduct in rural China, supported by evidence from the United States, Norway, and South Africa, suggests that resistance can share a common dynamic despite its occurrence in strikingly dissimilar settings. Aggrieved individuals and groups turn to established principles to anchor their defiance; use legitimating myths and normative language to frame their claims; rely on existing statutes and government commitments when leveling their charges; and locate and mobilize advocates within officialdom. In differing contexts, a combination of rights talk, legal tactics, and open confrontation may induce power holders to surrender advantages in accord with principles that usually favor them. The cases examined further suggest that rightful resistance springs from rights consciousness and increases it and, finally, that it may be more consequential than most "everyday resistance" while remaining less risky than wholly uninstitutionalized defiance.

Insights and Pitfalls

Selection Bias in Qualitative Research

By DAVID COLLIER and JAMES MAHONEY

Qualitative analysts have received stern warnings that the validity of their studies may be undermined by selection bias. This article provides an overview of this problem for qualitative researchers in the field of international and comparative studies, focusing on selection bias that may result from the deliberate selection of cases by the investigator. Examples are drawn from studies of revolution, international deterrence, the politics of inflation, international terms of trade, economic growth, and industrial competitiveness. The article first explores how insights about selection bias developed in quantitative research can most productively be applied in qualitative studies. The discussion considers why qualitative researchers need to be concerned about selection bias, even if they do not care about the generality of their findings, and it considers distinctive implications of this form of bias for qualitative research, as in the problem of what is labeled "complexification based on extreme cases." The article then considers pitfalls in recent discussions of selection bias in qualitative studies. These discussions at times get bogged down in disagreements and misunderstandings over how the dependent variable is conceptualized and

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what the appropriate frame of comparison should be, issues that are crucial to the assessment of bias within a given study. At certain points it becomes clear that the real issue is not just selection bias, but a larger set of trade-offs among alternative analytic goals.

Economic Reform and Political Transition in Africa

THE QUEST FOR A POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT

By PETER M. LEWIS

The 1980s were bracketed by crises in Africa, as protracted economic malaise was succeeded by a wave of political reform. Analysts have sought to understand the sources of economic decline as well as the political requisites for recovery in the region. Neoclassical and structuralist analyses have been challenged by state-centric views of economic change. The latter perspective emphasizes the need for capable developmental states as a basis for long-term adjustment, but a political theory of economic change is still lacking. Such a theory must address the institutional foundations of growth, as well as the shifting basis of social coalitions in African regimes. Political liberalization suggests the possibility of a new setting for economic reform, though the effects of political reform on institutions and coalitions remain ambiguous, and democratization cannot be regarded as a panacea for the region's developmental failure. Future research must look more closely at the interests and structures in transitional regimes, and scholars should adopt a more comparative vantage on Africa's challenges of reform.

The Not So Silent Revolution

POSTWAR MIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE

By ANTHONY M. MESSINA

In the 1990s scholars working within the subfield of immigration studies in Western Europe have advanced four major arguments. (1) In a liberal era of global economic markets the capacity of states to govern their territorial borders has significantly eroded. (2) The widespread diffusion of liberal norms has severely inhibited the ability of governments to execute a rational immigrant policy. (3) The experience of mass immigration has transformed the boundaries of national citizenship. And 4) postwar immigration has fostered the surge of radical right-wing populist movements. This article evaluates these arguments in light of the evidence presented in both the collected scholarship under review and other select works. It concludes by arguing the case for new scholarly initiatives to synthesize and unify the separate literatures represented by the volumes under review.

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DOES HIGH INCOME PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?

By JOHN B. LONDREGAN and KEITH T. POOLE*

INTRODUCTION

THE observation that authoritarian rule is prevalent among low-income countries, while democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries, raises important questions about the causal relationship between regime type and income.[1] One interpretation of this regularity is suggested by Einstein's pithy remark that "an empty stomach makes a poor political advisor." From this viewpoint, democracy is simply an entailment of a high level of social and economic development. Others suggest to the contrary that the regularity does not reflect an underlying causal link. They point on the one hand to the ability of some low-income countries, such as India, to sustain democracy, albeit in a flawed version, and on the other hand to the resistance of the oil-rich monarchies of the Arabian peninsula to liberalizing constitutional reforms. According to this perspective, democratic political culture depends more on the institutional and historical context than on the level of economic development.

Important public policy decisions depend on how this question is resolved. If democracy is simply another element of social and economic development, then our policy toward countries with authoritarian regimes should embrace free trade and perhaps even foreign aid to foster the process of economic development, thereby hastening the eventual replacement of authoritarian regimes with more democratic

* We are very grateful to Astrid Arraras, Andrew Barnes, and Guy Whitten for careful research assistance. Londregan's work was partially supported by the Richard A. Lester Preceptorship at Princeton University, while Poole's was assisted by a grant from the Carnegie-Bosch Institute.

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959); Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Social and Economic Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith, eds. *Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963); Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "The Economic Development Thesis," *American Political Science Review* 88 (December 1994); Adam Przeworski et al. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (January 1996).

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successors. By contrast, if democracy is not a by-product of economic and social development, promoting free trade may not be the route to free elections. From this perspective, democracies might do well to consider imposing various forms of conditionality in their trading relationships, requiring the observance of democratic political norms as a condition for free trade and foreign aid.

The robust regularity that wealthy countries tend to be more democratic than poor ones is not by itself enough to resolve this debate. Skeptics concede the empirical regularity but attribute its occurrence to other, hard-to-measure aspects of a country's historical background and political culture, such as the existence of democratic institutions and a history of democratic government. Not only are these variables difficult to measure, but if the skeptics are right, they are also sufficiently collinear with income to have produced the appearance that democracy is an entailment of a high level of economic development.

In this paper, we use statistical techniques to discriminate between these hypotheses. We construct and estimate a statistical model that allows for the joint endogeneity of the change of leaders and the change of regime type. This is important because national leaders are often replaced when regimes liberalize (as when effective executive power passes from a king to a prime minister) or become more authoritarian (as when an elected president is overthrown by a military junta). We also control for various aspects of the institutional environment, including biographical information about leaders. In addition, we include measures of economic performance and take account of unchanging aspects of the countries in our sample, such as the identity of the former colonial power, using country-specific "fixed effects."

We find that even after (1) correcting for various measures of the political context, (2) allowing for the simultaneity of leadership change and regime type, and (3) correcting for country-specific fixed effects, income has a small but statistically significant democratizing effect. The finding that a high level of economic development has stronger democracy-promoting effects in the European countries than in the remainder of the sample also survives the inclusion of our many controls.[2] However, even when we exclude the European countries plus the affluent European-settled former British colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, the democracy-promoting effect of income remains statistically significant, though it declines in magnitude.

Although we find the effect of income in promoting democracy is

[2] Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (fn. 1).

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robust to the inclusion of a multitude of controls, the estimated magnitude of the democracy-promoting impact of income is not large. Even a permanent doubling of income leads to a fairly modest predicted movement toward democracy. We offer this as a benchmark against which other strategies of promoting democracy should be measured. For example, if trade sanctions could be shown to produce a substantial liberalization in the target country within a few decades, they would merit serious consideration as an alternative to a policy of promoting democracy by promoting economic growth in countries under authoritarian rule. We test Linz's hypothesis that parliamentary rule tends to solidify democracy.[3] While our coefficient estimate has the positive sign implied by Linz's hypothesis, we find the link to be only marginally statistically significant.

Our evidence highlights the distinction between instability of regime type and high rates of change among leaders. We find that rates of leadership change rise with the level of democracy. Even controlling for the level of democracy, prime ministers lose power at a higher rate than other leaders, while leaders with military backgrounds hold on to power longer than their civilian counterparts. We find that the probability of a leader losing power rises with the time the leader has spent in office, even after controlling for the requirements stipulated in many constitutions that limit the amount of time a leader can remain in power without new elections. This extends a similar finding by King et al.,[4] who focused on cabinets in parliamentary democracies, to a much wider set of national leaders. Our finding of exit risks that rise through time runs counter to a finding by Bienen and van de Walle, who emphasize the importance of leaders becoming more expert manipulators of the political process as they remain in office.[5] With the passage of time national leaders' support coalitions fray and atrophy even as the leaders themselves learn more about how to manage the resources of power to remain at the helm. Our finding of a rising probability of losing power suggests that the risk-enhancing effect of fraying coalitions outweighs the learning effects highlighted by Bienen and van de Walle. Our finding is robust to the inclusion of a control for the leader's age, which we also find increases a leader's risk of losing office.

[3] Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[4] Gary King et al., "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (August 1990).

[5] Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, *Of Time and Power* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991).

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We find that the well-known effect of economic performance on the political fortunes of leaders in North America and Western Europe applies elsewhere.[6] Our finding that the probability that a leader will lose power declines with the rate of economic growth is robust to the exclusion of the European and North American countries, and to the use of income rather than per capita energy consumption to measure the level of economic development. Instead of becoming weaker, the estimated effect of economic growth on the leader's political fortunes is actually higher in the non-European subsample.

In the next section of the paper we discuss our data, while Section II (which nontechnical readers may prefer to skim) presents the statistical model we use to analyze regime change and leadership transition. Results for this model appear in Section III. Section IV briefly discusses our findings on leadership exit; and our conclusions appear in Section V.

I. The Data

Our analysis calls for a reliable measure of regime type, for biographical information about leaders, for various additional measures of the institutional environment, and for systematic data on economic conditions. Accordingly, we combine data from a variety of sources, as well as collecting some of our own measures.

Measuring Regime Type

Essential for our analysis is a reliable measurement of democracy. Calibrating the degree to which regimes are democratic is the subject of a vast and active literature. Controversy surrounds the precise list of criteria that should be used in evaluating how democratic (or authoritarian) countries are. Some emphasize reliance on objective measures, such as voter turnout and national leaders' winning electoral margins.[7] Others note that such measures are prone to confuse democracy with other things. For example, low voter turnout, interpreted by Vanhanen as an indication of limited suffrage, may also result from heavy rainfall or a (democratic) decision not to penalize nonvoters.[8] Yet the use of more

[6] Robert Erikson, "Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote," *American Political Science Review* 83 (June 1989); Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice, "Forecasting Presidential Elections: A Comparison of Naive Models," *Political Behavior* 6, no. 1 (1984).

[7] Tatu Vanhanen *The Emergence of Democracy* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarium Fennica, 1984); idem; *The Process of Democratization* (New York: Crane Russak, 1990).

[8] Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps," in Alex Inkeles, ed., *On Measuring Democracy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991).

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subjective measures may lead evaluators inadvertently to incorporate their own political biases in the evaluation of countries' regime types.

Many analysts incorporate stability in their definition of democracy, requiring a history of sustained democracy for a country to be coded as "democratic."[9] We agree with Bollen that this confuses two interesting but distinct concepts: the level and the persistence of democracy.[10] Some analysts categorize countries as being either "democratic" or "not democratic," while others use finely graded scales that treat the regime-type variable as essentially continuous.

Some of the most careful analyses are conducted for a cross section of countries for a single year,[11] while others report results for a small number of reference years.[12] Other results are only available on an annual basis for the past decade or two.[13] Perhaps the most comprehensive effort at measuring democracy is that of Gurr, who measures various aspects of regime type on an annual basis for a broad cross section of countries over the period 1800–1986.[14]

Gurr reports two measures of particular interest. His democracy measure, DEMOC, is a composite of underlying variables that measure the competitiveness of political participation and executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, and the level of constraint on the chief executive. The second measure, AUTOC, geared toward discriminating among authoritarian regimes, is a composite of the same measures, with the addition of a variable that gauges the degree to which political participation is regulated. Because the democracy measure is designed to discriminate between democracies and near democracies, it accords points only to the democratic ends of the underlying scales, while the authoritarian scale registers points only at the lower ends of the scales.

By combining Gurr's measures of democracy and authoritarianism, we can recover more information about the entire range of regime types than is provided by either scale individually. Thus we create a 21-point measure of government type, GOVTYPE, which is defined as the difference between Gurr's two variables:

$$\text{GOVTYPE} = \text{DEMOC} - \text{AUTOC}.$$

[9] Lipset (fn. 1).
[10] Bollen (fn. 8).
[11] Dahl (fn. 1).
[12] Bollen (fn. 8).
[13] Raymond Duncan Gastil "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," in Inkeles (fn. 8).
[14] Ted R. Gurr *Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800–1986* (Computer File 9263) (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1990).

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The values on the underlying scales that contribute points to the DEMOC measure do not contribute points on the AUTOC scale, nor do categories according higher points on the AUTOC measure gain points on the DEMOC scale. Therefore the scales do not contain redundant information. Gurr's executive recruitment scale, for example, has four categories: regimes in the "closed" and "designation" categories gain a point on the AUTOC scale, and no points on the DEMOC scale, while regimes in the two electoral categories score a point on the DEMOC scale and no points on the AUTOC scale.

As has been noted elsewhere, democracy measures devised by different analysts tend to be highly correlated.[15] Table 1 presents correlations between our measure of government type, derived from Gurr, and several other measures. Bollen used a 100-point scale, with higher values corresponding to greater levels of democracy. In contrast, Gastil uses 7-point scales to measure civil and political rights, with 1 corresponding to the greatest level of freedom and 7 to the lowest. Gastil also reports a 13-point measure of freedom, which is simply the sum of his political and civil rights scales, running from 2 to 14. Gastil's measures were designed to permit comparison across countries in terms of differences in the government's respect for human rights, but his political rights scale takes account of the same considerations built into others' democracy measures. Gastil[16] and Poe and Tate[17] note that there is a close empirical association between respect for personal freedoms and regime type. Working with a 1985 cross section, Coppedge and Reinicke classify regimes along an 11-category polyarchy scale, built up from a portfolio of underlying measures, with the most democratic category corresponding to a value of "0", and the least to a classification of "10".[18]

Table 1 reveals high positive correlations between the government type measure we use and Bollen's essentially continuous scale among the countries for which we were able to obtain both measures. This is true for both the 1960 and 1965 cross sections reported by Bollen.[19] Using a cross section of countries for 1978, we find a strong negative correlation between our Gurr-based measure of government type (which assigns higher values to more democratic regimes) and all three

[15] Vanhanen (fn. 7, 1990).
[16] Gastil (fn. 13).
[17] Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980's: A Global Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 88 (December 1994).
[18] Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Reinicke "Measuring Polyarchy," in Inkeles (fn. 8).
[19] Bollen (fn. 8).

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TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS OF OUR REGIME-TYPE MEASURE WITH OTHER RATINGS

Rating		*Year*	*Correlation*
Bollen		1960	0.81
Bollen		1965	0.83
Gastil	political rights	1978	−0.89
	civil rights	1978	−0.85
	freedom	1978	−0.88
Coppedge & Reinicke		1985	−0.89

of Gastil's measures (which associate low values with greater freedom). We also find high negative correlations with Coppedge and Reinicke's polyarchy scores (like Gastil's measures, these assign higher values to more repressive regimes). Vanhanen reported similarly strong correlations between his measures and those of Gastil and of Coppedge and Reinicke.

If Bollen's more continuous scale were available on an annual basis throughout our sample period, we would be predisposed to use it. However, there is a great advantage of being able to trace year-to-year changes using the Gurr-based scale. It permits us to work with a much larger data set and to correct for country-specific fixed effects in ways we could not if our attention were restricted to only one or two annual cross sections. Accordingly, we work with our Gurr-based measures while noting that the high, if imperfect, correlations with other measures suggest, but do not prove, that we would obtain qualitatively similar results if we were able to work with annual versions of some of the other scales.

The 21-point GOVTYPE scale is nearly continuous. However, because it has a "floor" of -10, and a "ceiling" of 10, we need to be careful not to use a statistical mode that predicts values outside this range. A standard way to ensure this does not happen is to apply a logistic transform to the variable. Let S denote a score on the 21-point scale. Take the following variant of the logit transform of S:

$$T(S) = ln(S+10.5) - ln(10.5 - S).$$

This converts scores to a truly continuous scale.[20] A value of S at 10.5 would correspond to a T(S) of ∞, an S of −10.5 to a T(S) at −∞, while a value for T(S) of 3.71 corresponds to a regime type of 10.

[20] Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubenfeld, *Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).

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In extreme cases of civil war and foreign invasion, the political environment is in a chaotic state of flux, and Gurr classifies these transitions separately. In these cases, the government, let alone its type, is of a highly uncertain nature. We include a regime transition variable that codes expressly for transition periods. During these periods the government type variable is set to 0 and the regime transition variable equals 1. At all other times the regime transition variable is set equal to 0.

Biographical Information about National Leaders

An important source of our data on leaders is the comprehensive catalog compiled by Bienen and van de Walle.[21] Their data set includes information on 2,258 different leadership spells across more than 100 countries. While they cover some Latin American countries from the early nineteenth century onward, their coverage is nearly universal for the period since the end of the Second World War, with more recently independent countries included from their first leader onward. These data include objective biographical variables, such as the year the leader assumed power, the leader's age, and (for leaders not still in power in 1987) the year the leader lost power. They also code for leaders with substantial military backgrounds and characterize the means by which the leader attained power.

While our regime-type data from Gurr are reported annually (as are the economic data we use), leaders gain and lose power on a much more flexible schedule. During times of flux it is common for a country to have multiple leaders in a given calendar year. Because our interest is in merging our analysis of leadership change with our analysis of regime change, we convert the data in the leadership data set to an annual basis. With each annual observation for a given country we match the fate of the first leader to hold power during a given year. Except in unusual circumstances, such as the first year of independence, this is the leader who holds power at 12:01 A.M. on New Year's Day. This rule has the advantage of always coding an exit when one occurs. Other options could miss at least some years with exits. For example, using the leader who spends the most time in power would treat years whose only exit occurred before midyear as years without exits.

In the course of gathering data on some of our other variables, we discovered a few cases, mostly in Latin America, of leaders who had been missed and of entry and exit dates that needed correction. These changes are incorporated in our analysis.

[21] Bienen and van de Walle (fn. 5).

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Bienen and van de Walle systematically record leaders' ages at coming to power. We use this to infer the leader's age during each year he continues to hold power. We also trace the number of years the leader has already spent in power. This variable has been variously interpreted by researchers. Some have found it to be important in predicting exit, with some finding "negative duration dependence," implying that leaders' exit probabilities decline with their time spent in power.[22] Others report that leaders' exit risks actually rise over time, once other factors have been controlled for.[23] Negative duration dependence may stem from learning by doing as more-experienced leaders learn to overcome threats to their continued hold on power and consolidate their support networks. The increasing risk of cabinet dissolution found by King et al. may stem from the progressive decay of legislative coalitions as their very successes weaken at least some members' need to continue the coalition.

Bienen and van de Walle code for whether a leader's primary career background was in the military. Most such leaders seized power with the backing of the armed forces, but there are exceptions. Dwight Eisenhower is coded as military because his primary career prior to assuming the presidency was in the military. By contrast, Eisenhower's successor, John Kennedy, is not coded as military, despite his having served in the armed forces, because his career prior to becoming president was primarily civilian.

Another interesting variable reported by Bienen and van de Walle identifies leaders who seized power by nonconstitutional means. Needless to say, this variable is correlated with our regime-type variable. None of the leaders classified as "democratic" using our Gurr-based codes were coded by Bienen and van de Walle as nonconstitutional. We emphasize that Bienen and van de Walle's constitutional/nonconstitutional dichotomy does not measure democracy: they code the brutal Duvalier regime in Haiti as "constitutional" on the technical grounds that the Duvaliers came to power under the preexisting system. Yet even though it does not measure democracy, Bienen and van de Walle's nonconstitutional rule variable does tell us something about the institutional framework within which a leader operates, so we include it in our analysis.

Other Measures of the Institutional Context

In addition to the leader variables coded by Bienen and van de Walle, we gathered information about when democratic (and semidemocratic)

[22] Ibid.
[23] King et al. (fn. 4).

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leaders needed to renew their terms. For presidents this was simply the number of years remaining until the end of the current term, while for prime ministers, it was the time remaining in what King et al.[24] call the constitutionally mandated interelection period (CMIP), that is, the maximum amount of time the prime minister may serve until he or she must call a new election. We collected this variable for all leaders of regimes classified as –3 or higher using our 21-point scale of government types. The clock was restarted at each new election. We also altered the "time remaining" variable when constitutional reforms or special legislation led to changes in the CMIP within the same country, for example, the 1973 extension by four years of Finnish president Kekkonen's term of office.

We derived an "end-of-term" variable from our CMIP data; it was equal to 1 for leaders subject to a CMIP whose CMIP was scheduled to expire during the year in question. This end-of-term variable is set equal to 0 for all other leaders, including those who are not subject to a CMIP. We include these CMIP and end-of-term variables because we believe they provide important information about the pressures on leaders to leave office.

In addition, to allow for the possibility that a legally imposed CMIP changes a leader's underlying probability of losing power, relative to leaders who held power without such a constraint, we include a variable that equals 1 if the leader has a CMIP and 0 otherwise.

We code for prime ministers with a variable that equals 1 for national leaders whose title is prime minister and 0 otherwise. Authoritarian leaders seldom style themselves as prime ministers, although Thailand has provided some exceptions to this rule. We include this variable as an indicator for parliamentary regimes in an effort to learn more about whether parliamentary regimes are more stable than democratic presidential systems, holding constant the level of democracy, a position taken by Linz and recently questioned by Shugart and Carey.[25] We also expect the prime ministership variable to provide information about the leader's risk of losing power, as prime ministers' support coalitions always have the theoretical option of a vote of no confidence, whereas the constitutional measures that can be taken to remove a president before the end of his or her allotted term are often cumbersome.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Linz (fn. 3); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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Measuring Economic Conditions

Our economic data come from Summers and Heston, who provide annual economic data for over one hundred countries during the interval 1950–88; however, for most countries, only a subinterval of the thirty-nine-year sample frame is available.[26] These estimates of income were constructed with considerable sensitivity to the cross-cultural differences in lifestyle that impede the comparison of incomes across time and between countries. Real incomes are reported in 1985 U.S. dollars, with separate price deflators for consumption, investment, and government spending. This approach provides a more reliable indicator of real income than could be obtained by using a single price deflator.

We include in our analysis the log of the previous year's per capita income, the current rate of income growth, and the previous year's income growth rate. We chose not to work solely with the current level of income because we want to allow for the possibility that the level and growth rate of income have distinct effects. For example, rapid growth might forestall a military coup d'état even as low income makes a power seizure more likely. By separating the previous year's income from the current growth rate, we allow our estimator to treat these two effects asymmetrically. If this were unnecessary, so that income had the same effects whether it represented an increase or a decline from the previous year, the coefficients should be identical. Our analysis permits the growth rate and the lagged income level to have different regression coefficients, but it does not force these coefficient estimates to differ.

Coping with Omitted Variables

We have gone to some lengths to control for various features of the political environment, including among our explanatory variables not only the status quo level of democracy but also measures for leaders who seized power, leaders with military backgrounds, and the amount of time the leader has been in power. We code for parliamentary rulers and constitutionally mandated interelection periods; our measures take account of periods of uncertainty and transition, such as civil war, and we even include data on the age of the national leader. We are, however, under no illusion that we have incorporated all of the relevant variables in our analysis. We are convinced that there are hard-to-measure aspects of political culture that nevertheless play an important role

[26] Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950–1988," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106 (May 1991).

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in determining a country's level of democracy. Spain's democracy, for example, has surely been weakened by an active and often violent ethnic separatist movement but also strengthened by a royal family willing to put its prestige on the line against attempted military takeovers.

The list of intangible variables that affect regime type is a long one. While these intangibles vary greatly across countries, in many cases they change little or not at all during our sample period within particular countries: historical experience with colonial governments is undoubtedly important in sub-Saharan Africa, where the very national borders reflect nineteenth-century jurisdictional boundaries and often divide linguistically and culturally homogeneous groups. Likewise, colonial education policy, road building, and bureaucratic procedures have all left their mark on sub-Saharan Africa. Ethnic fractionalization and the distribution of income and control over resources among ethnic groups are also likely to have considerable bearing on the success of democratic institutions. By not including these factors that are likely to affect regime type and the strength of leaders' grasp on power, we risk what is known as "omitted variables bias" in our remaining coefficient estimates. It is to just such omitted variables bias that skeptics attribute the positive coefficient on income in regressions explaining countries' levels of democratization.

For some of the most important omitted variables in our regime-type equation all or most of the variation is between countries, so that by using fixed-effect estimators we can protect our parameter estimates from bias due to the omitted variables. Fixed-effect estimators use a country's own history to control for cultural and historical influences on regime type and leadership change. Thus, Argentina's relatively democratic government in 1983, which scores 5 on the government-type scale, is evaluated relative to that country's mean government type of −3.59 for the sample period (various years of military government scored −9). This approach is equivalent to including a Netherlands variable, a Thailand variable, and a variable for each of the countries in our analysis. We thereby allow each country's individual cultural and historical context to have a unique effect on the country's tendency toward democratic government. This permits us to disentangle the effects of the variables we measure and include in our analysis (for example, income) from the various country effects.[27] We find that country-specific controls are very important and have a significant impact upon our results.

[27] John Londregan, Henry Bienen, and Nicolas van de Walle, "Ethnicity and Leadership Succession in Africa" *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (March 1995).

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The impact of ethnic fractionalization on a country's tendency to be democratic or authoritarian is a subject of keen interest. However, for many countries measures of ethnic fractionalization are only available for a single year.[28] Moreover, absent major cross-border refugee dislocations, ethnic fractionalization changes only slowly over the course of generations and is practically unchanged from one year to the next. Including country-specific fixed effects in our model controls for this slow-changing but important variable as effectively as would the alternative of using the cross section of observations gathered by Bruk and Apenchenko. One way to go further in exploring the effects of ethnicity is to incorporate information on the national leader's ethnicity relative to the ethnic fractionalization of the country. The national leader's ethnicity, and hence his position relative to the ethnic divisions within the country, often changes with the succession of leaders.[29] This effect remains even after controlling for country-specific fixed effects. Assembling ethnic data on national leaders for the entire sample is an important challenge for future work.

The Sample

Because countries that experience no changes in leaders provide us with no information about the influence of our explanatory variables on leader exit once we have controlled for the country-specific fixed effects, we exclude them from the data set. This point is discussed in greater detail below. We also omit the former Eastern bloc countries from our sample, as we suspect that the quality of the economic data for these countries during our sample period, which ends in 1985, is highly questionable, and we would not want anomalies in the data for these countries to drive our results.

Once we have matched data from the various sources—Gurr's regime-type data which end in 1985, the Summers and Heston economic data which limit us to the period after 1952, Bienen and van de Walle's leader data, and our own data on leader characteristics and constitutionally mandated interelection periods—we are left with 2,798 usable observations for the thirty-four-year time interval from 1952 through 1985. In each case the basic unit of observation is the country/year. Thus, Denmark in 1968 is treated as a separate data point from both Algeria in 1968 and Denmark in 1971. Our data encompass

[28] S.I. Bruk and V.S. Apenchenko. "Ethnic Composition of the World's Peoples," in *Atlas of the World's Peoples* (Moscow: Institute of Ethnography, 1964).

[29] Londregan, Bienen, and van de Walle (fn. 27).

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one hundred countries, with an average of twenty-eight observations per country. Included are countries from Western Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Summary statistics for our data set appear in Table 2. The average exit rate of 0.17 for leaders in our sample corresponds to about one exit every six years. For a typical country/year in our data set the leader is fifty-six and a half years old and has been in power for nearly five years. This does not contradict the exit rate of once every six years because leaders with long spells contribute more annual observations to the sample than their shorter-term counterparts.

The median value of our transformed government-type measure, GOVTYPE, is 0, exactly in the middle of the observed range for this variable [−3.71, 3.71]. Leaders who themselves came to power nonconstitutionally comprise fully a quarter of our observations. This of course does not include the leaders who assumed power under the rubric of an authoritarian "constitution" put in place by a predecessor who seized power: perhaps this is part of the reason almost a third (31 percent) of the leaders in our data set had military careers.

However, many of our leaders (49 percent of the sample) were subject to some form of constitutionally mandated interelection period, and for 29 percent of our sample the national leader was a prime minister. The mean time remaining in power for the leaders subject to constitutionally mandated interelection periods was just over two years, with a maximum of seven years. For 16 percent of the observations in our sample for which the leader was subject to a CMIP (or fixed term), the CMIP was scheduled to expire during the current year.

The average annual growth rate in real per capita incomes in our sample was 2.1 percent, ranging from Iraq's dramatic 52 percent annual decrease in 1981 during that country's bloody war with Iran, to Uganda's 48 percent growth rate for 1982, when it's draining civil war came to a temporary end. The average value for the log of per capita income in our sample is 7.72, corresponding to a geometric mean of $2,223 per capita. The log of per capita income ranges from a minimum of 5.04 ($154 in Uganda during 1980) to a maximum of 10.76 ($47,191 for Kuwait during 1966). Kuwait and some of the other small kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsula report very high per capita incomes with massive oil revenues in the numerator and a small number of citizens in the denominator (and an even smaller number sharing in the bounty). However, most of the high-income observations in our sample are for the industrial economies of Western Europe and the former English colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.

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TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable	*Mean*	*Standard Deviation*	*Minimum*	*Median*	*Maximum*
Leader exits	0.17	0.37	0.00	0.00	1.00
Government type	0.56	2.39	−3.71	0.00	3.71
Transition	0.02	0.14	0.00	0.00	1.00
Nonconstitutional leader	0.25	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00
Leader is a prime minister	0.29	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00
Leader had a military career	0.31	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00
Time since leader came to power	4.82	5.36	0.00	3.00	30.00
Leader has a CMIP[a]	0.49	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00
Time remaining in leader's CMIP[b]	2.04	1.39	−1.00	2.00	7.00
Leader's CMIP expires this year[b]	0.17	0.37	0.00	0.00	1.00
Leader's age	56.50	11.14	20.00	56.00	89.00
Current economic growth rate	0.02	0.06	−0.52	0.02	0.48
Ln (per capita income)	7.72	1.01	5.04	7.68	10.81
Lagged economic growth rate	0.02	0.06	−0.52	0.02	0.48
$N = 2{,}798$					

[a] CMIP signifies "constitutionally mandated interelection period"; see the text for more details.
[b] These statistics are calculated for the subset of leaders subject to constitutionally mandated interelection periods.

The raw correlation in our data between government type and our measure of the log of the previous year's per capita income level is 0.56. At first glance our data confirm the observation that wealthy countries tend to be democratic. In the next section we develop a statistical model that helps us to disentangle the causal web linking high incomes and democratic regimes.

II. MODELING REGIME CHANGE

We model regime change using our 21-point scale, based on the difference between Gurr's DEMOC and AUTOC measures. Many regime changes also involve a change of leaders—with coups d'état and revolutions changing heads of state along with the institutional framework. To avoid confusing the causes of these two distinct forms of political change, it makes sense to model them as jointly determined and interacting processes. This is done using a latent variables approach. Let z_{it} denote the latent leader-change variable for country i during year t, while $GovType_{it}$ is the regime type variable for country i during year t. We assume these variables emerge from the following process:

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$$z_{it} = \vec{x}'_{it}\vec{\beta} + u_{it} \tag{1}$$

$$y_{it} = \vec{a}'_{it}\vec{\alpha} + v_{it} \tag{2}$$

where the $\vec{x}_{it}$ and $\vec{a}_{it}$ vectors contain explanatory variables (including an intercept term in each). We will observe a leader change, δ_{it}, if $z_{it} > 0$, and no change of leaders, $\delta_{it}=0$, if $z_{it} < 0$. Recalling our discussion in the previous section, we work with $y_{it} = T(GovType_{it})$ to prevent our model making logically inconsistent predictions beyond the bounds of our 21-point regime-type scale.

To take account of the simultaneity of the process we allow for correlation between u_{it} and v_{it}, which we take to be normally distributed. The formulation for equation 1 is standard for probit models, except that in this case we allow for correlation between u_{it} and the residual for equation 2. We make the arbitrary but standard assumption that the variance of u_{it} is equal to 1, while we estimate both the correlation between u_{it} and v_{it} and the variance of v_{it}.

The log-likelihood function is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} l = & \sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{t=1}^{T_i}\delta_{it} ln\Phi((\vec{x}'_{it}\vec{\beta} - \frac{\rho}{\sigma}y_{it} + \frac{\rho}{\sigma}\vec{a}'_{it}\vec{\alpha})/\sqrt{1-\rho^2}) \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{t=1}^{T_i}(1-\delta_{it}) ln\Phi((-\vec{x}'_{it}\vec{\beta} + \frac{\rho}{\sigma}y_{it} - \frac{\rho}{\sigma}\vec{a}'_{it}\vec{\alpha})/\sqrt{1-\rho^2}) \\ & - \frac{N^*}{2}(ln(2\pi) + ln(\sigma^2)) - \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{t=1}^{T_i}(y_{it} - \vec{a}'_{it}\vec{\alpha})^2 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where $\Phi(z)$ is the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution. In this setting, incorporating fixed effects means including country-specific indicator variables in $\vec{x}_{it}$ and $\vec{a}_{it}$. This creates a problem for countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Zambia, which report no leadership changes within our sample period. For these countries the maximum likelihood fixed-effects estimates do not exist. This is because the algorithm attempts to attribute all of the lack of observed leadership changes in these countries to the country-specific effects, and accords no influence to the other variables in the analysis. Mathematically this corresponds to a fixed effect of $-\infty$. Since all of the effect is attributed to the country, and none to our other explanatory vari-

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ables, no information about leadership exit is lost by excluding these no-exit countries from our analysis.

While the parameter estimates from the regime-type equation pertain to the logistic transform of our measure of government type, the impact multipliers for the original 21-point scale are easy to calculate (see the appendix for details).

Because our regime-type model includes the regime type of the previous period among the explanatory variables, we can rewrite equation 2 as:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{it} &= \vec{a}_{it}^{0\prime}\vec{\alpha}^{0} + \gamma y_{it-1} + v_{it} \\ &= \vec{a}_{it}'\vec{\alpha} + v_{it} \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where $\vec{a}_{it}' = (\vec{a}_{it}^{0\prime}, y_{it-1})$ and $\vec{\alpha}' = (\vec{\alpha}^{0\prime}, \gamma)$. If there is a sustained change in one of the explanatory variables, say variable j shifts from a_{jit} to $a_{jit} + \Delta$, the effect on y_{it} will grow over time. The immediate impact will be $\alpha_j\Delta$. However, in the next period, not only will the value of variable j have changed by Δ, but the lagged value of y will be shifted by $\alpha_j\Delta$. Thus, the total effect on y_{it+1} of a permanent change of Δ in variable j that began in period t will be $\alpha_j\Delta(1 + \gamma)$. Over time the net effect will grow toward a limit of π_j:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_j &= \alpha_j\left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\gamma^t\right)\Delta \\ &= \frac{\alpha_j}{1-\gamma}\,\Delta. \end{aligned}$$

The approximate standard error of this estimated long-run impact can be calculated as:

$$\sigma(\hat{\pi}_j) = \sqrt{\frac{(1-\gamma)^2\sigma_{\alpha_j\alpha_j} + 2\alpha_j(1-\gamma)\sigma_{\alpha_j\gamma} + \alpha_j^2\sigma_{\gamma\gamma}}{(1-\gamma)^4}}.$$

Notice that when the covariance between $\hat{\alpha}_j$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ is negative we may obtain a more precise estimate of the long-run impact for variable j than we do for either α_j or for γ.

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III. Results on Regime Change

We saw in Section I that there is a large positive correlation in our data between democracy and per capita income. The model we developed in Section II can now be used to help us sort out whether this relationship is robust to controlling for our other measured variables, for country-specific fixed effects, and for the simultaneity of leadership change and changes in regime type. We work with the logistic transform of the variable to prevent logically inconsistent out-of-sample predictions.

Column 3 of Table 3 reports parameter estimates for the regime-type equation, while column 5 reports estimated long-run impacts of permanent changes in the associated variables. Country-specific fixed effects were included in the specification, but to save space the fixed-effect coefficients are not reported in Table 3. From the standpoint of estimating the effects of our measured variables, the country-specific fixed effects are nuisance parameters. While we must control for them, since a likelihood ratio test for their exclusion leads to rejection at all standard significance levels, they are not central to our analysis.

To our surprise these estimates do not reveal a significant correlation between the residual term for the leadership change equation and the residual to the regime-type equation. A sudden decline in the national leader's political fortunes does not threaten the status quo democracy, nor does it undermine any authoritarian tendencies the government might have, after correcting for our other explanatory variables.

A detailed picture of leadership exit is afforded by the parameter estimates reported in Table 3, column 1. These estimates emerge as a by-product of our analysis, and we defer our discussion of them until the next section in order to maintain our focus on the determinants of regime type, especially the role played by economic development.

Democracy and the Institutional Context

The regime-type equation reported in column 3 of Table 3 reveals a high degree of serial persistence in our government type variable, with the status quo regime type (also transformed using the logistic function) earning a coefficient of 0.848. Relative to its estimated asymptotic standard error of 0.014, this coefficient corresponds to a t-statistic of 59.12, indicating significance at all standard significance levels. The coefficient for transition periods of 0.197 corresponds to a t-statistic of 2.83, which is significant at $\alpha = 0.01$. Interpreting this coefficient requires some caution, as the status quo regime type is set equal to 0 (and

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TABLE 3
GOVERNMENT TYPE AND LEADERSHIP CHANGE

	Leader Exit		*Regime Change*			
Independent Variables	*Coeff. Est.*	*Std. Err.*	*Coeff. Est.*	*Std. Err.*	*Sust. Impact*	*Std. Err.*
Status quo government type (logistic scale)	0.192	0.047	0.848	0.014	—	—
Transition	0.404	0.209	0.197	0.069	—	—
Nonconstitutional leader	−0.031	0.139	0.020	0.040	0.131	0.095
Leader is a prime minister	1.067	0.312	0.221	0.086	1.453	0.812
Leader had a military career	−0.346	0.124	0.093	0.036	0.611	0.178
Time since leader came to power	0.018	0.009	−0.004	0.002	−0.029	0.094
Leader has a CMIP	−0.396	0.213	−0.020	0.063	−0.130	0.132
Time remaining in leader's CMIP	−0.152	0.046	−0.017	0.013	−0.112	0.095
Leader's CMIP expires this year	0.977	0.146	−0.027	0.045	−0.177	0.108
(Leader's age)/10	0.259	0.044	0.011	0.012	0.075	0.945
Current economic growth rate	−1.548	0.608	−0.305	0.161	−2.011	2.131
Ln (per capita income)	0.022	0.115	0.119	0.032	0.783	0.179
Lagged economic growth rate	−0.182	0.600	−0.027	0.156	−0.177	0.202
ρ	0.015	0.030				
N = 2,798; Log-Likelihood = −2830.46						

hence so is its logistic transform) for transition years. Thus, a period of transition may be expected to end in a more democratic government only for status quo regimes in the lower half of the scale. For the remainder, civil war and other major disruptions are likely to leave less democratic governments in their wake.

Interesting evidence pertaining to Linz's hypothesis that parliamentary regimes are more "stable" than presidential democracies is found in the significant coefficient for our prime minister variable. These estimates suggest that countries led by prime ministers have a greater tendency to preserve democracy. Greater understanding of the effects of this variable can be had by noting that, according to our estimates, switching to a parliamentary government raises the expected logit transform of a regime's democracy rating by 0.221. If the government remains parliamentary in the subsequent period, the democracy score is expected to rise by 0.221 because of the direct effect of having a parliamentary regime, plus 0.848 times the 0.221 increase in this year's democracy score. The net increase would thus be 0.221+ 0.848 · 0.221 = 0.4084. The estimated eventual effect of a sustained shift to parliamentary government is

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$$0.221 \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} 0.848^k = 0.221/(1 - 0.848) = 1.453$$

(see the estimated sustained impact in column 5). This says that a country at the sample median score of 0—for example, the Dominican Republic in 1960—that switches to a parliamentary system would be expected eventually to move upward to a rating of about 1.45, somewhere between the rating of 1 for Brazil in the mid-1970s and 2 for Guatemala at the end of the 1950s, hardly a breathtaking improvement. As Gurr accords more democratic scores to executives facing legislative constraints, all parliamentary systems are virtually guaranteed at least some points on his rating scale.

The positive coefficient for our variable measuring the leader's military background should be evaluated in light of the authoritarian nature of most status quo regimes with military leaders. All else being equal, military leaders may be more likely to liberalize than are other authoritarian rulers. Perhaps this is because among authoritarian rulers, those coming to power as the result of military intervention are constrained by the institutions of the military, which slightly, but only slightly, lessens the personalistic tendencies of authoritarian rule.

Income and Democracy

We find that the log of the previous year's per capita income level has a significant effect upon regime type. The estimated coefficient is 0.119 with a standard error of 0.032, so this coefficient is statistically significant at all standard confidence levels. The estimated long-run impact of a permanent increase in income is 0.783, with a standard error of 0.179. While we find that the tendency of high income levels to promote democracy is weaker than the raw correlation between these variables would suggest, our findings indicate it is a robust regularity. Even after controlling for the status quo level of democracy, for country-specific fixed effects, for an array of other features of the political context, and for the possible simultaneity of the processes of leadership changes and changes in regime type, higher incomes appear to be associated with more democratic government. However, the effect is fairly small: all else being equal, a permanent doubling of per capita income for a country at the sample median democracy score of 0—El Salvador in 1972, for example—will increase the steady state level of democracy to 2.78 points, a bit above the rating of 2 for Honduras in 1983 and slightly below Pakistan's rating of 3 in 1965.

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Analysis of the Non-European Countries

An interesting claim of European exceptionalism has been advanced by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, who find evidence that the democratizing effects of economic development work more powerfully among countries they consider to be at the core of the world system: basically the OECD countries of Europe, Japan, and a handful of affluent former English colonies.[30] Their finding is an interesting one, but they do not correct for country-specific fixed effects, nor for many of the other variables included in this analysis. To probe the robustness of their finding, we reestimate our model excluding Europe, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Unites States. We refer to this resulting subsample as the non-European countries. This basically amounts to excluding Lipset's category of "European and English-Speaking Stable Democracies," except that in the generation that has intervened since Lipset conducted his analysis most of Western Europe has moved into the stable category.[31] Parameter estimates for the non-European remainder of our sample are reported in Table 4.

For the non-European subsample the observed democratizing effect of parliamentary regimes remains, but it is no longer statistically significant. While the data lean toward Linz's hypothesis that parliamentary government helps to stabilize democracy, the estimated effect is not large, nor does it remain statistically significant in the non-European subsample. Similarly, the effects of the amount of time the leader has been in power cease to be significant when we limit our attention to the non-European countries.

Military leaders continue to be marginally less authoritarian than their mufti-clad autocratic counterparts. As we suggested in the preceding discussion of this effect, the institutional structure of the military provides at least a minimal level of constraint on the military ruler.

As with the sample that includes the European countries, we find a small and statistically insignificant antidemocratic effect associated with the last year of a leader's term. While we might expect more "veto coups" at such times, with the military exercising its option to prevent an election winner it disliked from coming to power, our estimates indicate that any systematic tendency in this direction is weak.

The estimated democratizing effect of a sustained income rise remains statistically significant, but its estimated magnitude is just under

[30] Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (fn. 1).
[31] Lipset (fn. 1).

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TABLE 4
GOVERNMENT TYPE AND LEADERSHIP CHANGE
NON-EUROPEAN SUBSAMPLE

	Leader Exit		*Regime Change*			
Independent Variables	*Coeff. Est.*	*Std. Err.*	*Coeff. Est.*	*Std. Err.*	*Sust. Impact*	*Std. Err.*
Status quo government type (logistic scale)	0.161	0.049	0.831	0.015	—	—
Transition	0.229	0.224	0.084	0.074	—	—
Nonconstitutional leader	−0.050	0.140	0.006	0.039	0.035	0.087
Leader is a prime minister	1.175	0.330	0.113	0.092	0.672	0.361
Leader had a military career	−0.389	0.126	0.077	0.037	0.457	0.138
Time since leader came to power	0.018	0.009	−0.003	0.002	−0.019	0.088
Leader has a CMIP	−0.446	0.215	−0.041	0.063	−0.244	0.154
Time remaining in leader's CMIP	−0.144	0.047	−0.015	0.013	−0.089	0.088
Leader's CMIP expires this year	1.026	0.147	−0.017	0.045	−0.102	0.092
(Leader's age)/10	0.025	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.136	1.878
Current economic growth rate	−1.649	0.615	−0.230	0.160	−1.364	1.299
Ln (per capita income)	−0.023	0.117	0.059	0.033	0.349	0.106
Lagged economic growth rate	−0.316	0.607	0.003	0.156	0.015	0.089
ρ	0.024	0.030				
N = 2,707; Log-Likelihood = −2688.92						

half the magnitude for the sample as a whole. This confirms the insight of Burkhart and Lewis-Beck that the democracy-promoting effect of income is weaker outside a core group of mostly European countries. Even after allowing for our many controls, their empirical finding of a greater impact of income in the core countries is sustained. Notice that the short-run impact estimated in column 3 is not statistically significant (with a t-ratio of 1.807); however, because the estimated persistence parameter, γ, is negatively correlated with the parameter estimate for income, we obtain a more precise (and statistically significant) estimate of income's sustained impact than we do of its short-run effect.

The effects of a sustained doubling of income are reported in Table 5, with columns 1 and 2 reporting the effects for the whole sample, while columns 3 and 4 report the even more modest impacts for the non-European subsample. We use a nonlinear transformation of the underlying government-type variable, which accords a larger effect of income for government types near the middle of the scale than at the extremes. Even at the middle of the scale, however, the overall impact of increased income is quite small. Those expecting income growth to

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TABLE 5
THE DEMOCRATIZING EFFECT OF DOUBLING PER CAPITA INCOME

Entire Sample		*Non-European Subsample*	
Status Quo Ex Ante	*Ex Post*	*Status Quo Ex Ante*	*Ex Post*
−10	−9.65	−10	−9.85
−9	−8.04	−9	−8.59
−8	−6.54	−8	−7.35
−7	−5.12	−7	−6.16
−6	−3.79	−6	−4.99
−5	−2.54	−5	−3.86
−4	−1.36	−4	−2.76
−3	−0.24	−3	−1.68
−2	0.82	−2	−0.63
−1	1.83	−1	0.39
0	2.78	0	1.38
1	3.36	1	2.35
2	4.55	2	3.30
3	5.37	3	4.22
4	6.16	4	5.12
5	6.91	5	6.01
6	7.63	6	6.87
7	8.31	7	7.71
8	8.97	8	8.53
9	9.60	9	9.33

promote the development of democratic political institutions must be very patient indeed.

Among the non-European countries the status quo at the beginning of the sample period was typically near the authoritarian end of the scale. During our sample period Egyptian per capita income more than quadrupled from $451 to $1,932, while there was a modest loosening of the authoritarian noose: government type rose from −7 to −1. Even by the end of our sample period, in 1985, Egypt remained in the authoritarian half of our scale of government type.

The Northern European countries were democratic throughout our sample, so why is the estimated impact of income growth so much larger within Europe? The answer, in fact, lies with the countries of Southern Europe. As the fixed-effect estimators respond to within-country changes in the variables, rather than to differences across countries, it is to Southern Europe (where most of the European regime changes of our sample occurred) that we must look for an explanation

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of why the effects of income are so much stronger when the European countries are included in the sample.

Consider the case of Spain. The sample period witnessed a dramatic threefold increase in per capita income, from $2,215 to $6,729. While Spain's government type of −7 was identical to that of Egypt at the beginning of the sample period, by 1985 Spain could be counted as genuinely democratic, with a rating of 9, while Egypt was still on the authoritarian end of our scale despite a quadrupling of income.

A closer examination of the process of democratization in Spain provides some valuable insights. Two factors are often mentioned as having been at work during the Franco regime. The first of these was internal. As Spain's economy modernized, the middle class expanded to include many blue-collar workers, with many Spaniards holding more prestigious jobs than their fathers and with greatly expanded opportunities for university education.[32] This middle-income paunch of bourgeois affluence made it much less likely that the Spanish electorate would exercise the option of voting for confiscatory redistribution. The reduced likelihood that democracy would mean confiscatory levels of redistribution made political liberalization less threatening to elites. The expansion of the middle class and the associated reduction in elites' fears about the policies that would be implemented by a democratic government is probably at work in any modernizing country.

In the Spanish case a second impulse toward democracy appears to have been at work. Entrepreneurs from the most dynamic part of the the private sector dreamed of an end to Spain's international status as a pariah. They understood that an end to the dictatorship could mean an opening of markets in the rest of Europe.[33] These businesspeople, largely from the more developed Basque and Catalan parts of the country, were especially interested in liberalization, not because they harbored more burning democratic yearnings than their countrymen, but because of the de facto sanctions imposed on Spain. If democracy was the price of membership in the European Community, then for those in the business community hungry for access to European markets, it

[32] Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and Transition Elections," *Comparative Politics* 19 (January 1987).

[33] Luís Angel Rojo, "Panorama económico," reprinted in Jacinto Hombravella, ed., *Trece economistas españoles* (Barcelona: Okos-tau, 1975); Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981); Nancy Bermeo and José Garcia-Durán, "Spain: Dual Transition Implemented by Two Parties," in Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, eds., *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

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was a price worth paying. As the Spanish economy grew, so did the potential gains from free trade with the rest of Europe and hence the costs of Spain remaining a dictatorship.

To the extent that Spain provides us with insight about the process of democratization in the rest of Southern Europe, it suggests the effects of income growth were higher for the Southern European countries than for the non-European countries in our sample because they operated on two channels. The first of these stems from the reduced intensity of redistributive conflicts between the rich and the poor as the middle class expands. The Southern European countries share this feature with other developing economies throughout the world. However, the Southern European countries also faced an environment in which very wealthy and geographically proximate trading partners imposed de facto sanctions: only countries that passed a democratic litmus test could aspire to EC membership. While these de facto sanctions probably slowed the growth of Spain in the short run, they may very well have sped the process of democratization by enlisting dynamic elements of the business community in the internal political struggle for democracy.

IV. Results on Leadership Change

The primary goal here is to explore the link between income and democracy. However, because a change of leader often accompanies a change of regime, we modeled these processes as jointly endogenous. Surprisingly, we found that the residual terms for our regime type and leadership change equations were uncorrelated. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals some interesting results on the structure of leadership exit. In contrast to our regime equation, the parameters of the leadership equation are fairly robust to the exclusion of the European sample, although correcting for fixed effects again proved important. We shall comment on the results for the whole sample, reported in column 1 of Table 3, and take note of the two points at which these results differ somewhat from those for the non-European subsample.

The estimated coefficient of 0.192 for the status quo type indicates that the more democratic the current regime, the greater the likelihood the current leader will be replaced, reinforcing the widely recognized distinction between leadership turnover and political instability. We find that, all else being equal, prime ministers face higher risks of losing power than do otherwise similar leaders (with prime ministers heading minority coalitions presumably facing the highest risks) while military

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leaders have a lower annual probability of being replaced than do otherwise similar heads of state.

The coefficient for the time remaining in the constitutionally mandated interelection period indicates that the more time the leader has left in his term, the smaller the likelihood he will lose power. This coefficient doubles for the non-European subsample, perhaps because it provides more insulation from the risk of exit for presidents than it does for prime ministers.

At the expiration of the interelection period, leaders are much more likely to be replaced, as indicated by the large positive coefficient estimate for the leader's end-of-term variable. This variable codes 1 both for leaders permitted to seek reelection and for those required to step down under the status quo constitution. A worthwhile future data-collection effort would distinguish between these two groups in the worldwide sample. Even leaders required to step down under the current constitution can, of course, seek a constitutional amendment, as did Argentina's Carlos Menem. Such leaders could likewise subvert the constitution entirely, as in the case of Peru's Alberto Fujimori. Nevertheless a no-reelection clause in the constitution adds an extra hurdle for any leader seeking to remain in power.

We find that a leader's risk of losing office rises over time, with the variable measuring the time since the leader came to power earning a coefficient of 0.018. A comparison of the estimates from column 1 of Table 3 and the corresponding estimates for the non-European subsample from column 1 of Table 4 shows that the effect is robust to excluding the European countries. This estimated effect of the passage of time is also robust to controlling for the leader's age, which we find also increases the leader's risk of losing power. These results are consistent with the findings of King et al., who showed that, for the group of European parliamentary democracies they analyze, the probability of cabinet dissolution rises with time.[34] While cabinet dissolution and leadership exit are not identical events, the factors that work to erode cabinets' support coalitions probably come into play to some extent for all leaders. The nature of leaders' key support networks varies widely. Some depend on legislative coalitions backed by a voting public. Others come to power at the behest of a group of coup conspirators. Over time, however, the concerns and grievances that united these supporters will dissipate and change. This leaves the leader more vulnerable to fresh challenges, whether by ballot or by bullet.

[34] King et al. (fn. 4).

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Our findings run counter to those of Bienen and van de Walle. They emphasize the importance of learning by doing, contending that leaders become more adept political competitors the longer they remain in power. While we accept this point, our findings suggest that the crumbling of leaders' support coalitions does more to undermine leaders than on-the-job learning does to help them. The difference between our empirical findings and those of Bienen and van de Walle probably stems from our having corrected for country-specific fixed effects and for several other institutional variables not included in their analysis.

Our estimates indicate that the widely noted impact of economic performance on the political fortunes of national leaders is not restricted to the electoral democracies of Europe and North America.[35] The large and significant negative coefficient estimate for economic growth in the leadership exit equation actually increases when we calculate our estimates using only the non-European subset of countries. (See the coefficient estimates for the "current economic growth rate" variable reported in column 1 of Table 3 and the corresponding estimates in column 1 of Table 4.) These results again highlight the underlying similarity between support coalitions in democratic and authoritarian environments. Political alliances, whether they operate as mass-based parties or barracks conspiracies, are organized in pursuit of policy objectives, including of course the private benefits of office. One of these objectives is to replace national leaders whose performance is considered lacking. Our findings on the impact of growth on leadership succession indicate that regardless of latitude or longitude, few things serve to tarnish a leader's reputation more corrosively than a badly performing economy.

V. Conclusion

In this analysis we examine the empirical regularity that countries with high incomes are more likely to enjoy democratic political institutions than their low-income counterparts. Some argue that economic development promotes democracy, while others claim this regularity is simply a chance by-product of the fact that countries with democratic political cultures industrialized first. Using techniques that correct for an array of measures of the institutional context, for idiosyncratic features of individual country histories, and for the potential simultaneity of the processes of leadership change and regime change, we test

[35] See, for example, Erikson (fn. 6); or Lewis-Beck and Rice (fn. 6).

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whether the democratizing effects of income are a mere by-product of failing to account for political and historical context.

We find that even after correcting for many features of the political and historical context, the democratizing effect of income remains as a significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions. However, the small magnitude of our estimated income effect suggests the democratizing effects of high income are modest. This is particularly true when we exclude the European countries from our analysis. We suggest a possible explanation for the more potent democratizing effect of income growth among the European countries, arguing that the role of international pressure was an important one. As the Southern European economies grew, so to did the impact of the European Community's insistence that potential member states pass a democratic litmus test.

Our findings indicate that policies that seek to increase the economic development of countries with authoritarian governments as a means of changing them into democracies, such as the current policy of many democracies toward China, may take more years to have an effect than current policymakers imagine. True, policies that make trade with authoritarian regimes conditional on political liberalization may be expected to impose greater costs in the short run. But the possibility that conditionality will substantially accelerate the pace at which countries are able to cast off the yoke of authoritarian rule deserves serious consideration and should be weighed against the higher short-run costs implied by trade sanctions.

Appendix

Matching the Data

The creation of our matched annual data set of economic and political variables was complicated by the differences between the reporting intervals for the economic and political variables. The beginnings and endings of leadership spells rarely coincide with the annual reporting interval of our economic data. Moreover, there are a number of cases of leaders who do not remain in power for an entire year. To handle multiple leaders, we assign the traits of the year's first leader to each annual observation. This means that some leaders do not show up in the matched data set: a leadership spell that began in January and ended in December of the same year would not be counted. Our data set on leaders contains 3,972 observations, covering 738 leaders in 135 countries.

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A complication is posed by the occurrence of interregnums; it is possible that short gaps between leaders will be erroneously treated as part of an exiting leader's time in office. For example, a ruler who gains power in 1975 and has a length of time in power reported as two years could conceivably have remained in power until 1977 or 1978. If his successor took office in 1978, there may have been an interregnum beginning in 1977. Knowing only the integer number of years his predecessor ruled, but not the former leader's exact exit date, we cannot tell. Our algorithm for matching the economic and leadership data only counts caretaker governments as having occurred when no other interpretation of the data is supportable. The hypothetical leader we discussed above would be coded in the matched data as the head of state at the beginning of 1978; he could conceivably have remained in power until his successor's arrival in 1978. If instead his time in power were coded as 1, then we must conclude that an interregnum, beginning as early as 1976, but certainly before the end of 1977, must have intervened between the leader and his successor. In this case, we treat the leader as leaving during 1976, no longer according the benefit of the doubt to the longer possible leadership spell. We identified several gaps that can only be explained as interregnums, and we dropped them from our leadership data set. We also identified an interval of contested multiple leadership during the first four years of Zairian independence, which we also drop from the sample.

Our analysis incorporates both lagged income levels and lagged growth rates. Calculating the lagged incomes and growth rates requires two preceding years of economic data. Thus, for a country that reports economic data from 1950 to 1988, we are left with usable economic data from 1952 to 1988 once we have calculated the lags. After calculating lags for our economic data, we then match them with our political data according to the selection rules outlined above.

Estimation of the Continuous Model

For purposes of estimation we employ the reparameterizations $\vec{\beta}^* = \vec{\beta}/\sqrt{(1-\rho^2)}$ and $\theta^* = -\frac{\rho}{\sigma\sqrt{(1-\rho^2)}}$. This leaves us with the following likelihood function in the transformed parameters:

$$l = \sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{t=1}^{T_i}\delta_{it} ln\Phi(\vec{x}_{it}'\vec{\beta}^* + \theta^*(y_{it} - \vec{a}_{it}'\vec{\alpha})$$

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$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} (1 - \delta_{it}) ln\Phi(-\vec{x}_{it}'\vec{\beta}^* - \theta^*(y_{it} - \vec{a}_{it}'\vec{\alpha}))$$

$$- \frac{N^*}{2} (ln(2\pi) + ln(\sigma^2)) - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} (y_{it} - \vec{a}_{it}'\vec{\alpha})^2. \quad (5)$$

We maximize this by first estimating $\vec{\alpha}$ by ordinary least squares regression of y_{it} on a_{it}, and calculate the regression residuals: e_{it}. We then estimate a probit with δ_{it} as the dependent variable and obtain $\vec{\beta}^*$, and $\hat{\theta}^*$ as the coefficients for x_{it} and e_{it}. Next we recover the corresponding values of $\hat{\vec{\beta}}$ and $\hat{\rho}$ from $\hat{\vec{\beta}}^*$, and $\hat{\theta}^*$. We then maximize the likelihood function from equation (3) using $\hat{\vec{\beta}}$ and $\hat{\rho}$ as starting values. It can be proved theoretically that these starting values are the maximum likelihood parameter estimates, a result confirmed by the fact that the algorithm always converges at our starting values.[36]

Recovering Impact Multipliers

The impact multipliers for the original 21-point scale are easy to calculate. Starting with

$$T^{-1}(\hat{y}_{it}) = (21/2)(e^{\hat{y}it} - 1)/(e^{\hat{y}it} + 1)$$

we can differentiate to obtain (after a little manipulation):

$$T^{-1'}(\hat{y}_{it}) = (10.5 + S_{it}) \cdot (10.5 - S_{it})/21$$

So, applying the chain rule:

$$\frac{\partial S_{it}}{\partial a_{jit}} = T^{-1'}(\hat{y}_{it})$$

$$= ((10.5 + S_{it}) \cdot (10.5 - S_{it})/21)\alpha_j.$$

This facilitates easy computation of the impacts on the government-type scale implied by our estimates. What is key is that all variables have their largest impact for countries at the middle of the scale, while the effects attenuate at the ends.

[36] John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," *World Politics* 42 (January 1990).

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RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE

By KEVIN J. O'BRIEN*

THE words "popular resistance" typically bring to mind images of negation, usually of the legitimacy of something, and actions by people who lack recourse to institutional politics.[1] When ticking off examples of popular resistance, one is drawn to accounts of marginalized workers and peasants rejecting the claims of officials and economic elites—of efforts by the poor and weak to upset the plans of those with more power and status. Whether it is furtive, everyday resistance to changes in village norms and charitable practices or open defiance of national rule, it is uninstitutionalized acts that spring from a deeply felt (if sometimes artfully undeclared) denial of legitimacy that tend to attract attention.[2]

Much popular resistance surely fits this description. Struggles to tame political and economic power are often waged by the utterly excluded and rest on feelings of disavowal, even outrage. At the same time, however, other episodes of resistance exhibit a somewhat different logic. Contentious politics is not always a story of neatly divided antagonists, with representatives of the state or superordinate classes on one side and members of the popular classes on the other. Sometimes resistance depends on the discontented locating and exploiting divisions among the powerful. In these circumstances setting up "subordinates" in opposition to "superordinates" can obscure how people actually go about warding off appropriation and political control. Thinking in

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[1] On the relationship of resistance to negation, see Andrew Turton, "Patrolling the Middle-Ground: Methodological Perspectives on 'Everyday Peasant Resistance,'" in James C. Scott and Benjamin J. Tria Kerkvliet, eds., *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 38.

[2] For differing views on whether political contention (particularly in the countryside) seeks mainly to retrieve what was or reaches for something new, see James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); and Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). For the purposes here, it is only important that intrusive states and expanding markets pose challenges and present opportunities to marginalized groups and individuals.

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terms of two parties can be especially misleading in those cases when aggrieved citizens employ government commitments and established values to persuade concerned elites to support their claims. When receptive officials, for instance, champion popular demands to execute laws and policies that have been ignored, unexpected alliances often emerge and simple dominant-subordinate distinctions break down. On these occasions, popular resistance operates partly within (yet in tension with) official norms; it depends on a degree of accommodation with a structure of domination, the deft use of prevailing cultural conventions, and an affirmation—sometimes sincere, sometimes strategic—of existing channels of inclusion.

Nearly a decade ago Jeffrey Herbst pointed to the importance of opportunities afforded by the wider environment to dissatisfied members of the popular classes. He advised against turning the state into a "forbidding monolith" and recommended recognizing that "certain institutional arrangements and political goods may be particularly amenable to the type of political pressure that only weak, unorganized groups can bring to bear."[3] At about the same time James Scott called attention to forms of resistance that occur "within the official discourse of deference," inasmuch as they rest on ethical claims legitimated by official ideologies. Such resistance, Scott explained, can hamstring political or economic elites because it is couched in the language of loyal intentions; it can reveal when members of powerful groups have dared to take liberties with the symbols in which they are most invested.[4] Meanwhile, other students of contentious politics have used terms such as "in-between forms of resistance," "reformist activism," and "reasonable radicalism" to describe petition drives in Thailand, struggles to reclaim appropriated land in Latin America, and the use of antidiscrimination laws to agitate for equal pay in the Unites States.[5] What is to be made of individuals or groups who dispute the legitimacy of certain political authorities and their actions while affirming (indeed relying upon) other authorities and established values to pursue their ends? How should we understand defiant acts that are intended both to open channels of participation and to make use of existing channels, that straddle

[3] Herbst, "How the Weak Succeed: Tactics, Political Goods, and Institutions in the Struggle over Land in Zimbabwe," in Forrest D. Colburn, ed., *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 199.

[4] Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 101, 106.

[5] On these types of resistance, see respectively Turton (fn. 1); Leslie E. Anderson, *The Political Ecology of the Modern Peasant: Calculation and Community* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 16; Michael W. McCann, *Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 276.

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the border between what is usually considered popular resistance and institutionalized participation?

This article will explore the phenomenon of "rightful resistance," first in China and then, more briefly, elsewhere. Rightful resistance is a form of popular contention that (1) operates near the boundary of an authorized channel, (2) employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb political or economic power, and (3) hinges on locating and exploiting divisions among the powerful. In particular, rightful resistance entails the innovative use of laws, policies, and other officially promoted values to defy "disloyal" political and economic elites; it is a kind of partially sanctioned resistance that uses influential advocates and recognized principles to apply pressure on those in power who have failed to live up to some professed ideal or who have not implemented some beneficial measure.

Rightful resisters normally frame their claims with reference to protections implied in ideologies or conferred by policymakers. Since they often demand little more than scrupulous enforcement of existing commitments, theirs is a defiance based on strict adherence to established values. In their acts of contention, which usually combine legal tactics with political pressure, rightful resisters typically behave in accord with prevailing statutes (or at least not in violation of them). They forgo, for example, unlawful force or other criminal behavior, which might weaken their standing and alienate their backers. Instead, rightful resisters assert their claims largely through approved channels and use a regime's policies and legitimating myths to justify their defiance. Rightful resisters know full well that instruments of domination which facilitate control can be turned to new purposes; they have an aspirational view of government measures and elite values and recognize that the very symbols embraced by those in power can be a source of entitlement, inclusion, and empowerment.[6]

Rightful resistance resembles other forms of popular contention, though at some remove. It harks back to Gramsci's "war of position," for example, in that it involves probing for weak points in a facade of power, and because it offers the marginalized a way to work the system to their minimum disadvantage.[7] In their search for patrons, rightful

[6] For related discussion, see Mari J. Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations," *Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Review* 22 (Spring 1987); McCann (fn. 5), 232–33; Ellis Goldberg, *Tinker, Tailor, and Textile Worker: Class and Politics in Egypt, 1930–1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 14–15.

[7] See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 229–39; E. J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Politics," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 1 (October 1973), 13.

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resisters also bear some likeness to "rebels in the name of the tsar," Russian peasants who employed the myth of the Tsar-Deliverer to mobilize others, protect themselves, and deny claims made by "faithless" officials.[8] At the same time, rightful resisters have a certain affinity with "everyday resisters" insofar as their defiance is opportunistic and measured and because, at least at first, they almost always lack the organizational resources and collective consciousness shared by members of well-formed groups.

As should be clear, however, rightful resistance is not simply another variant of everyday resistance or of not-so-naïve monarchism. Unlike rebels in the name of the tsar, rightful resisters stop short of violence and are not limited to wishfulness and willful misinterpretation of imaginary protections. Their insubordination is in fact nurtured by authoritative pronouncements, and they do have actual intercessors. And unlike everyday resisters, rightful resisters seek rather than avoid the attention of elites: whereas foot-dragging, poaching, sabotage, and other weapons of the weak are invariably quiet, disguised, and anonymous,[9] rightful resistance is invariably noisy, public, and open. Rightful resisters mitigate the risks of confrontation by proclaiming their allegiance to core values rather than by opting for disguised dissent. Indeed, because they work the territory between elites and challenge malfeasance using an approved discourse, rightful resisters do not subscribe to the view that "the state and its laws are typically inaccessible, arbitrary and alien."[10] To the contrary, they have learned how to exploit the potent symbolic and material capital made available by modern states. Rightful resistance is thus a product of state building and of opportunities created by the spread of participatory ideologies and patterns of rule rooted in notions of equality, rights, and rule of law. It derives as much from the "great tradition" of the powerful as from the "little tradition" of the powerless, and is a sign of growing rights consciousness and a more contractual approach to political life. It appears as individuals with new aspirations come to appreciate common interests, develop an oppositional consciousness, and become collective actors in the course of struggle.[11]

[8] Daniel Field, *Rebels in the Name of the Tsar* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).

[9] James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," in Colburn (fn. 3), 8.

[10] Ibid., 28.

[11] On the collective definition of grievances, see Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 33–35. On the development of an "oppositional consciousness" that only partly rejects a would-be "hegemonic consciousness," see Aldon D. Morris, "Political Consciousness and Collective Action," in Aldon D. Morris and Carol Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 363–64.

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For rightful resistance to emerge, discontented community members must first become aware that they have been granted certain protections. For it to be effective, its practitioners must craft effective legal tactics, mobilize followers, and win a measure of sufferance, even support, for their contention. That rightful resisters often engage in disruptive but not quite unlawful collective action inevitably attracts the attention of officials responsible for maintaining social peace and administering justice. That they use the vocabulary of the regime to advance their claims can help them locate advocates among the powerful and may afford a measure of protection when their plans go awry.

Rightful resistance, with its slightly oxymoronic sound, is the quintessential "critique within the hegemony." Those who pursue it take the values and programs of political and economic elites to heart while demonstrating that some authorities do not. They launch attacks that are legitimate by definition in a rhetoric that even unresponsive authorities must recognize, lest they risk being charged with hypocrisy and disloyalty to the system of power they represent.[12]

I. Rightful Resistance in China

Rightful resistance can appear in many settings; it happens, however, that the concept was derived from research on rural China. This section presents evidence from interviews with Chinese villagers, grassroots cadres, and officials at higher levels, as well as accounts of rightful resistance gleaned from government circulars and field reports by Chinese researchers.[13] The incidents examined center on disputes involving appropriation and cadre accountability: they were chosen for their diagnostic value, diversity, and ability to shed light on the dynamics of rightful resistance. Individually, each episode illuminates at least one feature of rightful resistance;[14] together, they trace what can occur when villagers frame their claims around party policies and official values, solicit assistance from influential backers, and combine legal tactics with collective action to defend their "lawful rights and interests" (*hefa quanyi*).

[12] For an insightful discussion of how resistance can originate within a hegemonic discourse, see Scott (fn. 4), 90–107. A passage on critiques within the hegemony that are legitimate by definition appears on p. 106.

[13] The fieldwork for this article was conducted in twenty-two villages, over a dozen townships and county towns, three provincial capitals, and Beijing from 1992 to 1995. The interviews were conducted by the author and Lianjiang Li, sometimes together and sometimes apart.

[14] Given the sensitivity of rural resistance and the limitations of Chinese sources, full ethnographic detail for each episode was not always available.

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Rightful Claims

The roots of Chinese rightful resistance lie in the rich soil of central policy. To appreciate how the programs of an unaccountable national leadership provide openings for rightful resisters, the term "central policy" must be understood in its broad Chinese sense. Central policies, in this usage, include essentially all authoritative pronouncements, ranging from party documents, laws, state council regulations, and leadership speeches to editorials by special commentators in prominent newspapers. Central policies can be both as general as guidelines (*fangzhen*) that cadres should "develop the economy" or be "clean and honest" or as specific as regulations prohibiting local fees from exceeding 5 percent of a villager's net income the previous year. At the same time, central policies may be formally ratified, like the state constitution, or only informally publicized, like Deng Xiaoping's remark that "some people should be allowed to get rich first." The scope of central policy in China thus encompasses what constitutes law in most other nations but also reaches into far murkier realms, such as pledges made by officials on inspection tours, party propaganda, and the "spirit of the center."

In the Chinese countryside the number of grievances amenable to rightful resistance has been rising. Discontented villagers increasingly cite laws, regulations, and other authoritative communications when challenging all sorts of cadre malfeasance, particularly misconduct related to economic appropriation and autocratic "work style."[15] They often claim a right, for instance, to withhold grain tax payments because they have not received fertilizer or diesel fuel that government authorities were contractually obliged to provide.[16] On even firmer ground, rightful resisters sometimes point to regulations limiting "farmers' burdens" to fend off unapproved fees or demands for grain that exceed amounts previously agreed to. In one of the poorest villages in Henan's Sheqi County, for example, a group of plucky villagers presented county officials with state council regulations distributed by the

[15] Tang Jinsu and Wang Jianjun, "Nanyi huibi de redian: jinnian nongcun ganqun guanxi toushi" (Hot issues that are hard to avoid: perspectives on rural cadre-mass relations in recent years) (Report of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Beijing, 1989), 4–5. A shortened version appeared in *Difang Zhengzhi yu Xingzheng*, no. 3 (1990), 15–20; no. 4 (1990), 13–17; Fang Guomin, "Dui dangqian nongcun jiti shangfang qingkuang de diaocha fenxi" (Investigation and analysis of the current situation of groups seeking audiences at higher levels), *Xiangzhen Luntan*, no. 12 (December 1993), 36; Cheng Tongshun, "Dangqian Zhongguo nongmin de zhengzhi canyu" (Political participation of current Chinese peasants) (Master's thesis, Nankai University, Tianjin, 1994), 11–12.

[16] "Shixin haiyao feili" (Not only breaking promises, but also using force), *Hebei Nongcun Gongzuo*, no. 6 (June 1993), 42.

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prefectural government when protesting thirty-seven fees that far exceeded the 5 percent limit announced in 1991.[17] The complainants' unspoken threat was that if county officials dared to rebuff them, they would take their case up the hierarchy and insist that prefectural officials enforce central regulations they themselves had publicized.

Contractual ways of thinking and a growing fluency in rights talk appear to underlie much of the rightful resistance emerging in the Chinese countryside.[18] Increasingly censorious villagers are demanding fidelity to values and rights embodied in the contract responsibility system of farming (which has been promoted by the central government since the early 1980s), and are finding fault with local power holders who fail to respect the sanctity of agreements.[19] These exacting critics know that the center seeks to encourage economic growth by creating webs of reciprocal obligation, and they are prepared to hand over whatever grain and fees are lawfully owed, provided the local representatives of state power treat them equitably, respect their rights, and deliver on promises made by officials at higher levels.

When, however, grassroots leaders neglect the letter of the law or refuse to respect limits on their discretion, eagle-eyed villagers are quick to step in and to accuse them of engaging in prohibited behavior. They say things such as, "Failing to carry out the 'three-linkage-policy' [concerning supply of agricultural inputs] amounts to unilaterally breaking a contract. I have the right not to pay the grain tax. You have broken the contract, how can you ask me to honor it?"[20] Or, "Central policy says that after farmers fulfill their contractual obligations, we can sell our grain freely on the market, why don't you obey? If you don't listen to the Center, then we won't listen to you. . . . Why do you always oppose the Center? Why do you always oppose us? Are you cadres of the Communist Party?"[21] Employing authorized symbols to pose incon-

[17] Cheng Tongshun (fn. 15), 11–12.

[18] On contractual ways of thinking in the countryside, see Murray Scot Tanner, "Law in China: The Terra Incognita of Political Studies," *China Exchange News* 22 (Winter 1994), 21–22; David Zweig et al., "Law, Contracts, and Economic Modernization: Lessons from the Recent Chinese Rural Reforms," *Stanford Journal of International Law* 23 (Summer 1987), 326, 335.

[19] On "censorious" Chinese villagers, see Marc Blecher, "Collectivism, Contractualism and Crisis in the Chinese Countryside," in Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, eds., *China in the 1990s* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), 106. On the concept of censoriousness more broadly, see Thomas Mathiesen, *The Defenses of the Weak: A Sociological Study of a Norwegian Correctional Institution* (London: Tavistock, 1965).

[20] "Shixin haiyao feili" (fn. 16), 41.

[21] Tang Jinsu and Wang Jianjun (fn. 15), 4. On reciprocal rights and duties in dynastic China, see Wang Gungwu, *The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 165–86. Interestingly, Wang argues that the notion of reciprocal duties currently takes the form of cadres "serving the people" and citizens meeting their legal responsibilities.

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venient rhetorical questions, these villagers wrap their resistance in sweet reason and tender impeccably respectable demands; at the same time their rebukes reflect a heightened rights consciousness, changed perceptions of cadre responsibilities, and a claim to equal status before the law.[22]

In addition to inspiring challenges to unauthorized financial demands, a contractual logic is also beginning to appear, as Chinese villagers turn a disapproving eye toward "unqualified" (*bu hege*) cadres and the undemocratic methods by which they are often selected. Delegations of rightful resisters, for example, frequently lodge complaints about rigged village elections, demand greater responsiveness and financial disclosure, and request the removal of imperious local leaders.[23] Relying mainly on the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees (1987) and regulations governing its implementation, some rural dwellers make much of procedural violations that Chinese peasants are usually thought to overlook. Following are just a few examples concerning one of the most delicate issues in rural China, that is, rules mandating how to constitute the village political elite:

> —Two young men in Hunan, when facing an illegal snap election, organized fellow villagers to plaster seventy-four posters around their village, recommending rejection of hand-picked candidates and opposition to "dictatorial elections."[24]
>
> —Hundreds of Shanxi farmers besieged a county government, demanding that a village election be nullified after a cadre seeking reelection escorted a mobile ballot box on its rounds.[25]
>
> —Residents of two Shanxi villages occupied a township office and refused to end their sit-in until officials agreed to make their villages "special zones" where free elections would be conducted and unpopular cadres could be removed.[26]
>
> —Nearly a hundred Hebei villagers lodged complaints at the Central Discipline Inspection Commission in Beijing concerning a township party committee

[22] On villagers' "awareness of personal rights and an intention to protect them," see Yun-xiang Yan, "Everyday Power Relations: Changes in a North China Village," in Andrew G. Walder, ed., *The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 235.

[23] Zhongguo Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Yanjiuhui, *Zhongguo Nongcun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Huanjie Xuanju Yanjiu Baogao* (Research report on rural China's villagers' committee reelections) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 1994); Fang Guomin (fn. 15), 36; interview with township official, 1993. One Liaoning farmer expressed his desire for greater disclosure with these words: "I don't know what kind of fee you are asking me to pay. When I know, I'll hand over any amount requested"; "Shixin haiyao feili" (fn. 16), 41.

[24] These posters were all written on white paper (a color associated with death and ill fortune). This gesture attracted the attention of county officials, who investigated the charges and ruled that the balloting should be rescheduled and nominations reopened. See Zhongguo Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Yanjiuhui (fn. 23), 80.

[25] Interviews with two officials from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Beijing, June 1994.

[26] Shao Xingliang et al., "Yi min wei tian" (Regarding the people as sovereign), *Xiangzhen Luntan*, no. 4 (April 1994), 10–13.

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that insisted that a village party branch had the right to nominate villagers' committee candidates.[27]

—Over twenty Liaoning complainants, indignant about "minor procedural irregularities," traveled at their own expense to the county seat, to the provincial capital, and finally to Beijing, at each stop reciting chapters of the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees while appealing for new elections.[28]

In each of these incidents resourceful villagers cited specific clauses or the spirit of the Organic Law as grounds for their resistance. They treated freshly minted restrictions on cadre power as if they codified leadership obligations *in their village* and argued, in essence, that the Organic Law created entitlements they had a right to expect would be enforced.

While infractions of new election procedures are generating rightful resistance in many locations, Chinese villagers also base their defiance on other leadership assurances and more ambiguous promises, some of which date to the Maoist era. The following are some of the recent laws and institutional protections to which rural residents have turned: the Administrative Litigation Law (1989), which enables villagers to sue officials who beat them up or who tear down their homes without going through legal channels; the Accounting Law (1985), which entitles villagers to make claims related to financial disclosure; new cadre responsibility systems, which set targets for cadres but also oblige them to respect villagers' rights; minutely detailed village charters and codes of conduct, which codify rights and responsibilities and provide standards for cadre supervision; and birth control regulations (not the policy itself, which is of course impervious to rightful resistance, but improper favoritism in allocating village-level quotas).[29] Even criminal statutes can at times provide grounds for rightful resistance. Yun-xiang Yan recounts how one villager accused several township policemen of "violating the law and human rights" for detaining him without an arrest warrant. When Yan encountered him, the villager was noisily demanding justice from the county government, as he brandished a booklet explaining the criminal law.[30]

[27] Interview with official from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Beijing, June 1994.

[28] Tian Yuan, "Zhongguo nongcun jiceng de minzhu zhilu" (The pathway to grassroots democracy in rural China), *Xiangzhen Luntan*, no. 6 (June 1993), 3–4. Complaints about election irregularities can also be found in Zhongguo Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Yanjiuhui (fn. 23).

[29] Interviews with two township officials, 1993; interview with provincial civil affairs bureau official, 1993; Bao Yonghui, "Cunmin zizhi fuhe bu fuhe Zhongguo guoqing?" (Does villagers' autonomy accord with China's conditions?), *Xiangzhen Luntan*, no. 6 (June 1991), 12; interview with village party secretary, 1993; interview with villagers, 1994.

[30] Yan (fn. 22), 235.

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All these protections offer ready-made rationales for demanding rights guaranteed by the center but undermined at lower levels. When such well-grounded appeals do not meet with success, however, another set of somewhat more equivocal commitments provides a different sort of ammunition—usually less potent, but occasionally quite effective. In recent years, for instance, villagers have been linking their claims with seemingly halfhearted campaigns to "clean up the government" and "promote rule by law."[31] Venturing forth in the name of unimpeachable ideals and in response to the center's "call" (*haozhao*), they use the regime's own pledges to assail corrupt and predatory cadres. At the same time, some villagers have also given new life to Maoist norms and buzzwords by summoning up "communist values" to support demands that cadres "work hard and live plainly" and be willing to "serve the people." Acting now in the name of loyalty to the revolution and its founder, they "search for the real Communist Party" and level charges against "commandist" and grasping cadres who "oppress the masses" and are not "authentic communists."[32]

Origins and Dynamics

Rural resistance is, of course, far from new in a nation where peasant rebellions have occurred for thousands of years and not a single decade of this century has been entirely without rural unrest.[33] Even more germane to this discussion, petitioning and appeals have long been elements in the Chinese repertoire of contention, and it was Mao himself who launched mass campaigns against corrupt and unreliable grassroots cadres and said "to rebel is justified."[34] Still, the rural rightful re-

[31] Interviews with two villagers, 1994.

[32] See, for example, Wang Wanfu, "Mo rang qunzhong 'xunzhao gongchandang'" (Don't make the masses "look for the Communist Party"), *Hebei Nongcun Gongzuo*, no. 9 (September 1992), 33; also interview with villager, 1994. Leveling charges concerning "oppressing the masses" was discussed in a 1993 interview with a township official.

[33] On rural collective violence before the mid-1980s, see David Zweig, "Struggling over Land in China: Peasant Resistance after Collectivization, 1966–1986," in Colburn (fn. 3); Elizabeth J. Perry, "Collective Violence in China, 1880–1980," *Theory and Society* 13 (May 1984); idem, "Rural Violence in Socialist China," *China Quarterly* 103 (September 1985).

[34] On petitioning and remonstrating in dynastic China, see Mary Backus Rankin, "'Public Opinion' and Political Power: *Qingyi* in Late Nineteenth Century China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 41 (May 1982); Jonathan K. Ocko, "I'll Take It All the Way to Beijing: Capital Appeals in the Qing," *Journal of Asian Studies* 47 (May 1988). On precommunist petitions and their relation to repertoires of contention in post-Mao China, see Elizabeth J. Perry, "To Rebel Is Justified: Maoist Influences on Popular Protest in Contemporary China" (Paper presented at the colloquium series of the Program in Agrarian Studies, Yale University, November 1995). On post-Mao remonstrators and their relationship to the state, see Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 24–26; Kevin J. O'Brien, "Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People's Congress Deputies," *China Quarterly* 138 (June 1994).

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sistance described here is not merely a recrudescence of routines that have existed from time immemorial, nor is it an echo of the mobilized resistance of the Maoist era, nor a simple borrowing of legalistic tactics pioneered by Chinese workers and intellectuals.[35] For it is only with recent socioeconomic and political reforms that rural residents have begun to blend traditional tactics with self-directed, legalistic, and sometimes proactive struggles to restructure villagewide governance and effect institutional change. Post-Mao reforms have shifted resources toward nonstate, local actors and have offered villagers unparalleled opportunities to press new claims.[36] As decollectivization and marketization have made villagers wealthier and less dependent on village cadres, the end of class labeling and mass political campaigns have made them less fearful.[37] As increased mobility and media penetration have made them more knowledgeable about their exploitation and about resistance routines devised elsewhere, so too administrative, electoral, and legal reforms have given them more protection against retaliation and more violations to protest.

These changes taken together have nurtured the current spurt of tactical innovation and have rendered rightful resistance less risky and more effective than petitioning and appealing to higher levels had been in the past. Bottom-up initiative has become more feasible because restless villagers are more aware of conflicts of interest with local cadres

[35] To see how contemporary resistance "bears the imprint of past practices" and how a "blurring" in protest repertoires of students, workers, and peasants that began during the Cultural Revolution is accelerating, see Perry (fn. 34). Perry, despite her focus on "continuations," agrees that recent unrest is partly a by-product of post-Mao reforms. On the adaptation of old repertoires to new concerns, see Sebastian Heilmann, "Grass-Roots Protest and the Counter–Cultural Revolution of the Seventies" (Manuscript, Hamburg, Germany, July 1995).

[36] On the empowering effects of quiet changes in "resource arrays," see Kate Xiao Zhou and Lynn T. White III, "Quiet Politics and Rural Enterprise in Reform China," *Journal of Developing Areas* 29 (July 1995), 463–65.

[37] The extent of villager dependence on village cadres before and after reform has been a subject of lively debate. For several perspectives, see Jean C. Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Victor Nee, "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism," *American Sociological Review* 54 (October 1989); Jonathan Unger, "State and Peasant in Post-Revolution China," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 17 (October 1989), 133–35; Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Andrew G. Walder, "Markets and Inequality in Transitional Economies: Toward Testable Theories," *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (January 1996). On the declining importance of administrative connections even in marketized areas with high labor-demand, see William L. Parish, Xiaoye Zhe, and Fang Li, "Nonfarm Work and Marketization of the Chinese Countryside," *China Quarterly* 143 (September 1995). Some research suggests that declining dependence may be most pronounced in poor agricultural villages. See Jean C. Oi, "Rational Choices and Attainment of Wealth and Power in the Countryside," in David S. G. Goodman and Beverly Hopper, eds., *China's Quiet Revolution: New Interactions between State and Society* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994), 73; Kevin J. O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 32 (July 1994).

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and more able to act without prompting from above.[38] Emboldened by what often seems to be a genuine belief that their codified rights have been abridged, villagers are increasingly willing to invoke unsettling symbols and to mount high-profile protests.[39] Even in places where grassroots cadres broker economic relationships and still control access to vital resources, villagers are better placed to defy corrupt or arbitrary rule and unsanctioned appropriation.

Of course, increased leverage over structurally weaker cadres does not automatically translate into effective resistance. In today's China rightful resisters seldom win the day uncontested. For one, "rural cadres generally do not welcome the diffusion of political information, especially about personal rights,"[40] and some openly oppose central efforts to promote legal education. Grassroots leaders typically feel that more knowledgeable villagers are harder to control, and they sometimes detain or rough up villagers simply for publicizing popular central policies.

At the same time equally established principles support existing power relations and serve to delegitimize even well-grounded rightful resistance. Chinese villagers, for example, may speak of "democratic work style" and their right to "reflect problems and expose bad cadres," but cadres can often trump them by invoking "democratic centralism" and the need to maintain "stability above all."[41] Or when farmers charge that it is unlawful to lock them up simply because a family member has violated the birth control policy, a public security officer may just as persuasively counter that forcing relatives to attend full-time, daily "study sessions" is warranted because a national policy like family planning takes precedence over any other law and every citizen has an obligation to assist in its enforcement.[42]

For their part, accused cadres typically try to discredit and disrupt rightful resistance by pointing to norms sanctioning coercion and also

[38] On farmer conflicts with the state, see Thomas P. Bernstein, "In Quest of Voice: China's Farmers and Prospects for Political Liberalization" (Paper presented at the University Seminar on Modern China, Columbia University, February 10, 1994).

[39] In a seven-year dispute over the illegal renaming of a township, hundreds of Shanxi villagers demonstrated in front of a county office building, demanding that the responsible officials come out. A group of the complainants marched carrying lit lanterns and candles (in broad daylight!) to prove that they could not "see" under the township's dark rule. Li Renhu and Yu Zhenhai, "Yangzhao xiang gengming fengbo" (The disturbance over changing the name of Yangzhao Township), *Banyuetan (Neibuban)*, no. 6 (March 1993), 32–36. This case is a textbook example of rightful resistance because the villagers (1) based their claims on two state council regulations, (2) sought to locate allies in the county and provincial government, and (3) engaged in lawful collective action.

[40] Yan (fn. 22), 235. For a similar report, see Yu Xin, "'Luan tanpai' reng wei xiu" (Arbitrary apportionments still have not stopped), *Minzhu yu Fazhi*, no. 9 (September 1993), 26–27.

[41] Interview with township official, 1993.

[42] Interview with township official, 1993.

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to political expediency. Most grassroots leaders are proficient at casting all contention in the ominous light of "rebellion against village cadres" and at countering legal tactics and smothering collective action by winning support from officials at higher levels. Township and county party secretaries, for example, frequently side with notoriously high-handed village cadres so long as they enforce birth control regulations and induce villagers to pay their taxes and fees.[43] Township leaders, in particular, tend to be receptive to pleas from village leaders that they face dozens of genuinely incompatible demands that even the most conscientious cadre could never meet.[44]

Many cadres use these conflicting norms and expectations to make rightful resisters appear unreasonable and to justify not implementing a popular measure or institutional protection. When all is said and done, officials at higher levels often end up dispatching the police to suppress rightful resisters who disrupt a rigged election or lodge a complaint—particularly if the targeted cadre lubricates a request for protection with a fine meal or a bribe.[45] And even if they find it impolitic to defend a cadre openly, township and county leaders can often convince judicial authorities to conduct perfunctory investigations of policy-based charges, or to spend years taking testimony or auditing finances.[46] In present-day China, a strong legal case and the use of compelling normative language is merely the ante for rightful resisters; to overcome the many advantages cadres still enjoy, villagers must also secure support from backers who have more clout than their adversaries.[47]

[43] Zhang Chenggong, "Cunzhang si yu chunjie" (Village heads die at spring festival), *Landun*, no. 3 (March 1993), 26–27; Zeng Yesong, "Jingdong Zhongnanhai de shinian yuanan" (A ten-year-long unjust verdict that disturbs Zhongnanhai), *Zhongguo Nongmin*, no. 5 (May 1995), 34–37; Lu Fengjun, "Da eba Han Gang fufa ji" (Report on the execution of local bully Han Gang) (Paper by a county judicial official, Shandong Province, 1993).

[44] Maintaining morale among village cadres is a top concern of township leaders, particularly in unstable, "semiparalyzed" villages where underpaid, overworked cadres often threaten to abandon their posts. Interview with a township official, 1993.

[45] Interviews with villagers, 1994. Suppression sometimes fails. In one telling case several villagers tore up their ballots just as a village election began and denounced a township-promoted candidate as corrupt. Though township officials at first sought to prosecute them for "impeding an election," and the county procurator accepted the case, the provincial people's congress, after consulting with the National People's Congress, decided it was "not appropriate to regard their actions as illegal" because the original nominating process had been conducted improperly. Zhongguo Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Yanjiuhui (fn. 23), 107–8.

[46] Interviews with villagers, 1994. In Hebi City, Henan, about 60 percent of the collective complaints lodged in 1993 demanded an audit of village financial records, sometimes up to ten years' worth. Fang Guomin (fn. 15), 36.

[47] Jonathan Fox argues that opportunities to gain citizenship rights rarely arise so long as authoritarian elites remain united, but that divisions caused by declining legitimacy and threats to long-term political stability can increase "access to state entitlements," even without meaningful electoral competition. See Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," *World Politics* 46 (January 1994), 155–56.

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In this regard, many rightful resisters have proven themselves adept at finding advocates (including journalists)[48] who are willing to investigate their charges and champion their claims.[49] Resourceful villagers skillfully ferret out supporters in various bureaucracies who have a stake in seeing their appeals addressed and in upholding the policies they invoke. Officials in the Ministry of Civil Affairs and its local offices, for instance, frequently receive delegations of villagers protesting infractions of the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees—a law the ministry is entrusted to implement.[50] Discipline Inspection Commissions, for their part, have become a focus for collective complaints concerning violation of party discipline, and some county procurators, particularly their anticorruption offices, have been receptive to charges concerning criminal misconduct.[51] Local people's congresses, in the course of promoting rule by law, often attract groups of villagers who point to the villagers' committee law and local implementing regulations when combating election irregularities. Even letters and visits offices of public security bureaus can serve as a clearinghouse for grievances, and at times have roused ranking officials to investigate accusations of wrongdoing.[52]

Given the limited institutionalization of Chinese politics and because their opponents usually have protectors among the local notables who matter most, rightful resisters typically find it advantageous to press their claims wherever they can.[53] They recognize that state power nowadays is both fragmented and divided against itself, and they know that if they search diligently, they can often locate pressure points

[48] In one village I visited, farmers have raised a collection to hire a journalist (preferably a reporter from the Focus segment of the CCTV program *Dongfang Shikong*) to investigate their charges. Interviews with villagers, 1994.

[49] Hobsbawm (fn. 7), 15, writes: "It is as though the villages, always conscious of potential strength even within their subalternity, required only the assurance of goodwill or even mere toleration from the highest authorities to straighten their backs."

[50] Interview with official of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1994; interviews with provincial civil affairs bureau officials, 1993 and 1994.

[51] Fang Guomin (fn. 15), 36; interview with villager, 1994.

[52] On "letters and visits work" and the use of mass petitions by leaders at higher levels to monitor cadre performance, see Yasheng Huang, "Administrative Monitoring in China," *China Quarterly* 143 (September 1995), 834–35; Ma Jinlin, "Jianchi qunzhong luxian, miqie dangqun guanxi" (Uphold the mass line, improve party-mass relations) (Paper by a county official, Hebei Province, 1992).

[53] Cf. "In fact, given the highly personal nature of political ties in Morocco generally, it is very likely indeed that if any individual has a problem in his own locale he will seek a person who can help him from any place in the country, any position in the official hierarchy, and on the basis of any personal connection that best serves his particular purpose at the moment." Lawrence Rosen, "Social Identity and Points of Attachment: Approaches to Social Organization," in Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen, *Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 53.

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where elite unity crumbles.[54] They are perfectly aware that their resistance hinges on exploiting the divergent interests of officials both in different systems (*xitong*) and at different levels in the same system, and they astutely align themselves with benefactors (*enren*) who are disposed to take their charges seriously and who have the authority to ensure that a cadre is disciplined or prosecuted.

Rightful resistance, in the final analysis, allows villagers to attack abusive cadres with rights claims rather than with their "shoulder poles."[55] It is pursued by those who (at least outwardly) accept party rule and who go along with many unwelcome measures (for example, birth control, economic extraction) in exchange for unflinching execution of all popular policies. Such individuals cede the high ground to official values, shape their defiance from materials made available by the structure of domination, and appeal to elites who recognize that their claims are consistent with established principles. Aware of the risks involved in other, less dependent forms of contention, they forgo revolutionary demands and offer conditional consent to rulers who control their agents and enforce their ideals. Their claims do not always fall on deaf ears because some members of the elite believe that offering redress may help placate the discontented and reduce the likelihood of unrest while improving policy implementation and cadre oversight.[56]

That rightful resistance is turning up in the Chinese countryside is perhaps not a great surprise, given the growing chasm between what is promised and what is delivered. But rightful resistance does not appear only where accountability is advocated but weakly institutionalized and rights are granted but weakly guaranteed. Elites in other settings may also be encouraged by rights talk, legal tactics, and political pressure to surrender advantages in accord with principles that usually favor them. In places far from rural China, different established values, legitimat-

[54] For a discussion of "sandwich strategies" and triangular conflict between reformers, entrenched elites, and popular forces, see Jonathan Fox, *The Politics of Food in Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chaps. 6, 7. On "fragmented authoritarianism," see Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), chap. 1.

[55] Wang Wanfu (fn. 32), 33. On concerns that angry villagers may one day attack grassroots leaders with their shoulder poles, see Peng Zhen (Speech to the fifth joint meeting of delegation leaders and members of the Law Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, April 6, 1987).

[56] Interviews with central officials, 1993 and 1994. On the role of the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees in reducing cadre-mass conflict, improving policy implementation, and strengthening cadre supervision, see Wang Zhenyao, "Woguo nongcun de lishixing biange yu cunmin zizhi de biran qushi" (Our country's historical reform and the inevitable trend of villagers' autonomy), in Minzhengbu Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshesi Nongcunchu, ed., *Cunmin Zizhi Shifan Jiangxi Ban Shiyong Jiaocai* (Teaching materials for the study group on villagers' autonomy demonstration) (Laixi City, Shandong Province, November 1991), 44–45.

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ing myths, and government commitments may also provide a basis for rightful resistance.

II. Comparative Perspectives

Most social scientists would agree that the value of a concept is closely related to how well it travels.[57] A truly useful theoretical construct has to survive applications beyond its original context; it must continue "to yield defensible interpretations as new social phenomena swim into view."[58]

With this in mind, this section looks to the research of others to suggest instances of rightful resistance outside of China. Two of the examples presented are fragmentary and illustrate only elements of rightful resistance. One is more complete. The aim here is simply to highlight a common dynamic: to identify "deep analogies"[59] that can help us "make sense of numerous details that otherwise would seem purely accidental."[60] Without glossing over dissimilarities, we can try to locate parallels that help "break out the relevant part of the narrative."[61] And while remaining attentive to variation stemming from a host of factors,[62] we can begin to assess the generality of the findings from China and avoid wrapping a concept around a single case.

One example of the claims characteristic of rightful resistance is the "censoriousness" of Norwegian prison inmates, who base their demands for better treatment on prison regulations and recognized principles of justice (for example, equality). According to Thomas Mathiesen, such prisoners "argue with the ruler on the basis of norms that the ruler also agrees with, trying to convince the ruler that he has not correctly adhered to these principles." These strict constructionists employ the rhetoric and values of their jailers and the wider society while targeting

[57] The subject of how to avoid abandoning categories prematurely when encompassing additional cases is discussed in David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 87 (December 1993).

[58] Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in Geertz, ed., *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 27.

[59] On "deep analogies," see Charles Tilly, *As Sociology Meets History* (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 8.

[60] The quoted text and a strong defense of pursuing "narrative ordering of circumstantial detail" can be found in William H. Sewell, Jr., "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology" (Manuscript, University of Chicago, February 1992).

[61] Arthur L. Stinchcombe, *Theoretical Methods in Social History* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 15, 21.

[62] Some relevant factors are which government commitments resisters invoke, which elite advocates are available, how political pressure is applied, and how willing authorities are to resort to ruining rightful resisters outside the law.

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"personal regimes" and demanding "bureaucracy."[63] In their efforts to domesticate power and render it predictable, they fall short of rightful resistance mainly because few inmates are able to locate elite advocates and because their potential for nonviolent political pressure is subject to obvious limitations.

In contrast to an actual prison, apartheid-era South Africa offered somewhat greater scope for using official values to goad concerned authorities into action. In Richard Abel's account of opposition to the "pass laws,"[64] black plaintiffs and their legal advisers pointed to inconsistent and ambiguous regulatory structures and demanded that the government prove its commitment to the rule of law. Invoking South Africa's "liberal tradition" and Nationalist boasts about judicial independence, they contested racial discrimination "on the terrain of ideology" and "honored the regime's pretensions by judging it in terms of legality." By framing their claims with reference to official values (including the sanctity of the family) and stressing misimplementation of judicial decisions, they won over key insiders (including some government attorneys, large employers, and judges) who endorsed their appeals and urged obstructionist enforcement agencies to heed the law. Although their foes hid behind procedural maneuvers and principles that condoned apartheid, workers and their families were able to use the language of power to win residency rights when obliging judges invalidated local rulings and condemned stalling tactics. Accommodating elites played a central role in this contention, unlike the Norwegian example, but this case still falls short of rightful resistance because, by the 1980s, opponents of influx controls focused on single-client legal challenges, while less institutionalized forms of political pressure (with the exception of a small amount of squatting) were not employed.

In the most repressive regimes resistance is largely limited to "weapons of the weak."[65] In slightly less controlled settings one or more features of rightful resistance may appear. As sanctioned coercion diminishes further and partial inclusion is formally extended, cases of more complete rightful resistance become possible, as in rural China. But what about further along the spectrum? In circumstances where numerous rights are guaranteed, the rule of law is established, and political participation is unquestionably legitimate, is rightful resistance

[63] Mathiesen (fn. 19), 13, also 178, 187.

[64] Richard L. Abel, *Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle against Apartheid, 1980–1994* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 23–65; material in the rest of the paragraph is drawn from pages 62, 534, 12, 3, 541, 13, 62, 28–43, 539, 61.

[65] On "weapons of the weak," see Scott (fn. 9).

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still viable and effective? Consider Michael McCann's analysis of how women workers in the United States employed legal strategies and collective action to press for wage reforms.

According to McCann, several familiar approaches to law and social change all share a skepticism "about the value of law for empowering marginalized and even ordinary citizens."[66] Modern neorealists, he explains, often portray litigation (concerning civil rights, women's rights, environmental protection, and so forth) as a "hollow hope,"[67] a strategy flawed by the limited resources that even congenial judges can muster to implement their decisions.[68] Structuralists, on the other hand, stress the limited resources possessed by disadvantaged citizens themselves and the unlikelihood these resources will be well spent on quixotic legal battles where the probability of success is low.[69] Even many Marxist scholars emphasize how law can mystify the powerless and disguise domination, largely by imposing definitions of property advantageous to ruling groups and by sustaining dubious claims to legitimacy.[70]

Nonetheless, as McCann found in his study of the pay equity campaign in the United States, ordinary workers and movement organizers had more access to the law than he had ever anticipated. Although prevailing legal discourses and practices were at times forces that obstructed challenges to the status quo, they too could be a "source of disorder and egalitarian reordering." Litigation and other legal tactics, in other words, were potent and flexible tools that enabled women's rights activists to employ existing statutes and recognized legal symbols while still remaining somewhat separate from the prevailing legal order. By the end of his research, McCann had come to question many assumptions about the conservative impact of established legal practices and was instead drawn to evidence of inventive tactical maneuvers and "site-specific accommodations between domination and resistance."[71]

And these tactical maneuvers originated on precisely the "old ground" on which rightful resistance appears.[72] In the United States this meant appropriating a "rights talk" that had long offered reform activists a normative language for identifying, interpreting, and challeng-

[66] McCann (fn. 5), ix.

[67] Gerald N. Rosenberg, *The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[68] McCann (fn. 5), 290–93.

[69] Ibid., 293–95.

[70] For a critique of this view, see E. P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 258–61.

[71] McCann (fn. 5). Cites in the paragraph are drawn from pages ix, 12, 9.

[72] On resistance that commences on "old ground," see Alan Hunt, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies," *Journal of Law and Society* 17 (Autumn 1990), 313, 320, 324.

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ing discrimination. In particular, comparable worth advocates borrowed from a decades-old discourse about equal rights, discrimination, and segregation that had become part of everyday understandings and expectations. They then used this language to express their demands for reworked wage scales, draping calls for reform in evocative and comparatively uncontroversial appeals to fairness and equity.[73]

In the course of mastering a new tongue, pay equity activists found it advantageous to couple broad references to widely accepted values with appeals to specific laws and regulations, at both the state and the federal levels. Accordingly, movement participants drew on explicit comparable worth, pay equity, and equal pay statutes, as well as more general equal rights, antidiscrimination, civil service, and fair employment measures. Most notably, several Supreme Court decisions, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and various executive orders regarding affirmative action were all repeatedly cited when attacking wage discrimination in the courts.[74]

Established law thus offered a framework for equity activists to make sense of their circumstances and to ground their resistance. At the same time, evolving antidiscrimination norms made it possible to take advantage of the flexibility of the American rights tradition to cloak new claims in old cloth. By urging, for instance, that job evaluation methods previously used to justify hierarchy be reinterpreted to support salary increases for low-ranking workers, legal strategists appropriated "the master's tool to challenge the master." In their actions on the courtroom steps and in the courtroom alike, pay equity activists shrewdly framed even their more radical demands in terms of loyalty to established principles while professing little more than a desire to make the legal system "live up to what it was supposed to be."[75]

Breaking through the silence and pursuing their claims depended on a series of timely events—some of which occurred apart from the movement, some of which were engineered by campaign activists themselves. In the first place, the overarching political opportunity structure[76] had to change in ways that supported, or at least allowed, articulation of new claims by individuals concerned with gender justice. At the same time, early arrivals had to become aware that the political landscape had become more advantageous, and they then had to exploit

[73] McCann (fn. 5), 49, 101, 245–58.
[74] Ibid., 41, 48–50.
[75] Ibid., 298–99, 185–86, 234.
[76] For a discussion of this concept, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17–18, chap. 5.

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this realization to draw in additional participants who were willing to devote time, energy, and resources to the campaign. Both of these conditions were effectively met by the late 1970s, as more women entered the workforce, the womens' movement matured, and an accommodating Carter administration made it possible for participation in the campaign to appear sensible to prospective participants.[77]

With awareness, expectations, and organizational resources mounting, a few high-profile legal victories then helped convince even more recruits that wage structures could be altered and that a meaningful space for grassroots action had opened up. Buoyed by their successes, organizing national legal challenges and local pressure on employers became easier, as previously uninvolved workers and long-standing activists came to believe they were acting at a particularly auspicious moment, ripe with possibilities for reform.[78]

To increase their leverage and institutionalize their gains, activists also had to locate influential backers, particularly ones who would take up the cause within the federal and state governments. Among the movement's champions were a handful of government administrators who were responsive to the campaign's "realistic radicalism." Some federal officials had in fact endorsed pay equity reform from an early date: lawyers and officials in the Department of Labor and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) were instrumental in developing and initially publicizing the notion of comparable worth, whereas committees on the status of women and elected female representatives and their staffs had pressed pay equity reform in several dozen states and the U.S. Congress.[79] Other officials, however, opposed reform from the start, and withdrawal of support was not uncommon. The EEOC and federal judges, for example, were generally receptive to pay equity claims during the Carter administration, but the Reagan years brought a more hostile response to litigation and other political pressure.

To their credit, movement activists found ways to endure and even exploit their fair-weather friends in the federal government. The pay equity campaign grew, even though not a single, unambiguous judicial endorsement of its underlying comparable worth theory managed to survive appellate review. Resourceful equity advocates needed only a tiny opening for their resistance to develop a momentum of its own. Even after judicial defeats became commonplace during the 1980s,

[77] McCann (fn. 5), chap. 4.
[78] Ibid., 64, 74, 89.
[79] Ibid., 276, 52, 123–29.

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movement organizers persevered. In fact, frustration with Reagan-era interpretations of civil rights law led to a redeployment of organizational resources from legal campaigns to collective bargaining, lobbying, and other forms of grassroots collective action. And this strategic retreat seems to have catalyzed rather than retarded the movement.[80]

In the end the campaign's successes arose from using "law as a club" and "bargaining in the shadow of the law." Legal tactics heightened uncertainty, which posed risks to employers and created a favorable environment for negotiation. Although more confrontational forms of defiance were rendered impractical by the reliance on existing channels of inclusion and on advocates within the executive and judicial branches, the campaign did help alter workplace practices and promoted other efforts to enhance workplace rights, even as the movement itself was contained.[81]

The attempt to win equal pay for women workers in the United States nicely exhibits the attributes of rightful resistance:

—the reliance on established principles to anchor defiance
—the use of legitimating myths and persuasive normative language to frame claims
—the attention to existing statutes when leveling charges
—the recognition and exploitation of a newly congenial opportunity structure
—the importance of advocates, however uncertain, within officialdom
—the combination of legal tactics with grassroots collective action
—the disavowal of overtly revolutionary alternatives
—and the partial victories and built-in limitations of a form of resistance that embraces values endorsed by conscientious political and economic elites

Rightful resistance in a democracy, as illustrated by McCann, is one way that dissatisfied citizens try to make officials and business leaders "prisoners of their own rhetoric."[82] It is a form of contention ideally suited to pursue new rights claims because at its heart lies the eminently reasonable expectation that rules and norms which usually reinforce dominance should be equitably and universally enforced. Enterprising rightful resisters in a nation such as the United States have astutely recognized that legal symbols and norms create practical obligations that can be used to mobilize the discontented and to limit the abuse of power.[83] They know, along with E. P. Thompson, that for

[80] Ibid., 58, 53, 64, 85–86.
[81] Ibid., chap. 5, 140, 143, 220, 285, 232, 281–82.
[82] See Thompson (fn. 70), 263.
[83] McCann (fn. 5), 297–98.

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the law and other official norms to appear just, they must, sometimes, be just.[84]

Rightful resisters may act out of conviction or they may strategically manipulate official norms. Most often, their motivations probably combine elements of both sincerity and cynicism. Whatever the case, they are adept at picking out where claims to authority lie and at maneuvering within systems that otherwise control them.[85] They have partly cast off the "mind-forged manacles"[86] through which law reaps obedience and deference, and have recognized that the weaknesses of any would-be hegemonic ideology provide grounds for resistance.

III. Rightful Resistance, Rights Consciousness, and Political Change

Concepts may not be about outcomes, but politics is. In the final analysis, the significance of any form of popular contention depends on its effects. What consequences does rightful resistance have for those who wage it and for wider political change?

In the United States, McCann concludes, the greatest impact of the pay equity campaign was on the activists themselves: participation in the movement affected their "hearts, minds, and social identities" by transforming their "understandings, commitments, and affiliations." As previously unvoiced or whispered objections grew into loudly asserted claims, thousands of working women became proficient at generating pressure on employers and "mobilizing rights as a political resource." Rather than being lulled by the law and its ability to confer legitimacy, they broke its spell and used legal practices and institutions to create protected spaces in which to act. In the end, taking rights seriously "opened up more than closed debates, exposed more than masked systemic injustices, stirred more than pacified discontents, and nurtured more than retarded the development of solidarity." Instead of reinforcing prevailing power relations, rights advocacy sparked dialogues, vali-

[84] Thompson (fn. 70), 263. Hunt (fn. 72), 311, has also noted, in discussing Gramsci's understanding of the relationship of law to social change, that "for a hegemonic project to be dominant it must address and incorporate, if only partially, some aspects of the aspirations, interests, and ideology of subordinate groups."

[85] For this point in a different context, see Paul E. Willis, *Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* (Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1977), 26–27.

[86] Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," in Douglas Hay et al., *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England* (London: Allen Lane, 1975). Although Hay allows for resistance based on law (p. 34), he focuses on the persuasiveness of law as ideology and its contribution to legitimacy. "Mind-forged manacles" are discussed on p. 49.

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dated new ways of thinking, posed troubling questions, and spurred a desire for political change.[87]

A similar process, but with a very different starting point, may be under way in China. Even though aggrieved villagers often advance their claims using elite homilies, their actions reflect new understandings and aspirations and spring from a creative reworking of official rights talk. Enterprising Chinese villagers are busy appropriating authorized rights discourses and extending them into new areas. They are mastering the changing language of power and are demanding, in particular, that quarrels with rogue cadres be resolved like contract disputes[88]—fairly, without reference to the identities of the parties involved, and in accord with some sort of procedural regularity. Displaying an increasingly sophisticated rights consciousness, rural Chinese appear to be invoking central policies not so much because they believe existing power relations are just but because this strategy produces leverage in a world of unequal resources.[89] There is little evidence, for instance, that dissatisfied villagers are unaware of continuing exploitation or are in any way taken in by pro-peasant propaganda; instead they seem to view central policies as tools that can expose the pretensions of elites who claim to rule in their interest.

To imagine that rightful resistance can remake a political system from top to bottom is a lot to expect from a form of contention that is, by its nature, mindful and circumscribed. Lasting impacts of this form of contention are more likely to be mediated, a consequence of intensified rights consciousness in populations that are experiencing "cognitive liberation" and recognize their capacity for action is growing.[90] In the United States, McCann notes, the legacy of pay equity reform included other, more significant advances that "matched or exceeded wage gains." The movement, for instance, increased sensitivity to social wrongs and strengthened organizational ties, as pay equity became a "symbol for a broad and growing political agenda of gender based reform in the workplace." The cohesion and solidarity forged in one

[87] McCann (fn. 5), 230, 276, 232, 269.

[88] On the growing importance of contracts even in remote rural areas, see Lester Ross, "The Changing Profile of Dispute Resolution in Rural China: The Case of Zouping County," *Stanford Journal of International Law* 26 (Fall 1989), 63.

[89] This language is borrowed from McCann (fn. 5), 232. In China many villagers have shown themselves to be remarkably attentive to cadre misconduct related to birth control implementation. This is probably not because they desire conscientious enforcement of family planning but rather because any violation of a "national policy" can be used to weaken a cadre and secure high-level support. Interview with villager, 1994; interview with village cadre, 1994.

[90] On "cognitive liberation," see McAdam (fn. 11), 34.

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struggle swiftly spilled over to other, often more successful campaigns for improved child care, sexual harassment regulations, parental leave, and health care for pregnant women.[91]

In China the subversive implications of rightful resistance may reach even deeper. Apart from restraining rapacious cadres and increasing accountability, rightful resistance may also presage the stirrings of a more far-reaching counterhegemonic project. In other words, although successful rightful resistance probably enhances regime legitimacy in the short term, some villagers may graduate from combating illegal mistreatment to combating legal mistreatment. And indeed, there is already scattered evidence of rural resistance to systematic discrimination, for example, efforts to overturn household registration policies that keep villagers out of the cities.[92]

But even if many villagers embrace established values and even if officials at higher levels continue to be seen as indispensable intercessors, we should not underestimate the potential consequences of growing rights consciousness in a nation where rights have traditionally been poorly protected. Rightful resisters, in a word, are subalterns, but they may not be as constrained in thought as Gramsci suggests or as constrained in action as Scott suggests.[93] As villagers refashion and recombine familiar elements in the repertoire of contention and exploit new opportunities to press fresh claims, their defiance may extend beyond the strict constructionism that normally constrains them. When rightful resisters cite people's congresses as a model for turning villagers' representative assemblies into policy-making bodies,[94] or claim that the principle of mass line democracy entitles them to vote in party primaries,[95] or use vague clauses stipulating direct election to demand open nominating procedures, their resistance is both "loyal" and proactive.[96] It is simulta-

[91] McCann (fn. 5), 281, 271, 282, 269, 264–69.

[92] Li Kang, "Jiceng zhengquan yu jiceng shequ" (Grassroots government and grassroots community), in Li Xueju, Wang Zhenyao and Tang Jinsu, eds., *Zhongguo Xiangzhen Zhengquan de Xianzhuang yu Gaige* (Current situation and reform of Chinese township government) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 1994), 267.

[93] For Scott's reversal of Gramsci, see Scott (fn. 4), 90–91. Scott's position is complex, and some of the evidence he considers in his discussion suggests less constraint in action than his turning of Gramsci upside down implies (pp. 94–107).

[94] Interview with village party secretary, 1993; interview with deputy village party secretary, 1993.

[95] Li Jingyi, "Nongcun 'zhiluan' qishi lu" (Reflections on overcoming disorder in the countryside) (Paper by a county party secretary in Hebei Province, 1992). A shortened version of this article appeared in *Hebei Nongcun Gongzuo*, no. 8 (August 1992), 14–15.

[96] On proactive claims in rural China, see, respectively, Perry (fnn. 33, 34); and Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, "Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China," *Modern China* 23 (January 1996). On competitive, reactive, and proactive claims in rural Europe, see Charles Tilly, "Rural Collective Action in Modern Europe," in Joseph Spielberg and Scott Whiteford, eds., *Forging Nations:*

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neously a means to advance one's interests within existing limits and a way to assert new rights and pry open channels of participation that few power holders at any level could have foreseen.

Chinese policymakers have many instruments of repression but few means to co-opt the discontented or soften their demands. Politically, the huge disparity between what is promised and what villagers experience creates openings for rightful resisters to challenge blatant misconduct, obvious evasion of central intent, and flagrant violations of recognized rights. In this sense, Chinese villagers may be more like American civil rights activists of the early 1960s than like pay equity campaigners of the 1980s. Speaking both as and for people who are closer to subjects than citizens, they risk repression daily and face formidable collective action hurdles but are well positioned to "win big" (that is, to reorder power relations), provided they do not "lose big" (that is, end up being crushed by their local opponents) first.

Rightful resistance is a hardy perennial that can sprout wherever leaders make commitments they cannot keep. A partly institutionalized form of contention, it works largely within (yet at the edges of) an existing opportunity structure, and it may be more consequential than most "everyday resistance" but still less risky than uninstitutionalized defiance. Its successes come about not because its practitioners remain unobtrusive or because they are insulated from hegemonic penetration,[97] but because they openly and opportunistically engage the structure of domination (and pierce the hegemony) at its weakest point. Using the raw material at hand, rightful resisters align themselves with lawful authority, however it is constituted, and confront power holders who compromise the ideals that justify their rule. So long as a gap exists between rights promised and rights delivered, there is always room for rightful resistance to emerge.

A Comparative View of Rural Ferment and Revolt (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1976). More recently, Tilly has preferred to speak of repertoires of contention, but others continue to find value in his trichotomy. See William H. Sewell, Jr., "Collective Violence and Collective Loyalties in France: Why the French Revolution Made a Difference," *Politics and Society* 18 (December 1990), 529.

[97] On the advantages of insulation from hegemonic discourses, see James Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," *Politics and Society* 7, no. 3 (1977), 267–96. My treatment of engaging the hegemony is closer to that developed in Scott (fn. 4), 94–107; and Susan F. Hirsch and Mindie Lazarus-Black, "Performance and Paradox: Exploring Law's Role in Hegemony and Resistance," in Mindie Lazarus-Black and Susan F. Hirsch, eds., *Contested States: Law, Hegemony and Resistance* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

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Research Note

INSIGHTS AND PITFALLS
Selection Bias in Qualitative Research

By DAVID COLLIER and JAMES MAHONEY*

QUALITATIVE analysts in the fields of comparative politics and international relations have received stern warnings that the validity of their research may be undermined by selection bias. King, Keohane, and Verba have identified this form of bias as posing important "dangers" for research; Geddes sees this as a problem with which various subfields are "bedeviled"; and Achen and Snidal consider it one of the "inferential felonies" that has "devastating implications."[1]

Among the circumstances under which selection bias can arise in small-N comparative analysis, these authors devote particular attention to the role of deliberate selection of cases by the investigator, out of a conviction that a modest improvement in methodological self-awareness in research design can yield a large improvement in scholarship. The mode of case selection that most concerns them is common in comparative studies that focus on certain outcomes of exceptional

* We acknowledge helpful comments from the following colleagues (but without thereby implying their agreement with the argument we develop): Christopher Achen, Larry Bartels, Andrew Bennett, Henry Brady, Barbara Geddes, Alexander George, David Freedman, Lynn Gayle, Stephan Haggard, Marcus Kurtz, Steven Levitsky, Carol Medlin, Lincoln Moses, Adam Przeworski, Philip Schrodt, Michael Sinatra, Laura Stoker, and Steven Weber. Certain of the arguments developed here were addressed in a preliminary form in David Collier, "Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias," *American Political Science Review* 89 (June 1995). David Collier's work on this analysis at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9022192.

[1] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 116; Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," in James A. Stimson, ed., *Political Analysis*, vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 131, n. 1; and Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," *World Politics* 41 (January 1989), 160, 161. The most important general statement by a political scientist on selection bias is Christopher H. Achen, *The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-Experiments* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). See also Gary King, *Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 9.

World Politics 49 (October 1996), 56–91

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interest, for example, revolutions, the onset of war, the breakdown of democratic and authoritarian regimes, and high (or low) rates of economic growth. Some analysts who study such topics either restrict their attention to cases where these outcomes occur or analyze a narrow range of variation, focusing on cases that all have high or low scores on the particular outcome (for example, growth rates) or that all come at least moderately close to experiencing the particular outcome (for example, serious crises of deterrence that stop short of all-out war). Their goal in focusing on these cases is typically to look as closely as possible at actual instances of the outcome being studied.

Unfortunately, according to methodologists concerned with selection bias, this approach to choosing cases leaves these scholars vulnerable to systematic, and potentially serious, error. The impressive tradition of work on this problem in the fields of econometrics and evaluation research lends considerable weight to this methodological critique,[2] and given the small number of cases typically analyzed by qualitative researchers, the strategy of avoiding selection bias through random sampling may create as many problems as it solves.[3]

Notwithstanding the persuasive character of this critique, some scholars have urged caution. Authors in a recent review symposium on "The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation"[4] express reservations about efforts to apply the idea of selection bias to qualitative research in international and comparative studies. Collier argues that although some innovative issues have been raised, the resulting recommendations at times end up being more similar than one might expect to the perspective of familiar work on the comparative method and small-N analysis.[5]

[2] James J. Heckman, "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," *Annals of Economic and Social Measurement* 5 (Fall 1976); idem, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," *Econometrica* 47 (January 1979); idem, "Varieties of Selection Bias," *American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings* 80 (May 1990); G. S. Maddala, *Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Economics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Donald T. Campbell and Albert Erlebacher, "How Regression Artifacts in Quasi-Experimental Evaluations Can Mistakenly Make Compensatory Education Look Harmful," in Elmer L. Struening and Marcia Guttentag, eds., *Handbook of Evaluation Research*, vol. 1 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975); and G. G. Cain, "Regression and Selection Models to Improve Nonexperimental Comparisons," in C. A. Bennett and A. A. Lumsdaine, eds., *Evaluation and Experiment: Some Critical Issues in Assessing Social Programs* (New York: Academic Press, 1975).

[3] King, Keohane, and Verba (fn. 1), 125–26.

[4] "Review Symposium—The Qualitative-Quantitative Disputation: Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba's *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*," *American Political Science Review* 89 (June 1995).

[5] David Collier, "Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias," *American Political Science Review* 89 (June 1995).

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Moreover, Rogowski suggests that some of the most influential studies in comparative politics have managed to produce valuable findings even though they violate norms of case selection proposed by the literature on selection bias.[6]

The goal of the present article is to extend this assessment of insights and pitfalls in the discussion of selection bias, bringing to the discussion a perspective derived in part from our experience in conducting qualitative research based on comparative-historical analysis. Examples are drawn from studies of revolution, international deterrence, the politics of inflation, international terms of trade, economic growth, and industrial competitiveness.

We explore in the first half of the article how insights about selection bias developed in quantitative research can most productively be applied in qualitative studies. We show how the very definition of selection bias depends on the research question, and specifically, on how the dependent variable is conceptualized. It depends on answers to questions such as: what are we trying to explain, and what is this a case of? We also suggest that selecting cases with extreme values on the dependent variable poses a distinctive issue for scholars who use case studies to generate new hypotheses, potentially involving what we call "complexification based on extreme cases"; and we consider strategies for avoiding selection bias, as well as whether it can be overcome by means of within-case analysis, a crucial tool of causal inference for practitioners of the case-study method and the small-N comparative method.

The discussion of pitfalls in applying ideas about selection bias to qualitative research, which is the concern of the second half of the article, illustrates the difficulties that arise in such basic tasks as reaching agreement on the research question, the dependent variable, and the frame of comparison appropriate for assessing selection bias. These difficulties emerge clearly in disputes among methodologically sophisticated scholars in their assessment of well-known studies. We also examine efforts to assess the effect of selection bias within given studies by extending the analysis to additional cases, a form of assessment that is in principle invaluable but that in practice can also get bogged down in divergent interpretations of the research question and the frame of comparison. We likewise consider the relevance of the idea of

[6] Ronald Rogowski, "The Role of Theory and Anomaly in Social-Scientific Inference," *American Political Science Review* 89 (June 1995), 468–70. For a cautionary treatment of selection bias within the field of quantitative sociology, see Ross M. Stolzenberg and Daniel A. Relles, "Theory Testing in a World of Constrained Research Design: The Significance of Heckman's Censored Sampling Bias Correction for Nonexperimental Research," *Sociological Methods and Research* 18 (May 1990).

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selection bias in evaluating interrupted time-series designs and studies that lack variance on the dependent variable.

Our overall conclusion is that although some arguments presented in discussions of selection bias may have created more confusion than illumination, scholars in the field of international and comparative studies should heed the admonition to be more self-conscious about the selection of cases and the frame of comparison most appropriate to addressing their research questions. In the conclusion we offer a summary of the points that we have found most useful in thinking about selection bias in qualitative studies, and we underscore two issues that require further exploration.

I. Selecting Extreme Cases on the Dependent Variable: What Is the Problem?

The central concern of scholars who have issued warnings about selection bias is that selecting extreme cases on the dependent variable leads the analyst to focus on cases that, in predictable ways, produce biased estimates of causal effects. It is useful to emphasize at the start that "bias" is *systematic* error that is *expected* to occur in a given context of research, whereas "error" is generally taken to mean any difference between an estimated value and the "true" value of a variable or parameter, whether the difference follows a systematic pattern or not.[7] Selection bias is commonly understood as occurring when some form of selection process in either the design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic error. As we will argue below, the term selection bias is sometimes employed more broadly to refer to other kinds of error. However, the force of recent warnings about selection bias derives in important part from the sophisticated attention this problem has received in econometrics, and we feel it is constructive to retain the meaning associated with that tradition.

Selection bias arises under a variety of circumstances. It can derive from the self-selection of individuals into the categories of an explanatory variable, which can systematically distort causal inferences if the investigator cannot fully model the self-selection process. This problem arose, for example, in assessing the impact of school integration on ed-

[7] See Maurice G. Kendall and William R. Buckland, *A Dictionary of Statistical Terms*, 4th ed. (London: Longman, 1982), 18, 66; and W. Paul Vogt, *Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1993), 21, 82.

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ucational achievement, given that attendance at an integrated school could result from self-selection (or parental selection).[8] Selection bias can also arise when the values of an explanatory variable are affected by the values of the dependent variable at a prior point in time, a dilemma that Przeworski and Limongi argue may be common in the field of international and comparative studies. In analyzing the consequences of democratic as opposed to authoritarian regimes for economic growth, they suggest that successful or unsuccessful growth may cause countries to be "selected in" to different regime categories, with the result that economic performance may be a cause, as well as a consequence, of regime type, leading to biased estimates of the impact of regime type on growth.[9]

The focus of the present discussion is on selection bias that derives from the deliberate selection of cases that have extreme values on the dependent variable, as sometimes occurs in the study of war, regime breakdown, and successful economic growth. When this specifically involves the selection of cases above or below a particular value on the overall distribution of cases that is considered relevant to the research question, it is called "truncation."[10]

The Basic Problem

A discussion of the consequences of truncation in quantitative analysis will serve to illustrate the basic problem of selection bias that concerns us here. The key insight for understanding these consequences is the fact that under many circumstances, choosing observations so as to constrain variation on the *dependent* variable tends to reduce the slope estimate produced by regression analysis, whereas an equivalent mode of selection on the *explanatory* variable does not. The example in Figure 1 suggests how this occurs in the bivariate case. In this example, it is assumed that the analytically meaningful spectrum of variation of the de-

[8] Achen (fn. 1).

[9] Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (Summer 1993), 62–64; and Adam Przeworski, contribution to "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," *World Politics* 48 (October 1995). This specific problem is also referred to as "endogeneity." It merits emphasis that even if scholars resolve the concerns about investigator-induced selection bias that are the focus of the present paper, they will still be faced with the selection issues raised by Przeworski.

[10] Lincoln E. Moses, "Truncation and Censorship," in David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 15 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), 196. Moses refers to this as truncation "on the left" and "on the right." We are not concerned with other forms of truncation, which he refers to as "inner" truncation (omitting cases within a given range of values, but including cases above and below that range) and "outer" truncation (omitting cases above and below a given range). In the discussion below, when we refer to truncation, we mean left and right truncation.

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

FIGURE 1
ILLUSTRATION OF SELECTION BIAS

pendent variable Y is the full range shown in the figure, and the purpose of the example is to illustrate the impact on inferences about that full range if the analyst selects a truncated sample that includes only cases with a score of 120 or higher on Y (see horizontal line in the figure). Due to this mode of selection, for any given value of the explanatory variable X, the corresponding Y is not free to assume any value, but rather will tend to be either close to or above the original regression line derived from the full data set.[11] In this example, among the cases with a Y value of 120 or more, most are located above the original regression line, whereas only two are located below it, and both of those are close to it. The result is a dramatic flattening of the slope (the broken line) within this subset of cases: it is reduced from .77 to .18.

A crucial feature of this truncated sample is that it is largely made up of cases for which extreme scores on one or more unmeasured variables

[11] Heckman (fn. 2, 1976), 478–79.

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are responsible for producing higher scores on the dependent variable.[12] Unless the investigator can identify missing variables that explain the position of these cases, the bivariate relationship in this subset of cases will tend to be *weaker* than in the larger set of cases.

These observations can be made more concrete if we imagine that Figure 1 reports data from a reanalysis of the ideas in Putnam's *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, based on a hypothetical study of regional governments located in a number of countries. The initial goal is to explore further Putnam's effort to explain government performance on the basis of his key explanatory variable: "civicness."[13] If civicness and government performance are the two variables in Figure 1, then the truncated sample will restrict our attention to cases for which extreme scores on some factor or factors *in addition to* civicness played a larger role in explaining the high scores on government performance than they do for the full set of cases. An analysis restricted to this narrower group of cases will underestimate the importance of civicness.

This problem of underestimating the effect of the main explanatory variable will also occur if selection is biased toward the *lower end* of the dependent variable. By contrast, if selection is biased toward the higher or lower end of the *explanatory* variable, then for any given value of that variable, the dependent variable is still free to assume any value. Consequently, with selection on the explanatory variable, as long as one is dealing with a linear relationship the expected value of the slope will not change.

This asymmetry is the basis for warnings about the hazards of "selecting on the dependent variable." When scholars use this expression, a more precise formulation of what they mean is any mode of selection that is correlated with the dependent variable (that is, tending to select cases that have higher, or lower, values on that variable), once the effect of the explanatory variables included in the analysis is removed. Another way of saying the same thing is that the selection mechanism is correlated with the error term in the underlying regression model. If such a correlation exists, causal inferences will be biased. In the special case of a selection procedure designed to produce a sample that reflects

[12] It is important to emphasize that this does not involve the situation of causal heterogeneity discussed below, in which unit changes in the explanatory variables have different effects on the dependent variable. Rather, a different *combination* of extreme scores on the explanatory variables produces the high scores.

[13] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chaps. 3–4, and esp. 91–99. His term is actually "civic-ness."

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the full variance of the dependent variable, the selection procedure will not be correlated with the underlying error term, and will not produce biased estimates.

In the bivariate case, selection bias will lead quantitative analysts to underestimate the strength of causal effects. In multivariate analysis it will frequently, though not always, have this same effect. King, Keohane, and Verba suggest that, *on average*, it will lead to low estimates, which may be understood as establishing a "lower bound" in relation to the true causal effect.[14]

What If Scholars Do Not Care about Generalization?

A point should be underscored that may be counterintuitive for some qualitative researchers. Our discussion of Figure 1 has adopted the perspective of starting with the full set of cases and observing how the findings change in a truncated sample. From a different perspective, one could ask what issues arise if researchers are working only with the smaller set of cases and do not care about generalizing to the larger set that has greater variance on the dependent variable. The answer is that, if these researchers seek to make causal inferences, they should, in principle, be concerned about the larger comparison.

This conclusion can be illustrated by pursuing further the Putnam example. We might imagine that a group of specialists in evaluating government performance is concerned only with a narrower range of cases that have very good performance, that is, the cases with scores between 120 to 200. Let us also imagine that among these scholars, there is a strong interest in why Government A and Government B are, within that comparison set, so different (see Figure 1). In fact, they are roughly tied for the lowest score and the highest score on government performance, respectively. If these scholars do a statistical analysis of the effect of civicness on government performance within this more limited set of cases, they will conclude that civicness is not very important in explaining the difference between A and B. Predicting on the basis of the level of civicness, B would be expected to have a slightly higher level of government performance than A (see the dashed regression line), but the difference must be accounted for mainly by other factors.

However, if Governments A and B are viewed in relation to the full range of variance of government performance, then civicness emerges

[14] King, Keohane, and Verba (fn. 1), 130. See also Heckman (fn. 2, 1976), 478, n. 4; and Christopher Winship and Robert D. Mare, "Models for Sample Selection Bias," *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (1992), 330.

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as a very important explanation, as can be seen in Figure 1 in relation to the solid regression line derived from the full set of cases. Although both A and B are well above this regression line, they are an equal (vertical) distance above it, which means that the difference between them in government performance that would be predicted on the basis of their levels of civicness closely corresponds to the actual difference between them. While other variables are needed to explain their distance above the regression line, the magnitude of the difference in government performance between A and B appears, at least within a bivariate plot, to be fully explained by civicness. Correspondingly, the much weaker finding regarding the impact of civicness that is derived from the smaller set of cases would be viewed as a biased estimate.

Thus, even specialists concerned only with the cases of relatively high performance will gain new knowledge of the relationship *among those specific cases* by using this broader comparison. As we will discuss further below, using the broader comparison in this way is much more plausible if one can assume causal homogeneity across the larger set of cases, an assumption that our hypothetical set of specialists in government performance may not believe is viable. The crucial point for now is that their lack of interest in making generalizations is not, by itself, grounds for rejecting the idea that a larger set of cases can be used to demonstrate the presence of bias within the smaller sample. Or, to put it positively, the larger comparison increases the variance of the dependent variable and, other things being equal, provides a better estimate of the underlying causal pattern that is present in the more limited set of cases.

II. Extending the Argument to Qualitative Research

What insights into qualitative research can be derived from this argument about selection bias? In this section we consider (1) the overall implication for qualitative studies; (2) the frame of comparison against which selection bias should be assessed; (3) the relation of that frame of comparison to the problem of causal heterogeneity; (4) the question of whether within-case analysis can overcome selection bias in qualitative research; and (5) a distinctive problem entailed in the complexification of prior knowledge based on case studies.

Overall Implication

In thinking about the overall implication for qualitative research, we would first observe that the qualitative studies of concern here do not

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employ numerical coefficients in estimating causal effects. Yet there is substantial agreement that the various forms of causal assessment they employ do offer a means of examining a kind of covariation between causal factors and the outcome to be explained.[15] The examination of this covariation provides a basis for causal inferences that in important respects are parallel to those of regression analysis. Given these similarities, if qualitative scholars were to analyze the truncated sample in Figure 1, it seems likely that the dramatic reduction in the strength of the bivariate relationship that occurred in the quantitative assessment would also be reflected in the qualitative assessment. Even recognizing that causal effects are assessed in an imprecise manner in qualitative studies, it still seems plausible that a weaker causal effect will be observed and hence that the problem of selection bias will arise.

It is important to avoid either overstating or understating the importance of this problem of bias for qualitative researchers. With regard to overstating the problem, it is essential to recognize that selection bias is only one of many things that can go wrong in qualitative research, and indeed in any other kind of study. The lesson is not that small-N studies should be abandoned; qualitative studies that focus on relatively few cases clearly have much to contribute. Rather, the point is that researchers should understand this form of bias and avoid it when they can, but they should also recognize that important trade-offs sometimes emerge between attending to this problem and addressing other kinds of problems, as we will see below.

With regard to understating the problem, although particular studies will occasionally reach conclusions that are not in error, researchers must remember the crucial insight that bias is understood as error that is, on average, *expected* to occur. Figure 1 can serve to illustrate this point. If small-N analysts did a paired comparison that focused exclusively on Governments A and B, they would doubtless conclude that civicness was an important causal factor, given the large difference between the two cases in terms of both civicness and government performance. However, if we imagine a large number of such paired

[15] Discussions of these methods of inference are found in John P. Frendreis, "Explanation of Variation and Detection of Covariation: The Purpose and Logic of Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 16 (July 1983); E. Gene DeFelice, "Causal Inference and Comparative Methods," *Comparative Political Studies* 19 (October 1986); Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, Calif: JAI Press, 1985), 29–41; Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), esp. chaps. 6–8; and David Collier, "The Comparative Method," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II* (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993).

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comparisons that are restricted to the upper part of the figure, they will on average provide weaker support for an association between civicness and performance than would the full comparison set. It is this *expected* finding that is the crucial point here.

This discussion of paired comparisons also serves to underscore the point that selection bias is not just a problem of regression analysis. This argument can be made in two steps. First, paired comparison is a basic tool in qualitative studies, and it seems appropriate to assume that even though qualitative researchers may not be employing precise measurement, they will nonetheless to some reasonable degree succeed in assessing the magnitude of differences among cases. Hence, as just noted, given the different constellation of cases in the truncated sample and in the full comparison set, it is plausible that with a substantial number of paired comparisons, the full set is likely to produce an average finding of a stronger relationship. Second, the problem again arises that with truncation on the dependent variable, for any given value of X the dependent variable Y is not free to assume any value, but is restricted to a value of at least 120. This restriction in the variability of Y has the consequence that, for any paired comparison, a given difference between the two cases in terms of X is likely to be associated, in the truncated sample, with a reduced difference in terms of Y. Hence, it is appropriate to conclude that this mode of selection leads the researchers to underestimate the strength of the relationship within the truncated sample.

At the same time, qualitative researchers may view with skepticism the assumption of causal homogeneity that makes it appropriate to consider this broader comparison. In this sense, they may have a distinctive view not of selection bias itself, but of the trade-offs vis-à-vis other analytic issues. It is to this question of the appropriate frame of comparison that we now turn.

Appropriate Frame of Comparison

It is essential to recognize that the literature on selection bias has emerged out of areas of quantitative research in which a given set of cases is analyzed with the goal of providing insight into what is often a relatively well-defined larger population. In this context, the central challenge is to provide good estimates of the characteristics of that population. By contrast, in qualitative research in international and comparative studies, the definition of the appropriate frame of comparison is more frequently ambiguous or a matter of dispute. A prior

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challenge, before issues of selection bias can be resolved, is to address these disputes.

A useful point of entry in dealing with disputes about the frame of comparison is Garfinkel's concept of the "contrast space" around which studies are organized.[16] Thus, in relation to a given research question that focuses on a particular dependent variable, it is essential to identify the specific contrasts on that variable which in the view of the researcher make it an interesting outcome to explain. This contrast space vis-à-vis the dependent variable in turn helps to define the appropriate frame of comparison for evaluating explanations. For example, if a scholar wishes to understand why certain countries experience high rates of economic growth, the relevant contrast space should include low-growth countries that serve as negative cases and consequently make it meaningful to characterize the initial set of countries as experiencing high growth. In relation to this research question, the assessment of explanations for high growth should therefore be concerned with the comparison set that includes these negative cases.

This idea of a contrast space provides an initial benchmark in considering the implications for selection bias of both narrower and broader comparisons. If a given study evaluates explanations on the basis of a comparison that is *narrower* than the contrast space suggested by the research question, it is reasonable to conclude that the comparison does not reflect the appropriate range of variance on the dependent variable. To continue the above example, if the low-growth countries are not included in testing the explanation, then the scholar has not analyzed the full contrast space derived from the research question and a biased answer to the research question will result.

The other option is to use a comparison that is *broader* than would be called for in light of the contrast space of immediate concern to the investigator. A broader comparison could be advantageous because it increases the "N," which from the point of view of statistical analysis is seen as facilitating more adequate estimation of causal effects. A broader comparison that increases the variance on the dependent variable might likewise be desirable because it will produce a more adequate assessment of the underlying causal structure. However, these desirable goals must be weighed against important trade-offs that arise in the design of research.

[16] Alan Garfinkel, *Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 22–24.

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The Frame of Comparison and Causal Heterogeneity

It is useful at this point to posit a basic trade-off concerning the frame of comparison. If a broader comparison turns out to encompass heterogeneous causal relations, it might be reasonable for qualitative researchers to focus their comparisons more narrowly, notwithstanding the cost in terms of these other advantages of including more cases. Because this issue plays a crucial role in choices about the frame of comparison, we explore it briefly here.

Qualitative researchers are frequently concerned about the heterogeneity of causal relations, which is one of the reasons they are often skeptical about quantitative studies that are broadly comparative. They may believe that this heterogeneity can occur across different levels on important dependent variables: for example, the factors that explain the difference between a high and an exceptionally high level of government performance, in Putnam's terms, might be different from those that explain cases in the middle to upper-middle range. A concern with this heterogeneity might lead scholars to focus on a limited range variance for such a variable, which in turn may a pose a dilemma from the standpoint of selection bias.

The issue of causal heterogeneity is of course not exclusively a preoccupation of qualitative researchers. For example, Bartels has emphasized the critical role in the choice of cases for statistical analysis of "*a prior belief* in the *similarity* of the bases of behavior across units or time periods or contexts."[17] In fact, the crucial difference between qualitative and quantitative methodologists may not be their beliefs about causal heterogeneity, but rather their capacity to analyze it. With a complex regression model, it may be possible to deal with heterogeneous causal patterns.[18] Yet the goal of recent warnings about selection bias in qualitative research has not been to convert all scholars to quantitative analysis, but rather to encourage more appropriate choices about the frame of comparison in qualitative research. The real issue thus concerns how qualitative researchers should select the appropriate frame of comparison.

We believe that these considerations suggest a relevant standard: it is unrealistic to expect qualitative researchers, in their effort to avoid selection bias, to make comparisons across contexts that may reasonably be thought to encompass heterogeneous causal relations. Given the tools that they have for causal inference, it may be more appropriate for them to

[17] Larry M. Bartels, "Pooling Disparate Observations," *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (August 1996), 906; emphasis in original.

[18] Bartels offers an excellent example of such a model. See ibid.

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focus on a more homogeneous set of cases, even at the cost of narrowing the comparison in a way that may introduce problems of selection bias.

This specific trade-off, which is important in its own right, may also be looked at in relation to a larger set of trade-offs explored some time ago by Przeworski and Teune, involving the relationship among generality, parsimony, accuracy, and causality.[19] Studies that achieve greater generality could be seen as doing so at the cost of parsimony, accuracy, and causality. Some scholars might add yet another element to the trade-off: more general theories are also more vulnerable to problems of conceptual validity, because extending the theory to broader contexts may result in conceptual stretching.[20]

In the past two decades, thinking about the trade-off of generality vis-à-vis parsimony, accuracy, causality, and conceptual validity has gone in two directions. On the one hand, scholars engaged in new forms of theoretical modeling in the social sciences might maintain that it is in fact possible to develop valid concepts at a high level of generality across what might appear to be heterogeneous contexts, and that the models in which these concepts are embedded, if appropriately applied, can perform well across a broad range of cases in terms of the criteria of parsimony, accuracy, and causality. Hence, they may not believe that trade-offs between generality and these other goals are inevitable.

On the other hand, many scholars who believe it is difficult to model the heterogeneity of human behavior have a strong concern about the dilemmas posed by these trade-offs, are fundamentally ambivalent about generalization, are committed to careful contextualization of their findings, and in some cases explicitly seek to impose domain restrictions on their studies. From this standpoint, even important theories may sometimes apply to limited domains. These issues and choices play an important role in the examples discussed below.

Can Selection Bias Be Overcome through Within-Case Analysis?

Given the differences between quantitative and qualitative research, does qualitative methodology offer tools that might serve to overcome

[19] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1970), 20–23. "Causality" is achieved when the causal model is correctly specified. Although greater generality may at times be achieved at the cost of causality, discussions of selection bias point to the alternative view that greater generality may sometimes improve causal assessment.

[20] Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970); and David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 87 (December 1993).

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selection bias? One possibility is that within-case analysis, an important means of causal inference in qualitative studies, could address this problem. Methodological discussions of within-case analysis—which has variously been called "discerning," "process analysis," "pattern matching," "process tracing," and "causal narrative"—have a long history in the field of qualitative research.[21] This form of causal assessment tests hypotheses against multiple features of what was initially treated as a single unit of observation, and a broad spectrum of methodological writings has suggested that the power of causal inference is thereby greatly increased. Campbell, for example, has argued that within-case analysis helps overcome a major statistical problem in case studies.[22] He focuses on the issue of degrees of freedom, involving the fact that in case-study research the number of observations is insufficient for making causal assessments, given the number of rival explanations the analyst is likely to consider. Campbell shows that within-case analysis can address this problem by increasing the number of cases.

The question of concern here is whether within-case analysis can help overcome another statistical problem of case studies, that is, selection bias. In our view it cannot. As suggested for the bivariate case in Figure 1, the distinctive problem of selection bias is the overrepresentation of cases for which extreme scores on factors in addition to the explanatory variable employed in the analysis play an important role in producing higher scores on the dependent variable. To continue with the Putnam example, these might be cases for which extreme scores on one or more of his explanatory variables *other than* civicness play a greater relative role in explaining the attainment of a high level of government performance. These other variables might include economic modernization, another of his hypothesized explanations.[23] A more nuanced causal assessment based on within-case analysis would doubtless provide new insight into these specific cases, but it cannot transform them into cases among which civicness plays as important an explanatory role as it does in relation to the full range of variation. Hence,

[21] On discerning, see Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family: The Effect of Unemployment upon the Status of the Man in Fifty-nine Families* (New York: Dryden Press, 1940), esp. 135–46; on process analysis, see Allen H. Barton and Paul Lazarsfeld, "Some Functions of Qualitative Analysis in Social Research," in G. J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, eds., *Issues in Participant Observation* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969); on pattern matching, see Donald T. Campbell, "'Degrees of Freedom' and the Case Study," *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (July 1975), 181–82; on process tracing, see George and McKeown (fn. 15); on causal narrative, see William H. Sewell, Jr., "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in Terrence J. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming).

[22] Campbell (fn. 21).

[23] Putnam (fn. 13), 85, 118–19.

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within-case analysis is a valuable tool, but not for solving the problem of selection bias.

Complexification Based on Extreme Cases

Finally, we would like to suggest that one of the very strengths of qualitative research—its capacity to discover new explanations—may pose a distinctive problem, given the issues of selection bias of concern here. A well-established tradition underscores the value of case studies and small-N analysis in discovering new hypotheses and in complexifying received understandings by demonstrating the multifaceted character of causal explanation.[24] If indeed qualitative researchers have unusually good tools for discovering new explanations, and if they are analyzing cases that exhibit extreme outcomes in relation to what might appropriately be understood as the full distribution of the dependent variable, these researchers may be well positioned to provide new insights by identifying the distinctive combination of extreme scores that explain the extreme outcomes in these cases. Thus, they may discover what, from the point of view of the scholar doing regression analysis, are missing variables that help account for the biased estimates of the causal effects among these extreme cases.

However, this distinctive contribution, involving complexification based on extreme cases, may in turn leave case-study and small-N researchers vulnerable to a distinctive form of systematic error that will occur if they overlook the fact that they are working with a truncated sample and proceed to generalize their newly discovered explanations to the full spectrum of cases. This would be a mistake, given that this smaller set of cases is likely to be unrepresentative due to selection bias. Case-study and small-N researchers are often admired for their capacity to introduce nuance and complexity into the understanding of a given topic, yet in this instance readers would have ground to be suspicious of their efforts at generalization.

To summarize, whereas for the quantitative researcher the most commonly discussed risk deriving from selection bias lies in *underesti-*

[24] For a particularly interesting statement on the tendency of case studies to overturn prior understandings, see again Campbell (fn. 21), 182. On the use of case studies to discover new explanations and conceptualizations, see also Michael J. Piore, "Qualitative Research Techniques in Economics," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24 (December 1979); Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65 (September 1971), 691–92; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 104–8. Some of these themes are incisively summarized in Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 51–52.

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mating the importance of the main causal factors that are relevant for the larger frame of comparison, for the qualitative researcher an important part of the risk may also lie in *overestimating* the importance of explanations discovered in case studies of extreme observations.

III. Selection Bias vis-à-vis the No-Variance Problem

Turning to some of the pitfalls encountered in efforts to apply the idea of selection bias to qualitative research, we first review the relationship between selection bias and what we will call the "no-variance" problem. As noted above, this problem arises because qualitative researchers sometimes undertake studies in which the outcome to be explained is either one value of what is understood as a dichotomous variable (for example, war or revolution) or an extreme value of a continuous variable (for example, high or low growth rates).[25] Consequently, they have no variance on the dependent variable.

Scholars might adopt this strategy of deliberately selecting only one extreme value if they are analyzing an outcome of exceptional interest and wish to focus only on this outcome, in hopes of achieving greater insight into the phenomenon itself and into its causes. Alternatively, they may be dealing with an outcome about which previous theories, conceptualizations, measurement procedures, and empirical studies provide limited insight. Hence, they may be convinced that a carefully contextualized and conceptually valid analysis of one or a few cases of the outcome will be more productive than what they would view as a less valid study that compares cases of its occurrence and nonoccurrence. To the extent that these scholars engage in causal assessment, a frequent approach is to examine the causal factors that this set of cases has in common, in order to assess whether these factors can plausibly be understood as producing the outcome.

King, Keohane, and Verba, as well as Geddes, present as a central concern in their discussions of selection bias a critique of studies that lack variance on the dependent variable.[26] In their treatment of selection bias, these authors point to a problem of no-variance studies that is important, but that in significant respects is a separate issue. Thus, King, Keohane, and Verba argue that in studies which employ this design, "nothing whatsoever can be learned about the causes of the de-

[25] In this latter case, scholars may actually look at a range of variation at the high or low extreme of the variable, yet they treat this range of variation as a single outcome, for example, as "high" or "low" growth.

[26] King, Keohane, and Verba (fn. 1), 129; Geddes (fn. 1), 132–33.

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pendent variable without taking into account other instances when the dependent variable takes on other values."[27] They point out that because the analyst has no way of telling whether hypothesized causal factors present in cases matched on a given outcome are also present in cases that do not share this outcome, it is impossible to determine whether these factors are causal. Consequently, they see the problem with this research design as "so obvious that we would think it hardly needs to be mentioned," and suggest that such research designs "are easy to deal with: avoid them!"[28]

We believe that it is somewhat misleading to use the leverage of the larger tradition of research on selection bias as a basis for declaring that no-variance designs are illegitimate. Not only does this framing of the problem provide an inadequate basis for assessing these designs, but it also distracts from the more central problems that have made selection bias a compelling methodological issue. As noted above, the force of recent warnings about selection bias derives in substantial measure from the sophisticated attention this problem has received in econometrics, involving a concern with the distortion of causal inferences that can occur in studies based on analysis of covariation between explanations and outcomes to be explained. To the extent that these no-variance studies do not analyze covariation, this central idea is not relevant.

There is of course substantial reason for being critical of no-variance designs, given that they preclude the possibility of analyzing covariation with the dependent variable as a means of testing explanations. A concern with selection bias likewise provides one perspective for assessing these designs, as we suggested in our discussion of the bias that may arise in complexification based on extreme cases. However, this perspective is hardly an appropriate basis for the kind of emphatic rejection of no-variance designs offered by King, Keohane, and Verba. We are convinced that these designs are better evaluated from alternative viewpoints offered in the literature on comparative method and small-N analysis.

First, a traditional way of thinking about no-variance designs is in terms of J. S. Mill's method of agreement. Although this is a much weaker tool of causal inference than regression analysis, it does serve as a method of elimination that can contribute to causal assessment. Second, no-variance designs play an invaluable role in generating new in-

[27] King, Keohane, and Verba (fn. 1), 129.

[28] Ibid., 129, 130. We might add that notwithstanding this emphatic advice, these authors state their position more cautiously at a later point (p. 134). They suggest that this type of design may be a useful first step in addressing a research question and can be used to develop interesting hypotheses.

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formation and discovering novel explanations, which in terms of a larger research cycle provides indispensable data for broader comparative studies and new hypotheses for them to evaluate. Third, these designs are routinely employed in conjunction with counterfactual analysis, in which the absence of real variance on the dependent variable is compensated for by the logic of counterfactual reasoning.[29]

Given these alternative perspectives, it seems inappropriate simply to dismiss this type of design. At the same time, it is essential to look at the real trade-offs between alternative designs. If little is known about a given outcome, then the close analysis of one or two cases of its occurrence may be more productive than a broader study focused on positive and negative cases, in which the researcher never becomes sufficiently familiar with the phenomenon under investigation to make good choices about conceptualization and measurement. This can lead to conclusions of dubious validity. Nevertheless, by not utilizing the comparative perspective provided by the examination of contrasting cases, the researcher forfeits a lot in analytic leverage. In general, it is productive to build contrasts into the research design, even if it is only in a secondary comparison, within which an intensive study of extreme cases is embedded. But it is not productive to dismiss completely designs that have no variance at all.

A further observation should be made about the issue of no variance. The problem of lacking variance on a key variable is not exclusively an issue with the *dependent* variable, and studies that select cases lacking variance on the *explanatory* variable suffer from parallel limitations.[30] If investigators focus on only one value of the explanatory variable, they run the risk of (wrongly) concluding that any subsequent characteristic that the cases share is a causal consequence of the explanatory variable. Unless they also consider cases with a different value on the explanatory variable, they will lack a basic tool for assessing whether the shared characteristic is indeed an outcome of the explanatory variable under consideration. Thus, while selection bias as conventionally understood is an asymmetrical problem arising only with selection on the dependent variable, the no-variance problem is symmetrical, arising in a parallel manner with both the dependent and the explanatory variable.

[29] Collier (fn. 5), 464. On counterfactual analysis, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991), 179–80; and Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). See also John Stuart Mill, "Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry," in *A System of Logic* (1843; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

[30] King, Keohane, and Verba (fn. 1), 146, underscore this point.

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This is a further reason for distinguishing clearly between selection bias and the no-variance problem.

IV. Divergent Views of the Dependent Variable and the Research Question

Another pitfall in discussions of selection bias is suggested by the fact that even the most sophisticated scholars engaged in these discussions at times disagree about the identification of the dependent variable in a given study and about the scope of its variation. For example, a debate focused on these issues emerged between Rogowski and King, Keohane, and Verba over such well-known studies as Bates's *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* and Katzenstein's *Small States in World Markets*.[31] Because such disputes raise key issues in the assessment of selection bias, they are important for the present analysis. The general lesson suggested by these disputes is that it is crucial to consider carefully the research question that guides a given study, as well as the frame of comparison appropriate to that question, before reaching conclusions about selection bias.

We consider two examples of divergent views on whether a particular study has a no-variance design in relation to the dependent variable. In both examples, it turns out that the study in question does have variance, and to the extent that there is a problem it is not the absence of variance, but rather selection bias, more conventionally understood. In this sense, a concern with the no-variance problem appears to have distracted attention from selection bias.

Industrial Competitiveness

The first example is a critique of Michael E. Porter's ambitious book on industrial competitiveness, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*.[32] In King, Keohane, and Verba's discussion of Porter, it appears that they may have zeroed in too quickly on the no-variance problem, instead of focusing on what we view as the real issue of selection bias in this study. These authors observe that Porter chose to analyze ten nations that shared a common outcome on the dependent variable of competitive advantage, thereby "making his observed dependent variable nearly

[31] Rogowski (fn. 6), 468–70; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, "The Importance of Research Design in Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 89 (June 1995), 478–79; Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

[32] Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

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constant."[33] As a consequence, they suggest that he will experience great difficulty in making causal inferences.

Porter argues, by contrast, that national competitiveness is an aggregated outcome of the competitiveness of specific sectors and that the way to understand the overall outcome is by disaggregating it into component elements. Consequently, notwithstanding the title of his book, Porter repeatedly points out that his central goal is to explain success and failure, not at the level of nations, but rather at the level of industrial sectors; to this end, he considers both successful and unsuccessful sectors.[34] Thus, within his own framework for understanding national competitiveness, Porter does have variance on the dependent variable.

With reference to the issue of selection bias as conventionally understood, a problem does arise with the mode of case selection. Although in studying specific sectors Porter has included negative cases of failed competitiveness, he restricts his analysis to countries that, overall, are competitive, focusing on ten important trading nations which all either enjoy a high degree of international competitiveness or are rapidly achieving it. He thereby indirectly selects on the dependent variable. As a consequence, certain types of findings are less likely to emerge as important. For example, some of the explanatory factors that make particular sectors internationally competitive could also operate at the level of the national economy, tending to make the whole economy more competitive. His design is likely to *underestimate* the importance of such factors, given that the sample includes only countries at higher levels of national competitiveness.

The character of Porter's overall conclusions may well reflect this selection problem. Although his findings are multifaceted and should not be oversimplified, his conclusion does place strong emphasis on idiosyncratic explanatory factors and suggests that recommendations for improving competitiveness must be different for each country. As he states at the beginning of the final chapter, "The issues for each nation, as well as the ways of best addressing them, are unique. Each nation has its own history, social structure, and institutions which influence its feasible options."[35] Porter's design may have disposed him to reach this type of conclusion, reflecting a distinctive problem of small-N studies focused on extreme cases that we discussed above. To adapt our earlier label, it could be seen as a consequence of selection bias involving "complexification based on extreme contexts."

[33] King, Keohane, and Verba (fn. 1), 134.
[34] Porter (fn. 32), 6–10, 28–29, 33, 69, 577, 735.
[35] Ibid., 683. See pp. 21–22 for Porter's discussion of his criteria for case selection.

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In evaluating this presumed problem of bias, it is important to keep in mind the standard regarding causal heterogeneity suggested above: if Porter believed that the causal patterns he is analyzing are distinctively associated with these ten countries, by that standard it could be argued that complex trade-offs are entailed in pursuing a broader comparison and that he should perhaps not be expected to include additional cases, even if this more limited frame of comparison does produce bias. However, he in fact asserts that the patterns he has discovered are found across a much broader range of cases,[36] and consequently this standard, based on these trade-offs, is not relevant.

Two alternative strategies for case selection might have been considered here. First, to the extent that Porter is interested in broader comparisons and believes that causal patterns are homogeneous across a wider set of cases, one option would have been to select ten national contexts that reflect a full spectrum of national competitiveness. Second, if Porter is interested in focusing only on national contexts that are relatively competitive, another alternative would have been to select nations that have extreme values on an explanatory variable that is believed to be strongly correlated with national competitiveness. This procedure should yield a set of countries at a fairly high level of competitiveness. Although correlated with the dependent variable, this selection procedure would not yield the form of bias of concern here because it would not be correlated with the underlying error term, provided this explanatory variable is truly exogenous (that is, not caused in part by the "dependent" variable) and the model is properly specified. If these assumptions are not met, this procedure could introduce bias, but it might well pose fewer problems than the strategy Porter in fact employed.

International Deterrence

A second example is found in the debate stimulated by Achen and Snidal on the case-study literature on international deterrence.[37] They argue that in these studies "the selection of cases is systematically biased," in part because they "focus on crises which, in one sense or another, are already deterrence breakdowns." Thus, in relation to the alternatives of "deterrence success or failure," these studies deal almost exclusively with failure.[38] With reference to George and Smoke's major study, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, Achen and Snidal state

[36] Ibid., 675–80.
[37] "The Rational Deterrence Debate: A Symposium," *World Politics* 41 (January 1989).
[38] Achen and Snidal (fn. 1), 160, 162.

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their concern strongly: "In hundreds of pages, the reader rarely encounters anything but deterrence failures. The cumulative impression is overwhelming, and the mind tends to succumb."[39]

George and Smoke view their work and methodology differently, arguing that they are not concerned with the alternatives of successful deterrence and failed deterrence. Rather, they wish to explain variation *among* cases of deterrence failure,[40] developing a typology of three "patterns of deterrence failure": "fait accompli," "limited probe," and "controlled pressure." These patterns are distinguished "according to the type of initiative the initiator takes," and George and Smoke seek to explain the patterns in terms of factors such as the initiator's perception both of the risks entailed and of the defender's level of commitment and capabilities.[41] Hence, they do have variation on their dependent variable, in the sense that they are concerned with explaining differences in the behavior of the initiator and in how deterrence crises are played out.

However, it could also be argued that George and Smoke are seeking to explain variability at the high end of Achen and Snidal's dependent variable. It is true that George and Smoke label all of their patterns as instances of deterrence failure.[42] Yet because their pattern of fait accompli usually results in war, it could be seen as a more *complete* failure of deterrence, whereas the patterns of limited probe and controlled pressure could be seen as *less complete* failures.[43] From a standpoint that views this contrast as variability at the extreme end of the larger variable of deterrence failure, selection bias would become a concern.

We believe that a crucial issue here is different understandings of the domains across which similar causal patterns are operating, suggesting again the relevance of the standard that it may not be reasonable to expect George and Smoke to compare a broader range of cases. They argue that the "contemporary abstract, deductivistic theory of deterrence is inadequate for policy application" and see their own analysis as addressing "the kinds of complexities which arise when the United States makes actual deterrence attempts."[44] The implication is that the

[39] Achen and Snidal (fn. 1), 161; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

[40] George and Smoke (fn. 39), 513–15, 519. See also George and Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 41 (January 1989), 173.

[41] George and Smoke (fn. 39), 534, 522–36. See more generally chap. 18.

[42] Even the cases not classified as following one of their patterns are still treated as instances of deterrence failure. See George and Smoke (fn. 39), 547–48.

[43] George and Smoke's (fn. 40) subsequent discussion of these issues appears to underscore the idea of thinking of this variability in terms of gradations (p. 172).

[44] George and Smoke (fn. 39), 503.

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"kinds of complexities" they wish to study do not occur across the full set of cases, and hence that the causal patterns that arise are not homogeneous. Thus, although George and Smoke may be paying a price in terms of bias by focusing on variability at the extreme end of this larger variable, it is not reasonable to expect them to give up this comparison at the cost of abandoning their focus on the distinctive set of phenomena central to their research question. Achen and Snidal, by contrast, have a different research question. They are interested in a general deductive theory of deterrence, within a framework that appears to assume a more consistent pattern of causal relations across a broad range of cases. Given their focus, they quite appropriately see the need for a sustained analysis of deterrence success, as well as of deterrence failure.

A further cautionary observation should be made. Although George and Smoke's argument is carefully crafted, at a couple of points they appear to switch to Achen and Snidal's question. In one instance George and Smoke argue that "the oversimplified and often erroneous character of these theoretical assumptions [of deterrence theory] is best demonstrated by comparing them with the more complex variables and processes associated with efforts to employ deterrence strategy in real-life historical cases."[45] Thus, they explicitly assert that their case studies provide a test of the theory. As a consequence, the problem of complexification based on extreme cases does arise as a secondary issue in this study.

Our immediate concern here is not with whether rational deterrence theory is right or wrong, but rather with evaluating the methodological issue. If for the purpose of this discussion we were to make the assumption that the theory is right, then a study of extreme cases would be likely to identify precisely these "more complex variables and processes" that George and Smoke discovered in their case studies. As argued above, this is the finding one would expect due to selection bias, and these extreme cases, by themselves, do not offer a good test of the overall theory. Thus, we would say that George and Smoke's book is a splendid study that is extremely well designed, yet the specific assertion just quoted could be a product of selection bias.

The examples of both Porter and George and Smoke serve as a reminder that the no-variance problem may be less common and more complicated than is sometimes believed. Studies can certainly be found in which the cases of central concern do not vary on the dependent

[45] Ibid., 2. Similar statements are found on pp. 503 and 589.

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variable, and in those studies causal inference would certainly be constrained in the manner suggested above in the discussion of no-variance designs. Yet due to a scholarly instinct for "variation seeking,"[46] analysts have a strong tendency to find variation in the main outcome they seek to explain. The challenge is to link this instinct for finding variation to a stronger awareness of the kinds of variation that are likely to yield useful, and one hopes unbiased, answers to the research questions that motivate the study.

V. Assessing Selection Bias through Comparison with a Larger Set of Cases

If one believes that a given study suffers from bias, how can one assess the consequences? The central goal of Geddes' article on selection bias is to show how this can be done by comparing the inference derived from the initial set of cases with a parallel inference based on additional cases that are not selected on the dependent variable. Her analysis is built on a highly laudable commitment to the difficult task of developing the data sets that provide a basis for making these further comparisons. Moreover, the findings that emerge from her comparison with additional cases directly contradict those presented in the studies she is evaluating. Her analysis would thus seem to be a stunning demonstration of the impact of selection bias.

An examination of Geddes' analysis illustrates the diverse issues that arise in such assessments. Among the pitfalls encountered are some of the same problems of divergent interpretations considered in the previous section. Her first two examples raise questions about the choice of cases used in replicating a study and about the expected direction of bias. The other two examples are concerned with the relation between time-series analysis and the problem of selection bias.

Revolution

We first consider Geddes' analysis of Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions*, which explores the causes of social revolutions in France, Russia, and China.[47] The key issue that arises here is the role of domain specifications that stipulate a range of cases across which given causal patterns are expected to be found. Geddes' central concern about this study

[46] This is an adaptation of Tilly's term "variation finding." See Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), 82, 116–24.

[47] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

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is that although Skocpol examines contrasting cases where social revolutions did not occur, because Skocpol deliberately selected cases according to their value on the dependent variable, the test of her argument "carries less weight than would a test based on more cases selected without reference to the dependent variable." On the basis of a comparative-longitudinal analysis of nine Latin American countries, Geddes seeks to provide a more convincing test. She finds cases where the causes of revolution identified by Skocpol are present, but which did not have a revolution, and cases where the causes were not present, but a social revolution nonetheless occurred. Geddes suggests that the findings based on these new cases "cast doubt on the original argument."[48]

The question of the domain across which the analyst believes causal patterns are homogeneous is again a central issue here. In the introduction and conclusion of *States and Social Revolutions*, Skocpol argues that she is not developing a general theory of revolution and that her argument is specifically focused on wealthy, politically ambitious agrarian states that had not experienced colonial domination. She suggests that outside of this context, causal patterns will be different, in that virtually all other modern revolutions have been strongly influenced by the historical legacies of colonialism, external dependence within the world system, and the emergence of modern military establishments that are differentiated from the dominant classes. None of the Latin American countries analyzed by Geddes fits Skocpol's specification of the domain in which she believes the causal patterns identified in her book can be expected to operate. In fact, Skocpol explicitly excludes from her argument three cases (Mexico 1910, Bolivia 1952, and Cuba 1959) that Geddes includes in her supplementary test.[49] Hence, Geddes' finding that the causal pattern identified by Skocpol is not present in these Latin American cases would be consistent with Skocpol's expectations.

Two concluding observations may be made here about this assessment of Skocpol. First, it is always reasonable to question the appropriateness of a given specification of a domain of causal homogeneity, either in the overall characterization of the domain or in the inclusion or exclusion of particular countries. But Geddes does not challenge Skocpol's specification of the domain and thus does not establish the relevance of her broader comparison for Skocpol's original argument. Second, this example underscores a generic problem in efforts to assess selection bias through comparisons with a broader set of cases: if the

[48] Geddes (fn. 1), 142, 145.
[49] Skocpol (fn. 47), 33–42, 287–90.

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larger comparison extends across contexts that are causally heterogeneous, the contrasting finding derived from the additional cases may be due, not to selection bias, but rather to the presence of different causal patterns among those cases.

Newly Industrializing Countries

We next examine Geddes' analysis of studies focused on newly industrializing countries (the NICs). The interesting issue here is that in Geddes' assessment of whether bias is present, the broader comparison of cases that were not selected on the dependent variable yields the opposite finding from what one would expect if the issue were in fact selection bias. This in turn raises questions about the potential role played by the frame of comparison in contributing to this opposite finding.

In assessing the literature on the NICs, Geddes considers studies that explain high growth rates in countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, and Mexico as an outcome of "labor repression," which she understands to be the "repression, cooptation, discipline, or quiescence of labor."[50] Geddes asserts that because the sample of cases was in effect selected on the dependent variable (that is, high growth rates), one cannot assume that the relationship between labor repression and growth will characterize all developing countries.[51] To explore this hypothesis further, she develops a measure of labor repression and conducts a series of cross-national tests of its relationship to economic growth. Given the complexity and diversity of arguments in the literature on the NICs, this is a somewhat risky enterprise, but it produces results that we believe merit serious consideration, even though we are not entirely convinced by them.

Geddes points out that scholars who focus their attention on the best-known East Asian NICs thereby select a set of cases located toward the more successful end of the spectrum of growth rates. In effect, they select on the dependent variable, raising concerns about selection bias. Using her cross-national data, Geddes finds a strong relationship between labor repression and growth among seven East Asian countries (her Figure 4), but this relationship disappears when she compares a large number of Third World countries that are not selected with reference to the dependent variable. This latter finding emerges most crucially in her Figure 6, which compares twenty-one more advanced Third World countries. This restriction of the domain to the more ad-

[50] Geddes (fn. 1), 134.
[51] Ibid., 138.

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vanced countries seeks to respond to a stipulation within the literature on the NICs concerning the set of countries in which this causal relation between labor repression and growth is assumed to operate.[52] Thus, Geddes' key point is that when cases are not selected on the dependent variable, a very different finding emerges.[53]

In considering this example, we would first raise a question about the direction of bias. Geddes' conclusion that labor repression is more strongly correlated with growth within a subset of high-growth countries does not correspond to the finding one would expect on the basis of insights about selection bias. Especially in a bivariate case such as this one, selection bias should weaken, rather than strengthen, the correlation within the smaller group of high-growth countries. Given that in Geddes' analysis the difference is dramatically in the opposite direction, it is hard to believe that the issue is selection bias.

This concern leads us to take a closer look at the frame of comparison appropriate to arguments that have been made about the NICs and to the implications of this frame for the outcome of Geddes' assessment. First, we may begin by considering the contrast space suggested by the concept of the NICs. This concept is not adequately defined in much of this literature,[54] but roughly speaking it refers to a set of Third World countries that between approximately the 1960s and the 1980s experienced rapid industrial expansion and economic growth. Hence, our first observation would be that the negative cases relevant to the contrast space should include Third World countries that did *not* experience such growth during this period. Any possible objection to including non-NICs in the analysis cannot be sustained, because without such a comparison the analysis lacks a minimal, viable contrast.

Second, it would similarly not be legitimate for area specialists to object to extending the comparison beyond their region of specialization, unless there are grounds for arguing that the causal relationship is not homogeneous across a broader set of cases. In the absence of this constraint, we suggested above that even the scholar interested exclusively in a specific set of cases can gain new insight into those cases through broader comparisons.

Third, a central argument in the literature is that the causal relation

[52] Geddes (fn. 1), 135, introduces additional domain restrictions that seem highly appropriate, as in the exclusion of oil-exporting states.

[53] See Geddes (fn. 1), 135–140, and esp. Figures 4, 5, 6.

[54] This point is made by Haggard, one of the authors whom Geddes cites. See Stephan Haggard, "The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System," *World Politics* 38 (January 1986), 343, n. 1.

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between labor repression and growth applies to two specific sets of countries: (1) more economically developed Third World countries that are undergoing an advanced phase of industrialization oriented toward the domestic market; and (2) Third World countries at widely varying levels of overall economic development that are undergoing export-oriented industrialization. On the basis of this distinction, the negative cases appropriate to the first set are found among more advanced countries of the Third World, whereas in the second set, countries at a broader range of development levels are relevant. In light of this criterion, we believe that Geddes' broader comparison encompassing advanced countries of the Third World (Figure 6) is missing important cases, in that it excludes export-oriented industrializers at lower levels of development. In particular, it appears that this restriction eliminates from the analysis three of the seven countries (Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines) included in her comparison of East Asian cases (Figure 4).

Fourth, complex issues of sequencing arise in the identification of relevant negative cases. For example, one can imagine the sequence in which intense labor mobilization (that is, an utter "failure" of repression) contributes to severe socioeconomic crisis, which in turn simultaneously produces both an intense political reaction that includes a sustained period of labor repression and a sustained period of failed growth. In a cross-sectional analysis, these might be seen as cases of high labor repression and low growth that would count against the hypothesis. From a longitudinal perspective, however, these could be conceptualized as cases in which the important connection between the strength of the labor movement and low growth is consistent with the hypothesis.

On the basis of this fourth criterion, we have a further reservation about the broader comparison of advanced Third World countries (Figure 6). It appears to us that this issue of conceptualization and coding arises for two countries that may be "influential cases,"[55] in the sense that they play an important role in contributing to the near-zero correlation in this figure. Thus, Chile and Argentina could be viewed alternatively as cases where high levels of labor repression were for a substantial period associated with low growth, or, more correctly we believe, as cases where intense labor mobilization played a central role in socioeconomic crises that left a legacy of a substantial period of low growth. This same reinterpretation also appears to apply to Uruguay.

[55] See Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Regression Diagnostics: An Expository Treatment of Outliers and Influential Cases," *Sociological Methods and Research* 13 (May 1985).

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These issues of case selection, conceptualization, and coding have important implications for the contrast between the finding that emerged with the seven East Asian cases, as opposed to the broader comparison of advanced Third World countries. If the three East Asian cases that appear to be missing from Figure 6 were also excluded from Figure 4, then the strong correlation in Figure 4 would depend solely on one case, raising a concern about the contrast between the two correlations. Alternatively, if the three apparently missing East Asian cases were added to the broader comparison, and if Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay were coded according to the revised interpretation suggested above, it appears to us that the broader comparison of advanced Third World countries (Figure 6) would yield a substantial positive correlation. In either case, our tentative conclusion is that the correlations in the two figures are more similar than they initially appear to be.

In sum, the results of this assessment appear to us to be ambiguous, perhaps involving—as in the Skocpol example—issues of causal heterogeneity instead of, or possibly along with, the problem of selection bias. Nevertheless, we hope that Geddes' ambitious effort to extend the argument about the NICs can stimulate further reflection among scholars who work on this topic about the appropriate frame of comparison for making causal inferences.

Time-Series Analysis

In the final pair of examples, Geddes considers a problem of selecting on the dependent variable that can result from choosing the end point in time-series data. She begins with an interesting observation:

> The analyst may feel that he or she has no choice in selecting the endpoint; it may be the last year for which information is available. Nevertheless, if one selects a case because its value on some variable at the end of a time series seems particularly in need of explanation, one, in effect, selects on the dependent variable. If the conclusions drawn depend heavily on the last few data points, they may be proven wrong within a short space of time as more information becomes available.[56]

The treatment of this problem is a further application of Geddes' general idea of gaining new insight by extending the domain of analysis—in this case, over time. However, contrary to what she suggests,[57] this particular problem does not involve bias, in that the mistaken inference

[56] Geddes (fn. 1), 146–47.
[57] Ibid., 145.

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that can occur here involves not *systematic* error, but rather a substantial risk of *unsystematic* error. In addition, closer attention must be devoted to how these two examples relate to the methodological problem with which Geddes is concerned.

Geddes' first example of a time-series analysis is Raúl Prébisch's famous study prepared for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, published in 1950, which observed declining terms of trade for primary products between the late nineteenth century and the Second World War.[58] Geddes points out that subsequent "[s]tudies using different endpoints have failed to replicate Prébisch's results,"[59] an outcome that she considers understandable in light of the bias introduced by this mode of selection.[60] On closer examination, however, Prébisch's study is not an example of the mode of selection Geddes has in mind. In Prébisch's time series the last two data points in fact show an *improvement* in the terms of trade.[61] Thus, he was *not* drawn to an incorrect inference about declining terms of trade by the temptation to explain the final data points in the time series; consequently this is not an example of selecting on the dependent variable in the sense put forth by Geddes.

The second example concerning the end point in a time series is Hirschman's study of inflation in Chile.[62] Geddes characterizes Hirschman's study as a time-series design which attempts to show that inflation in Chile was, as Geddes puts it, "brought under control . . . as competing political groups realize[d] the futility of their competition and politicians [came] to understand the problem better." Geddes argues that Hirschman's finding is biased because the last available data before his book went to press correspond to years of particularly low inflation, that is, 1960 and 1961. She presents Hirschman's analysis as an example of the problem that researchers may be drawn to explain extreme values at the end of a time series, thereby leaving themselves vulnerable to reaching a conclusion that will soon be invalidated by subsequent data.[63]

To demonstrate that this selection procedure generated bias, Geddes extends Hirschman's original time series and produces an apparently

[58] Raúl Prébisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems* (New York: United Nations, 1950).

[59] Geddes (fn. 1), 146.

[60] Ibid., 145–47.

[61] Prébisch (fn. 58), 9.

[62] Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), originally published by the Twentieth Century Fund in 1963.

[63] Geddes (fn. 1), 147, 148.

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different conclusion. She finds that 1960 and 1961 were atypical and that inflation rates quickly returned to higher levels. Thus, an argument that learning on the part of political groups and leaders was responsible for controlling inflation seems dubious. According to Geddes, there is "no evidence that groups had learned the futility of pressing inflationary demands or that political leaders had learned to solve the problem."[64]

Geddes' extension of the time series in this example constructively points to an important finding about Chile, yet this extension of the data does not call into question the conclusion of the original study. Hirschman in fact states his conclusion with precisely the degree of caution that Geddes would prefer. Specifically, in the block quotation Geddes presents to summarize Hirschman's findings, the second ellipsis within the quote corresponds to a sentence in which he states that the *opposite* interpretation of the Chilean case can also be entertained.[65] Hirschman suggests in this omitted section of Geddes' quote that actors may *not* come to understand the problem better, and that, in his words, "nothing is resolved."[66] Given what Hirschman in fact says at this point, his study should be cited as a model of an appropriately cautious interpretation of time-series data.

Looking beyond these two examples, we would reiterate that the problem of evaluating a fluctuating time series presented here is extremely important, but is really not an issue of selection bias as conventionally understood. Other scholars have approached this problem on the basis of the literature that grew out of Campbell and Stanley's classic book on interrupted time-series designs, and these issues are more appropriately addressed with the array of methodological tools offered by this literature.[67]

To conclude this part of our discussion, although we have misgivings about Geddes' specific arguments regarding selection bias, we believe that this kind of effort to test the arguments derived from earlier studies against broader frames of comparison represents an indispensable means of exploring the generality and validity of any given finding. As such it is an essential component of scholarship.

[64] Ibid., 147.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Hirschman (fn. 62), 223.
[67] Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), 37–43, esp. Figure 3; Donald T. Campbell and H. Laurence Ross, "The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time-Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis," *Law and Society Review* 3 (August 1968); Francis W. Hoole, *Evaluation Research and Development Activities* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978); Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, *Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), chap. 2.

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VI. Conclusion

The problems addressed here are complex, requiring the attention of scholars with diverse skills and analytic perspectives. Our goal has not been to definitively resolve these problems, but to raise issues that may help qualitative researchers in thinking about selection bias. By way of conclusion, we offer an informal summary of basic observations that may be useful to qualitative researchers, followed by two suggestions about issues that require further attention.

First, selection bias is indeed a common and potentially serious problem, and qualitative researchers in international and comparative studies need to understand the consequences of selecting extreme cases of the outcome they wish to explain. Even if researchers are convinced that they have no interest in generalizing to a larger set of cases that encompass greater variance on their dependent variable, selection bias can still be an issue—a dilemma that may seem counterintuitive to some qualitative analysts, but one that is essential to understand. Selection bias can also be an issue if the cases under study appear to have a full range of variability on the outcome to be explained, but the investigator chooses to study these cases in contexts that have extreme scores on a closely related outcome. Likewise, although within-case analysis is an important tool of causal inference in case-study and small-N research, it does not serve to overcome selection bias.

Second, selection bias may raise somewhat distinctive issues in case studies and small-N comparative analyses that focus on extreme cases on the dependent variable. For the scholar doing quantitative analysis the problem in analyzing such cases is, on average, that of *underestimating* the main causal effects that are under investigation. By contrast, for case-study and small-N analysts, given their tendency to discover new explanations, the risk may also lie in *overestimating* the importance of explanations discovered in case studies of extreme observations, involving what we called complexification based on extreme cases. However, if these analysts recognize the way in which extreme cases are *expected* to be distinctive, their inclination toward complexification can lead to invaluable insights into those cases and into their relation to a broader set of observations.

Third, a recurring problem in assessing selection bias in qualitative research is to define the frame of comparison against which the full variance of the dependent variable should be assessed. A point of entry is to understand the contrast space that serves to identify the relevant negative cases that should be included in the comparison. A further

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standard might restrict the frame of comparison to domains which the investigator presumes are characterized by relatively homogeneous causal patterns. This standard may be seen as relevant in light of the potential trade-off between the advantage of broader comparisons that may encompass greater variance on the dependent variable and thereby avoid selection bias, and the advantage of narrower comparisons in which the investigator focuses on cases that are more causally homogeneous, and hence more analytically tractable. This specific trade-off can be looked at in the larger framework of potential trade-offs between generality and the alternative goals of parsimony, accuracy, causality, and conceptual validity. At the same time, it is essential to recognize that different scholars have contrasting views of whether these really are trade-offs, and consequently of the degree of generality that they believe it is possible and appropriate to achieve. Regardless of how particular scholars view these trade-offs, it is invaluable for them to state explicitly their understanding of the appropriate frame of comparison and what considerations led them to select it.

Fourth, the practice of assessing the findings of previous research through comparisons with larger sets of cases that exhibit greater variance on the dependent variable is a valuable way of exploring the role of selection bias in an initial study, and scholars should be open to appropriate efforts to make such larger comparisons. However, these broader assessments are subject to numerous pitfalls, and the standards about the scope of comparison just discussed provide an essential framework in which such broader assessments should be conducted.

Fifth, strategies are available for avoiding selection bias through informed choices about research design. Unfortunately, in small-N studies random sampling may produce more problems than it solves. An alternative approach is nonrandom sampling that deliberately produces a sample in which the variance on the dependent variable is similar to its variance in the larger set of cases that provides a relevant point of reference. If investigators have a special interest in cases that have high scores on the dependent variable, another solution may be to select cases that have extreme scores on an *explanatory* variable that they suspect is strongly correlated with the dependent variable. This should yield a set of cases that has higher scores on the dependent variable, and if this explanatory variable is then incorporated into the analysis, selection bias should not occur, although other risks of bias and error may arise.

Finally, another pitfall is encountered when the idea of selection bias is used as a criterion in evaluating types of research that really involve different issues. Qualitative designs that lack variance on the dependent

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variable are vulnerable to selection bias, as in the problem of complexification based on extreme cases. However, we are convinced that selection bias is not the central issue in evaluating such designs and that this perspective provides an inappropriate basis for completely dismissing them. Similarly, research that follows the selection procedure of focusing on one or a few distinctive values at the endpoint of time-series data runs a substantial risk of error, but it is not the specific form of systemic error entailed in selection bias.

In addition to offering these summary observations, we would like to focus on two issues that especially require further exploration. The first concerns the proposed standard of using causal homogeneity as a criterion for restricting the domain of analysis. A central point of reference among scholars who have tried to apply the idea of selection bias to qualitative studies has been an understanding of similarities and contrasts between how qualitative researchers conduct their work and certain ideas associated with regression analysis, including a probabilistic view of causation.[68] The standard concerning causal homogeneity derives from the idea that it would be very difficult for qualitative researchers to analyze heterogeneous causal relations in a manner parallel to that employed by quantitative researchers. However, a very different perspective on these issues is found in Charles Ragin's *The Comparative Method*, which takes as a point of departure the assumption of causal heterogeneity and analyzes this heterogeneity through a logic of necessary and sufficient causes, using Boolean algebra.[69] Scholars who think about causation in terms of a probabilistic regression model and who reject the idea of necessary and sufficient causes would do well to give some consideration to the issues raised by this alternative perspective.

The second unresolved issue involves rival interpretations of what we have called complexification based on extreme cases. The problem is how to interpret the finding that emerges when case-study or small-N analysts who have selected extreme cases on the dependent variable claim to have discovered that a distinctive combination of explanatory variables accounts for the extreme scores of these cases. One interpretation is that this will routinely appear to be the case, as long as the units under study have extreme scores on the dependent variable. How-

[68] For two perspectives on the role of probabilistic causation in small-N analysis, see Stanley Lieberson, "Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases," *Social Forces* 70 (December 1991), 309–12; and Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 20.

[69] Ragin (fn. 15).

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ever, an alternative interpretation would be that this finding could in fact reflect genuine causal heterogeneity. That is to say, for the extreme cases on this *particular* dependent variable, unit changes in the explanatory variables would actually have *different* causal effects.

Procedures for sorting out these alternative interpretations in qualitative studies would provide a new basis for assessing, for example, the claim by qualitative analysts of international deterrence that one should focus on a distinctive set of explanations in studying cases of international crisis. Such procedures could be an important addition to the tools available for evaluating case-study evidence.

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Review Articles

ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL TRANSITION IN AFRICA

The Quest for a Politics of Development

By PETER M. LEWIS*

Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds. *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 573 pp.

Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds. *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992, 329 pp.

Adebayo Olukoshi, ed. *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*. London: James Currey; Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann Educational, 1993, 144 pp.

Donald Rothchild, ed. *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 285 pp.

Richard Sandbrook. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 170 pp.

Jennifer Widner, ed. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, 307 pp.

AFRICA'S DUAL CRISES

AT the beginning of the 1980s the economies of sub-Saharan Africa were in precipitous decline. A combination of economic mismanagement and adverse global trends yielded a downward spiral that undermined growth, hindered production, and fostered deepening poverty in dozens of countries. The region's per capita gross domestic product declined at an average rate of 2.8 percent from 1980 to 1987. At least nine countries registered null or negative growth rates during the same period.[1] Numerous economies witnessed declining agricul-

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[1] On the dimensions of the African crisis, see John Ravenhill, ed., *Africa in Economic Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1989).

World Politics 49 (October 1996), 92–129

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tural and industrial output as Africa's share of world exports shrank by a fifth from the preceding decade.

Mounting foreign debt, acute fiscal pressures, and a retreat of global capital led many countries to the doorsteps of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as lenders of last resort.[2] Under the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors, numerous governments instituted economic stabilization and structural adjustment programs. More than ten years of conditional lending to Africa yielded hesitant recovery in several countries but few cases of consistent adjustment and no genuine exemplar of revitalized production or self-sustaining growth.[3] Throughout its diffident course of reform, Africa as a region has become increasingly marginal to the international economy, largely shunned by international investors and commercial lenders, with control over a fraction of global trade, and saddled with a severe debt overhang that depletes investable resources.

Well into the second decade of structural adjustment efforts in Africa, there is broad recognition that the orthodox agenda has registered meager success in the region.[4] Contending explanations for failed reform have alternately stressed African governments' weak adherence to necessary policies or the flawed premises of neoclassical prescriptions promoted by donors. A growing body of evidence, however, has underscored the political origins of continued economic malaise in Africa. It is now abundantly clear that macroeconomic balance and changes in relative prices are essential but insufficient to reorient African economies toward more productive and dynamic trajectories.[5] Much as they fostered the region's initial descent, the accumulation strategies of political elites and the weak capacities of African states have also shaped the dynamics of attempted reform.

[2] David Gordon, "Debt, Conditionality and Reform: The International Relations of Economic Policy Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Callaghy and Ravenhill. For a general treatment of the international debt regime, see Miles Kahler, ed., *The Politics of International Debt* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[3] This conclusion is reflected in the World Bank study, *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). See also Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye, *Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1991).

[4] In a study of economic reform in twenty-nine countries in Africa, the World Bank concluded that structural adjustment measures had not been substantially implemented by most countries of the region; see *Adjustment in Africa* (fn. 3). The report attempted to correlate the extent of recovery among countries with their degree of adherence to orthodox reforms. In a dissenting view reflecting on earlier studies by the World Bank, Paul Mosley and John Weeks argue that structural adjustment policies cannot be correlated with relative economic performance and that the spread of IFI programs has not appreciably aided recovery in the region. See "Has Recovery Begun? Africa's Adjustment in the 1980s Revisited," *World Development* 21, no. 10 (1993).

[5] John Ravenhill, "A Second Decade of Adjustment: Greater Complexity, Greater Uncertainty," in Callaghy and Ravenhill, 27.

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A second regional crisis—this time, political in character—emerged at the end of 1989. Concurrent with the East European revolutions and liberalization in South Africa, a wave of political opposition and regime change swept the African continent. Almost instantaneously, activists and demonstrators in dozens of countries voiced a broad-based repudiation of predatory authoritarian rule. During the next five years, more than forty military or single-party regimes, responding to domestic and international pressures, liberalized their political arenas or staged transitions to competitive electoral government.[6] By 1995 at least fifteen nominal democracies had emerged, while two dozen other countries had taken steps toward multiparty electoral systems. In the wake of initial exhilaration over "Africa's second independence," the consequences of political change have proven as ambiguous as the results of economic reform. Challenges to the old regime have produced an array of outcomes, ranging from democratic transition in Zambia and Benin to political deadlock in Zaire and Togo, civil catastrophe in Rwanda and Burundi, and state collapse in Somalia and Liberia.

Africa is now enmeshed in dual crises as the dilemmas of economic transformation and growth are intertwined with the struggle for capable and legitimate government. Through circumstance or design, numerous countries are currently engaged in coincidental, though rarely parallel, transitions from economic statism and authoritarian rule toward undefined and often elusive objectives. Amid the growing regional diversity of the developing world, Africa often appears sui generis as an area gripped by intractable economic stagnation and political decay. As a seeming outlier, Africa nonetheless offers insight into the relations between economic and political restructuring and the difficulties of transition from predatory to developmental regimes.

Although there has been general recognition of the momentous changes in the region, there is little consensus on their scope, correlations, or trajectories. The books reviewed here are among the leading efforts to address these questions. Nearly all are edited collections, reflecting the array of experiences within Africa and the equally varied perspectives brought to bear on the area's diverse transitions. Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill's *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline* offers the most comprehensive vantage on the course of eco-

[6] The changes are discussed by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 24 (July 1992); and Richard Joseph, "Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 4 (1991). See also the periodical *African Demos*, especially vol. 3 (March 1995).

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nomic and political change, and it is also among the more analytically ambitious efforts to appear in this area in recent years. Donald Rothchild's *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery* and Adebayo Olukoshi's *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria* each examine the process of economic reform in the context of a single significant case though from divergent analytic perspectives. Richard Sandbrook's *The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery*, a briefer theoretically informed essay, addresses the interactions between political and economic liberalization while exploring alternative paths of renewal. *Politics and Governance in Africa*, edited by Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, is concerned with aspects of political authority, community, and opposition in Africa, while Jennifer Widner's collection, *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa,* focuses on the implications of the dual crises and political transition.

Since the earliest appearance of economic distress, scholars and practitioners have engaged in animated debate over the sources of decline and the recourse for recovery in Africa. These unresolved controversies have converged on the relations among economic transformation, institutional capacity, and the social bases of state power. We now have a lucid account of the failings of African economic development and the central impediments to reform. Yet we lack a general framework for understanding the process of political change in the region or the implications of political liberalization for economic performance. After sketching the intellectual setting for discussions of the origins of economic crisis, this essay will focus on the quest for a politics of development in Africa.

The Origins of Crisis: Contending Perspectives

To a significant extent the dialogue over Africa's political economy has been framed by the leading international financial institutions (IFIs), especially the World Bank, and by African regional organizations, notably the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). This exchange exemplifies the contention between neoclassical and structuralist analyses of economic development. Each perspective provides divergent explanations for economic decline and offers correspondingly different strategies for recovery. Owing largely to the commanding resources of the IFIs, neoclassical prescriptions have predominated in Africa, yet the structuralist paradigm continues to exert significant influence among the region's decision makers and intellectuals.

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This protracted controversy has been noteworthy for its relative inattention to politics.[7] Neither analysis adequately addresses the question of how governments develop the capacity to foster economic growth nor looks at the equally urgent issue of how developmental coalitions might emerge among state elites and societal groups. Academic analysts, largely from outside the region, have attempted to provide these missing political components.

The neoclassical version of African decline ascribes economic failure to the inappropriate policy choices of postindependence regimes. The World Bank, in the now notorious "Berg Report," diagnosed the regional economic malaise and issued a sweeping injunction for reform.[8] The observed facts were uncontroversial: at the end of Africa's second postindependence decade, most countries in the region experienced the stagnation or decline of growth rates, the erosion of per capita incomes, deindustrialization, food shortfalls, sluggish exports, chronic fiscal deficits, and mounting external debt.[9] More contentious was the report's ascription of these problems to a common syndrome of economic statism pursued by governments of diverse ideological stripes. Statist policies fostered excessive government intervention in domestic markets, bloated and profligate public sectors, protectionism and restrictive investment regimes, and a widespread bias against agriculture. Common recourse to overvalued exchange rates, price controls, subsidies, uncontrolled spending, and heedless foreign borrowing created debilitating economic distortions. Cumbersome administrative regulations stifled trade and investment. The neoclassical prescription for recovery was blunt: get the state out of the market and reintegrate African economies into the global economy.

The structuralist counterpoint, as articulated by African regional organizations, offers a divergent interpretation of the continent's decline.[10] Economic stagnation is attributed mainly to the legacy of colonial development and to Africa's position as a subordinate and de-

[7] Crawford Young, "Democratization in Africa: The Contradictions of a Political Imperative," in Widner, 232.

[8] Elliott Berg served as principal author for the report, published by the World Bank, as *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981).

[9] See also Ravenhill (fn. 1).

[10] Although dependency theory continues to hold sway in much current intellectual discourse on Africa, the prevailing view among policymakers is structuralist, as most contemporary African elites reject dependency theory's emphasis on class struggle and redistributive strategies. The dependency literature on Africa is extensive and largely tangential to the present discussion. Relevant application of the perspective can be found in Bade Onimode, *A Political Economy of the African Crisis* (London: Zed Books, 1988). The mainstream structuralist view is outlined in *African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation* (*AAF-SAP*) (hereafter cited as *AAF-SAP*) (Addis Ababa: UN Economic Commission for Africa, 1989).

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pendent region in the international division of labor.[11] The disarticulation of African economies and their reliance on primary commodity exports are adduced as central impediments to dynamic growth. Structuralists trace the crisis of the early 1980s to accumulating debt and deteriorating terms of trade, both factors deemed beyond the control of debtor governments. Rising energy prices, falling returns for nonenergy exports, and an inflexible creditor regime have been the central agents of adversity. The consequent remedies are to be found mainly in amending the international economy: key measures include the forgiveness of debt, an increase in concessional finance, and the reform of global commodity markets to improve access and sustain prices. At the domestic and regional levels, structuralists call for increased state investment and protection, more efficient regulation, and the promotion of regional integration schemes to foster collective self-reliance.[12]

These perspectives offer equally unsatisfactory explanations of the African predicament. The policy prescriptions of the neoclassical school are subject to debate on economic grounds, but more importantly they beg the central questions of where policies come from, how they are sustained and implemented, and how they might change.[13] Neoclassical analysis regards the state as institutionally static and assumes the presence of frictionless markets.[14] The politics of adjustment, driven by instrumental calculation among affected sectors, presents a simple schematic picture. Faced with the redistributive effects of liberalization, a narrow coalition of bureaucrats and urban rent-seeking groups might resist reform. A countervailing alliance of reformist technocrats and potential beneficiaries, however, notably rural producers and export-oriented manufacturers, will exert growing political pressure in support of adjustment.[15] In sum, the productive response to adjustment is facile, and changing economic interests create a constituency to sustain liberalization.

[11] See Adebayo Adedeji, "An Alternative for Africa," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Economic Reform and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

[12] *AAF-SAP* (fn. 10).

[13] For a range of critical assessements of orthodox policies, see Lance Taylor, *Varieties of Stabilization Experience* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Christopher Colclough and James Manor, eds., *States or Markets? Neo-Liberalism and the Development Policy Debate* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); and Frances Stewart, Sanjaya Lall, and Samuel Wangwe, eds., *Alternative Development Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1992).

[14] For a critique of the neoclassical view of institutions, see Thráinn Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[15] See Richard Westebbe, "Structural Adjustment, Rent-Seeking and Liberalization in Benin," in Widner.

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This portrait of reform bears scant resemblance to the actual political dynamics at work. The orthodox agenda has encountered ready opposition from threatened elites and popular groups yet garnered only wary acquiescence from most of its potential constituents.[16] Confronted with a host of political hazards in the implementation of austerity measures, African regimes have frequently curtailed or abandoned reform. The neoclassical image of a fluid market response to policy incentives has proven equally quixotic. Government institutions are unequal to the complex administrative demands of reform, while production and investment have been impeded by social fragmentation, weak human capital, and an ailing infrastructure. Lacking an institutional understanding of economic growth or a viable theory of politics, the IFIs were generally unprepared for the erratic pace of economic reform in sub-Saharan Africa and the tepid supply response to price incentives and market liberalization.[17]

Contrasting perspectives fare little better in projecting a feasible path of recovery. Despite its emphasis on economic structure and state agency, the structuralist paradigm reflects a curiously naïve prescription for institutional change. Structuralists misconstrue administration as control, thus conflating the creation of regulatory instruments with their presumed efficacy. Their calls for more effective government oversight and regional economic coordination are premised upon two particularly dubious assumptions: an improved revenue base from either domestic or external sources, and a renewed commitment to development on the part of governments.[18] African regional organizations and their intellectual allies offer no design for enhancing institutional performance amid the stubborn reality of financial constraints. Nor can they explain why corrupt and ineffectual regimes throughout the region should suddenly demonstrate greater developmental resolve.

Political Explanations of Economic Decline

Political analysts have offered an alternative model of economic decline. This perspective, rooted primarily in the Weberian tradition of

[16] On the politics of reform, see Mosley, Toye, and Harrigan (fn. 3), 300; see also Joan Nelson, ed., *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). See also Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," *American Economic Review* 81 (December 1991), 1147; and Barry Weingast, "Political Impediments to Economic Reform" (Manuscript, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, October 1993).

[17] Ravenhill (fn. 5), 20. On the political myopia of the international financial institutions, see also Jeffrey Herbst, "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa," *World Development* 18, no. 7 (1990).

[18] Nicolas van de Walle, "Adjustment Alternatives and Alternatives to Adjustment," *African Studies Review* 37 (December 1994).

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historical sociology, also draws upon recent theories of the state in developing countries.[19] From this vantage the central causes of economic degeneration are found in the prevalence of weak authoritarian regimes in Africa and in the constellation of patron-client relationships providing the foundations of rule throughout the region.[20] Elite interests and popular distributive pressures have fostered detrimental public policies, while institutional deficiencies undermine official economic management and private accumulation. These factors also pose impediments to sustained economic reform.

Statecentric analyses highlight the prevalence of neopatrimonial regimes throughout sub-Saharan Africa, so called because they reflect the outward features of institutionalized administrative states while operating essentially along patrimonial lines.[21] Though rooted in historical patterns of authority and social solidarity, neopatrimonial rule emerged during the postindependence era as African leaders consolidated their fledgling regimes through an array of personal linkages and patron-client networks. Beneath the veneer of formal bureaucracy, legal procedure, and constitutional order inherited from the colonial state, neopatrimonial states have been organized by kinship, faction, and clientage. Power in such regimes is concentrated and personalized, entailing discretionary control over broad realms of public life. The personal prerogatives of the ruler typically eclipse the authority of laws and organizations, fostering a weak and unstable institutional arena.[22] Owing to the large measure of material inducement inherent in patron-client systems, neopatrimonial regimes require a regular flow of resources to elite loyalists and strategic coalitional groups.

This legacy of state formation carries important consequences for economic development. While neopatrimonial rule has often provided a resilient mechanism for stabilizing governments, it has created weak

[19] See, for example, Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). See also Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa* (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1993); and Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

[20] See, for example, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Richard Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Thomas Callaghy, "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria," in Nelson, ed. (fn. 16); and Bayart (fn. 19).

[21] See Weber (fn. 19); Christopher Clapham, ed., *Patronage and Public Power* (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transition in Africa," *World Politics* 46 (July 1994); and Peter M. Lewis, "Economic Statism, Private Capital, and the Dilemmas of Accumulation in Nigeria," *World Development* 22 (March 1994).

[22] Jackson and Rosberg (fn. 20).

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vessels for economic growth. Such regimes find it difficult to muster the political autonomy necessary to pursue a long-term project of accumulation, and they lack the organization to manage the demands of a dynamic economy.[23] Exclusionary authoritarian governments have tended more toward economic predation than developmentalism, and the powerful distributive pressures inherent in clientalist systems encourage the consumption and redistribution of public resources rather than savings or investment. The institutional weakness of African states renders them largely incapable of resolving the collective-action dilemmas at the core of economic development.[24] Absent rudimentary guarantees of the rule of law, African states are ill-equipped to secure property rights or enforce contractual relations in market economies.[25] They lack the faculties to exert coherent macroeconomic guidance, and they possess neither the authority nor the administrative sophistication to structure markets, encourage entrepreneurship, or discipline private actors. Comparable dilemmas of state capacity have proven equally frustrating in the pursuit of socialist development strategies.[26]

The statecentric model outlines a compelling logic of political management at variance with the requisites of capital accumulation, and it captures the essential infirmity of African regimes amid the challenges of economic reform. The need for continued discretionary control over resources encourages pervasive regulatory intervention and arbitrary bureaucratic meddling in markets. The incessant unpredictable budgetary demands of patronage politics subvert accountability and probity in state finance. Indeed, the distinctions between public and private realms of expenditure or wealth have been largely obscured as government elites and commercial cronies contend over state-mediated resources. Nominally private economic interests are typically co-opted by government officials through rent-seeking opportunities, illicit activities, and public patronage.[27] These practices have undermined the emer-

[23] Nicolas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa, with an Illustration from Cameroon," in Widner, 134–35.

[24] Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention," in Rueschemeyer, Evans, and Skocpol (fn. 19); see also Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[25] See Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Eggertsson (fn. 14).

[26] See Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

[27] Richard Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Catherine Boone, "The Making of a Rentier Class: Wealth Accumulation and Political Control in Senegal," *Journal of Development* 26 (April 1990).

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gence of autonomous domestic capitalist classes. Moreover, in most countries the predominant urban composition of the ruling coalition fostered a pervasive bias against rural producers, while reliance upon ethnic allegiances has fragmented markets and economic groups.[28]

The inherent liabilities of economic management in neopatrimonial systems already produced a slackening of economic growth by the late 1970s, when the converging impact of international price shocks, declining export demand, and rapidly bunching debt yielded collapse in dozens of countries. In the face of inescapable budgetary pressures, African regimes reluctantly acceded to the liberalizing reforms advocated by IFIs and donors, yet they often evinced scant commitment to the agenda of adjustment. The exigencies of political control frequently contradicted the requirements of orthodox economic reform.[29] As the donor community exhorted debtor governments to retreat from domestic markets and enhance economic efficiency, African leaders struggled to retain access to patronage resources and outlets for rent-seeking. The resultant patterns of partial and intermittent reform were logical consequences of the political dynamics specified in statecentric analysis.

The explanatory value of state theory is evinced by the fact that other analysts have increasingly adopted its insights. By the end of the 1980s both the World Bank and the UNECA pointedly recognized the role of governance in economic recovery, and they called for more responsible and participatory government as a requisite for development.[30] The bank has also underscored the need to create a favorable institutional "enabling environment" for investment and entrepreneurship. The donor community seeks to bolster these prescriptions by providing resources for "capacity building" in African governments and by explicitly linking economic reform to political liberalization.[31] However imperfectly it has been translated into policy, there has been a greater conceptual focus on the political foundations of growth.

[28] Joseph (fn. 27); and Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). See also Larry Diamond, "Class Formation in the Swollen African State," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (1987); Paul Kennedy, *African Capitalism: The Struggle for Ascendancy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Bayart (fn. 19).

[29] Gordon (fn. 2), 115. On the political logic of reform, see Callaghy (fn. 20); and Weingast (fn. 16). See also Merilee S. Grindle and John W. Thomas, *Public Choices and Policy Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); and John Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994).

[30] World Bank (fn. 1); see also Goran Hyden, "Governance and the Study of Politics," in Hyden and Bratton, 5.

[31] World Bank (fn. 1).

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The Elusive Politics of Recovery

African countries confront the historical challenge, familiar from other regions, of building developmental states. For most countries, this entails the establishment of legitimate public authority, the assertion of societal interests committed to productive accumulation, and the construction of an institutional framework that can guarantee property and facilitate exchange.[32] While there is some accord that changes in the nature of government tutelage are necessary for economic recovery, there is little agreement on the feasible contours of an African developmental state. Against the donors' vision of a liberal minimalist government and the structuralists' longing for a progressive populism, statecentric analysts have offered an archetype derived mainly from the high-performing East Asian economies. While some aspects of this model (for instance, greater political insulation of economic policymakers) could reasonably be achieved in African countries, the extensive coordinated economic interventions of the East Asian states are well beyond the administrative faculties of most African governments. Also, the dynamic phase of Asian transformation occurred under stable authoritarian regimes, an increasingly untenable political setting in Africa. In short, a more appropriate institutional design must be articulated with attention to the region's contextual factors.

Moreover, the path of transition in African political economies remains obscure. Comparative experience suggests that transformative shifts often follow sweeping social and political dislocation, such as war or depression. Amid the widespread economic shocks and political transitions in Africa during the last decade, there would seem to be opportunities for significant change. Nonetheless, African countries reflect powerful structural legacies of poverty, dependence, social division, and autocratic rule. In addition, the potential agents of transformation—political leaders and societal interests—are organizationally weak. Among the studies considered in this essay, it is difficult to identify a theory of change that would outline an African recovery. Normative prescriptions have not been buttressed by a "positive politics" of reform. Such an analysis must address the coalitions underlying political regimes and the institutional context of rule.

Prevailing statecentric approaches, which generally focus on elite politics and patron-client relations, have inadequately captured the shifting terrain of social coalitions in many African countries. Eco-

[32] Sandbrook (fn. 20), 54–55.

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nomic reform is not effected simply by the volition of political leaders. More basically, the reform process is a reflection of broader relations between state and society. The abilities of state agencies to make autonomous policy decisions are conditioned by their relations with societal interests. In addition, the capacity to implement economic policies is contingent upon compliance from investors and producers.[33] The terms of popular representation in political institutions and the disposition of policymakers toward economically salient classes create a setting for inertia or change. A decisive question in Africa's liberalizing countries is whether emergent coalitions of interest can eclipse prevailing neopatrimonial formations and sustain a shift in economic strategy toward productive accumulation.[34]

In addition to understanding shifts in coalitions, strategies for economic recovery also require a more specific conception of the institutional requisites for investment and capital formation. Political analysts have recently devoted greater attention to the impact of institutions on economic performance, yet they have generally failed to specify a theory of institutional change as part of the reform problematic.[35] Neoclassical theorists call for a brusque contraction of state agencies, while structuralists seek to preserve or even extend the scope of administrative control. State theory, by contrast, outlines the general conditions for more efficacious government intervention, yet it does not provide a model for restructuring or invigorating public functions. It is more concerned with outcomes or ideal types than with the process of institution building. The conundrum of reforming existing state structures amid the inevitable constraints of economic austerity is unresolved.

In approaching these issues, an overview of leading inquiries into economic and political restructuring provides an essential background. Among the diverse volumes discussed here, several prominent themes reflect a logical, and historical, sequence of issues. The first issue involves *the commitment to reform*: What are the effects of prolonged eco-

[33] Issues of state capacity and state-society relations are discussed by Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). See also Evans (fn. 24); Naomi Chazan and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and D. Michael Shafer, *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

[34] Thomas M. Callaghy, "Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa," in Callaghy and Ravenhill, 484.

[35] Ibid., 506. See also Deborah Brautigam, "Governance and Economy," Working Paper, no. 815 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, December 1991). In an important recent contribution, Merilee Grindle has elaborated the elements of state capacity in developing countries and the impact of sustained crisis on government capabilities. See Grindle, *Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

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nomic crisis, and how have international factors affected the policy choices of African leaders? Another set of questions focuses on *the capacity to reform*: What are the main political impediments to economic reform, and how have institutional constraints shaped the implementation of adjustment? This prompts a related discussion of how adjustment measures and institutional arrangements might be modified to foster long-term growth. A further central concern is *the revision of politics*: How have African regimes been affected by changes in popular participation and by growing pressures for democratic transition? What are the salient forces affecting the nature of governance in the countries of the region? Finally, *the relationship between political and economic transition* has been an area of growing relevance: How has economic distress influenced the conduct of politics in Africa? Does political liberalization presage a new setting for economic management? These issues are elaborated below and are followed by a discussion of pressing analytical challenges, concluding with directions for future research.

Crisis, Commitment, and Economic Reform

During the early 1980s, rising energy prices, recession in the northern economies, and the retreat of commercial lending in the wake of the international debt crisis conveyed a common array of exogenous shocks to most developing countries. Around the world, different regional responses to economic decline were apparent. Although African states were among the most seriously afflicted by external shocks, the region was comparatively diffident in embarking upon economic liberalization.

The editors of *Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline* are especially concerned with interactions among domestic and international dimensions of the reform process. There is a broad consensus among the contributors that the adoption of orthodox measures by African states was impelled by urgent circumstances and a dearth of feasible options. The limitations on African countries are noted by John Ravenhill, Reginald Herbold Green, and David Gordon, who variously recount the dire economic predicament for most countries at the beginning of the 1980s.[36] The absence of alternative resources or policy ideas essentially compelled the acceptance of orthodox measures, since the Bretton Woods institutions proffered a uniquely coherent reform package supported by access to vital short-term finance and debt relief.

[36] Ravenhill (fn. 5); Green, "The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: How Much Learning?"; Gordon (fn. 2).

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African leaders' pragmatic acceptance of economic liberalization, however, signified neither an embrace of neoclassical precepts nor unalloyed policy influence on the part of external actors. As David Gordon notes in his chapter on debt and conditionality, the commitment to reform reflected a convergence of fiscal realities, stipulations by donors, and a gradual diffusion of liberal economic doctrine among African technocratic groups. While external conditionality could induce a liberal direction in policy change, it was a relatively ineffectual instrument for sustaining reform. The reason centers on the "orthodox paradox," recognized originally by Miles Kahler and reiterated by numerous observers of economic adjustment.[37] The ostensible agents of orthodox reform were the weak clientalist states that had fomented the initial crisis. Political elites were naturally reluctant to challenge traditional constituencies and to relinquish their own control over patronage resources. Moreover, the institutions of most African states provided thin support for the implementation of policy change.

African leaders entered into a calculating assent with the IFIs. External donors and creditors sought to maximize their policy leverage in return for concessional aid and debt relief. Conversely, African governments sought to optimize the flow of resources while limiting their own observance of external policy prescriptions. As several authors have observed, the proliferation of conditions paradoxically served to weaken compliance.[38] External agencies could scarcely monitor the welter of indicators, and policymakers soon realized that slippage on most targets entailed few consequences. Also, a common syndrome of adjustment fatigue was manifest as debtor governments tired of renegotiating a growing set of prescriptions while seeing few economic or political dividends.

International negotiations constituted one dimension of a two-level game carried out by African political elites, the obverse side being contention with domestic groups over the costs of adjustment.[39] The most important aspect of domestic bargaining was the relative capacity of state elites to resist distributive pressures and to assign durable author-

[37] See Kahler, "Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabilization and Adjustment," in Nelson (fn. 16), 55.

[38] Gordon (fn. 2), 113–14. See also Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (fn. 3), 38; and Miles Kahler, "International Financial Institutions and the Politics of Adjustment," in Joan Nelson, ed., *Fragile Coalitions* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers for the Overseas Development Council, 1989), 144.

[39] See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988); Thomas Callaghy, "Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: Lessons for Adjustment," in Nelson (fn. 38), 120; and Howard Lehman, *Indebted Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

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ity for policy reform to a capable technocratic team.[40] Where these conditions obtained, as in Ghana under Jerry Rawlings, a modicum of reform could be sustained. More typically, however, African leaders muddled through by seeking to preserve their core entitlements and to placate key constituencies while marginally observing policy conditions in order to preserve the flow of external resources. Nicolas van de Walle, illustrating this process of "nonreform" in the case of Cameroon, sketches a pattern evident in many other countries.[41]

The bargaining process gave rise to uneven, inconsistent, and unequal policy outcomes. Most governments readily implemented policies that were visible and important to the IFIs as well as administratively simple to enact. Devaluation, trade reform, and subsidy reductions are central examples. African regimes commonly temporized on complex reforms that were difficult to monitor, such as state enterprise reform or financial liberalization.[42] Moreover, the pace of reform was erratic, with frequent lapses or the suspension of some packages, notably Zambia's 1987 abandonment of its adjustment program. In consequence, adjustment measures carried limited credibility with foreign investors and creditors and with domestic producers. This significantly limited the supply response to liberalization.[43] Economic reform was further tainted by the unequal distribution of costs. The real privation affecting civil servants, public employees, and the urban poor starkly contrasted the apparent dispensations for political elites and civilian cronies. Such resentment was augmented by the public perception encouraged by African leaders that adjustment measures were imposed by an imperious northern creditors' cartel.

As suggested earlier, the domestic arena was not the only source of wavering commitment to adjustment. A pivotal failure in the IFIs' promotion of reform was the implicit conditionality bargain between donors, creditors, and African governments.[44] Economic liberalization, embodied in policy conditions, was purported to bring rapid benefits in the form of debt relief, new investment, and lending. African countries, however, discovered a lackluster international response to policy

[40] Callaghy (fn. 39), 120–21. John Waterbury has also elaborated on the pursuit of reform by politically autonomous states; see Waterbury, *Exposed to Innumerable Delusions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 33.

[41] See also Catherine Boone, "Trade, Taxes and Tribute: Market Liberalization and the New Importers in West Africa," *World Development* 22 (March 1994); and Lewis (fn. 21).

[42] See the World Bank (fn. 3), 8; and Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (fn. 3), 301.

[43] For a more general discussion of this dilemma, see Dani Rodrik, "How Should Structural Adjustment Programs Be Designed?" *World Development* 18, no. 7 (1990).

[44] Callaghy (fn. 34), 476.

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change. Debt relief was slower and less extensive than expected, while external investors proved reticent largely because of uncertainty about the durability of African policy reforms. Perhaps more important was the global economic context, in which prices for traditional African exports were depressed, market share was squeezed by other developing regions, and investment flows gravitated toward more dynamic markets in Asia and Latin America. Frustrated by apparent international indifference, many African policymakers, in the face of domestic austerity and political dissension, slackened their commitment to reform.

The Capacity to Reform: Politics and Institutions

While most African countries had resolved by the mid-1980s to amend their economic policies, economic revival involved an array of political and institutional challenges. Stabilization and adjustment measures carried significant redistributive effects, prompting widespread resistance to reform from elements within government as well as groups in society. This confronted most leaders with the problem of bolstering or shifting their bases of support.[45] Moreover, governments had administrative difficulties in implementing many important aspects of adjustment, and rigidities within private economies inhibited the responses to liberalization.

Politically, the popular reactions to economic reform diverged markedly from the alignments predicted by liberal coalitional models. The perceived losers from adjustment mobilized quickly against such programs, employing active opposition or tacit resistance to allay the effects of austerity and liberalization.[46] Yet the presumed beneficiaries were diffuse and ambivalent, only rarely emerging as a social bulwark for reform-minded regimes. Consequently, in the absence of supportive coalitions, reform was generally led by authoritarian states. These conditions inherently limited the extent of economic change while also jeopardizing the sustainability of liberalization programs.

The West African states of Ghana and Nigeria provide instructive comparisons and revealing contrasts in the politics of reform, which in many respects are emblematic of patterns throughout the region. The genesis of economic malaise was comparable in the two countries, arising from statist import-substitution strategies, unstable civil-military cycles, and sagging export revenues. The impact of economic decline,

[45] Herbst (fn. 17), 954–55.

[46] Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (fn. 3) distinguish between resistance at the level of policy formation and obstruction of implementation (p. 300). See also Grindle and Thomas (fn. 29), 38.

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however, differed significantly in each country, and their governments shaped divergent responses to crisis. In Ghana the radical populist regime of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings took a sharply pragmatic turn in the early 1980s, adopting an orthodox adjustment program that lasted more than a decade. Economic reform was followed in 1992 by a managed electoral transition through which Rawlings maintained power as a civilian president. Nigeria's military leader, Ibrahim Babangida, professed a more moderate reformist intent upon taking power. He quickly retreated from a corrective path, however, and chose a predatory course of action, defaulting on both adjustment and democratic transition, resulting in an economic downward spiral during his tenure. These cases reflect different approaches to the political management of reform.

Within sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is distinguished as the most steadfast reformer of the 1980s. Since 1983 the country has adhered to the central elements of an IFI-sponsored program, moving from initial stabilization to a broader adjustment agenda. As the donors' showcase, the country has often been cited as the conspicuous success story in Africa and has benefited from abundant external aid. Ghana's early recovery under authoritarian auspices and the controlled liberalization subsequently pursued by Rawlings also suggest troubling lessons about the sequencing of economic and political reform. Moreover, despite an impressive economic rebound, the country's mixed performance in the 1990s implies limits to the efficacy of orthodox policies.

The contributors to *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery* are generally mindful of these contradictions. Focusing on regime type and economic change during the 1980s, the volume considers Ghana's distinctive odyssey from debacle to revival. At the time of Jerry Rawlings's 1981 coup, the country was in a state of economic and political collapse.[47] As detailed in chapters by Naomi Chazan and Jon Kraus, a steep and sustained economic decline caused widespread social dislocation while depleting public revenues and undermining government legitimacy.[48] Rawlings's corrective regime instigated a decisive break with the past, espousing a populist political agenda and a radical nationalist economic program. The military created an array of revolutionary

[47] It will be recalled that the revolt of December 31, 1981, was Rawlings's second coup. After initially seizing power in mid-1979, Rawlings summarily tried and executed three former heads of state while proceeding with a planned democratic transition. Within two years he again intervened to oust the Hilla Limann government.

[48] Chazan, "The Political Transformation of Ghana under the PNDC"; Kraus, "The Political Economy of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment in Ghana."

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grassroots organizations, initiated a campaign against economic elites, and attempted to stabilize the economy through administrative controls and mass mobilization.[49]

A deepening economic morass soon led Rawlings to accept the necessity of orthodox measures. Richard Jeffries describes how a small advisory circle, led by Finance Minister Kwesi Botchwey, employed populist arguments to advocate a pragmatic course of reform and maintained that structural adjustment would reverse the traditional bias toward urban classes, benefiting the rural majority.[50] This technocratic group captured the attention of the head of state and benefited from political insulation throughout the ensuing reforms. Beginning in 1983 Rawlings launched an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in close collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank, which entailed broad liberalization of the economy and a heavy reliance on conditional aid. During the following period, as elaborated in a series of chapters, the regime employed authoritarian strategies to quell popular resistance to the ERP, ironically wielding revolutionary organs of mobilization to enforce aquiescence to neoliberal reform.[51]

The ERP yielded significant stabilization of the economy, which, several authors concur, led to a resuscitation of both public institutions and the social fabric. Economic revival provided the wherewithal for a rehabilitation of basic government services, while austerity stimulated a proliferation of societal organizations. This reawakened civic realm contended with the regime over issues of social welfare and popular representation.[52]

The reform process revealed two central tensions. Adjustment produced adverse distributional effects as urban incomes declined and austerity affected politically strategic popular groups. As in most African countries, there was little distinction in the public eye between the consequences of inherited crisis and the more immediate privations induced by adjustment policies. Efforts to address these disparities through a compensatory spending program, known as the Program to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), failed to alleviate popular antipathy toward the perceived effects of liberalization.[53]

[49] Chazan (fn. 48), 24.

[50] Richard Jeffries, "Leadership Commitment and Political Opposition to Structural Adjustment in Ghana," 164.

[51] See Chazan (fn. 48); Kwame Ninsin, "The PNDC and the Problem of Legitimacy"; and Jeffrey Herbst, "Labor in Ghana under Structural Adjustment: The Politics of Acquiescence."

[52] Chazan (fn. 48), 37–38.

[53] Modeled on United Nations recommendations for compensatory policies to buffer the effects of austerity, PAMSCAD was introduced by the Rawlings government in 1988.

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This contributed to a second dilemma, the problem of legitimation. Authoritarian tactics were effective in carrying out short-term stabilization, but the consolidation of economic and political reform required greater popular support. The Rawlings government tried to shore up its social base by cultivating corporatist organizations, initiating local government reforms, and allowing limited electoral representation. Two authors note that local elections held in 1988–89 demonstrated significant rural approval for the regime and indicated a nascent shift in public support. But it is equally clear from their accounts and those of several other authors that the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was unable to reconstitute a supportive coalition, especially among urban workers, professionals, public employees, and indigenous business groups.[54] Ultimately, the revolutionary and charismatic formula that served Rawlings in his early years proved insufficient to sustain economic restructuring. The search for a stable political formula helps to explain the regime's turn toward political liberalization.

The advent of General Ibrahim Babangida's regime in Nigeria suggested the antithesis of Rawlings's approach to rule. After ousting General Muhammadu Buhari in August of 1985, Babangida evinced a refreshing combination of moderation and pragmatism. Babangida distanced himself from his predecessor by liberalizing the political arena and slating a timely return to democratic rule alongside an extensive program of economic reform. In his introductory chapter to *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*, a collection of essays by Nigerian scholars, Adebayo Olukoshi traces the emergence of Babangida's reform agenda. After opening a public debate on the acceptance of conditional finance from the IMF, Babangida publically repudiated the Bretton Woods institutions and subsequently unveiled a "home-grown" package known as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The SAP, drafted in consultation with World Bank staff, included the central policy components of a standard orthodox package. The military regime deftly inaugurated a liberal program under nationalist guise.[55] During the early years of his administration, Babangida displayed similar dexterity in balancing the demands of economic stabilization with the challenges of democratic transition.

These parallel schemes of reform, however, proved to be unsustain-

[54] Chazan (fn. 48), 37–38; Ninsin (fn. 51), 61. Moreover, as Gwendolyn Mikell observes in her chapter "Equity Issues in Ghana's Rural Development," the differential impact of liberalization in the rural areas engendered uneven political responses.

[55] Olukoshi, "Introduction: From Crisis to Adjustment in Nigeria," 8.

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able. Economic restructuring required an ability to resist entrenched economic groups, ethnic and regional demands, and clientalist pressures. Political transition was predicated upon a relaxation of centralized control along with tolerance for an open-ended plural arena of politics. Babangida and his military coterie proved unwilling either to challenge traditional economic elites or to permit genuinely competitive politics, and the dual transition became increasingly untenable. Distributive pressures induced wavering economic management, and economic uncertainty increased the contentious nature of political competition. A dynamic of faltering reform was evident within a few years, leading ultimately to a breakdown of the transitional agenda.[56] In the early 1990s Nigeria experienced depression and political crisis as military rulers aborted the democratization program while pursuing a reckless and avaricious course of economic control.

Olukoshi and his contributors provide some useful accounts of the social and political stresses accompanying Babangida's tortuous reform program. While much of their skepticism toward the military-led transition is warranted, the structuralist and dependency biases of the authors create problems in their analyses. When critiquing the SAP, there is little effort to differentiate halfhearted or lapsed policies from faithful implementation of orthodox measures, making it difficult to assess the real impact of the adjustment program. Also, the generally negative accounts of market-oriented policies in such areas as agriculture, industry, public enterprises, and exchange rates pose implicit alternatives that are either vague or patently unsustainable.[57] There is an additional moot assertion that the SAP inherently subverted democratization, since it was imposed from without and carried adverse social effects that could only be maintained through authoritarian means.[58] In sum, the authors fail to sort out the pathologies of Babangida's rule from the problems of orthodox reform per se, leaving open the question of

[56] See Peter M. Lewis, "Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition," *African Affairs* 93 (July 1994); and Larry Diamond, "Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

[57] In Olukoshi see Shehu Yahaya, "State versus Market: The Privatization Programme of the Nigerian State"; Akin Fadahunsi, "Devaluation: Implications for Employment, Inflation, Growth and Development"; Abdul Raufu Mustapha, "Structural Adjustment and Agrarian Change in Nigeria"; and Adebayo Olukoshi, "Structural Adjustment and Nigerian Industry." On the problem of alternative prescriptions, see van de Walle (fn. 18).

[58] Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Transition to Civil Rule: Sapping Democracy." The government's repressive stance toward dissident social groups is also stressed by Yusuf Bangura and Bjorn Beckman, "African Workers and Structural Adjustment: A Nigerian Case-Study"; and by Attahiru Jega, "Professional Associations and Structural Adjustment."

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whether Nigeria's decline has been a consequence of bad policy design or retrograde politics.

From a comparative vantage, the paths of reform in Ghana and Nigeria highlight important differences in the depth of crises, the sequence of liberalization, and the response to political challenges. A striking contrast can be found between the extent of social dislocation in the two countries and the ensuing opportunities for leaders to confront traditionally dominant interests. Barbara Grosh, writing in Widner's collection, distinguishes between countries experiencing a generalized economic and political collapse and those in which economic deterioration has been relatively moderate.[59] In the former circumstances, clientalist networks have largely unraveled, while in the latter, state elites are reluctant to encroach on rent-seeking coalitions. These conditions give rise to varying outcomes from economic reform.

By the time Rawlings took power, Ghanaian elites were essentially routed by the depth of economic crisis, many popular groups were on the brink of subsistence, and the state sector was virtually prostrate. In Nigeria, while economic decline buffeted many segments of society, most sectors retained significant resources and organizational cohesion, and government institutions remained intact. Consequently, Rawlings faced a more malleable environment for pursuing radical reform, while Babangida confronted vigorous distributive demands from state and societal interests. These circumstances, melded with the military's particular designs, led to the failure of reform in Nigeria.

The order of reform was also noteworthy. Rawlings faced few pressures for democratization during the early years of his rule, and his hastily contrived transition to civilian politics followed nearly a decade of economic reorganization. In seeking to preserve his incumbency, he was able to capitalize on the gains from adjustment, or, at least, on the fear of a reversion to decay. By contrast, Babangida's early commitment to simultaneous transition unleashed the inherent tensions between economic and political liberalization. At the very least, the unsettling effects of economic reform implied potential discord as the political arena opened up. While a resolute leadership might have managed these stresses, Babangida's deviation from the path of reform insured that these contradictions would prove irreconcilable.

In addition to coalitional pressures, the institutional shortcomings of both states and markets have also shaped the results of policy change. Reform is generally effective when the nominal incentives of liberaliza-

[59] Barbara Grosh, "Through the Structual Adjustment Minefield," in Widner.

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tion are viewed as credible and where producers and investors are capable of efficiently reallocating resources. Price signals mean little if there is limited confidence that policy change will be sustained and if markets are too weak or fragmented to permit shifts in factors.[60] In this regard, effective state capabilities are as important for the administration of a liberal economy as for a statist strategy.[61] Institutions within the private sector, such as credit networks and trade associations, also influence the scale and scope of transactions. As reform proceeded in Africa, the adverse organizational setting for recovery became an increasingly prominent concern among donors and governments.

Among the contributions reviewed here, there are relatively few writings with an explicitly institutionalist focus; yet, the role of institutions is central to the accounts of many authors. Public goods are poorly rendered in most African countries, and the need for stronger administrative and legal infrastructure has been widely recognized. In a comparative chapter in *Hemmed In*, Naomi Chazan and Donald Rothchild argue that African state capabilities have ebbed and flowed with the fortunes of their economies. While many states were badly eroded by economic crisis during the 1980s, tentative recovery has increased the resources of governments to provide essential functions and to reestablish weakened links with societal groups.[62] But while economic stabilization may yield relative improvements in economic administration, the capacities of most African governments generally fall below the threshold for fostering sustained growth. As Thomas Callaghy emphasizes, technocratic cadres remain thin and politically vulnerable throughout much of Africa, and senior policymakers are not supported by effective administration.[63] Policies are diverted at the top by particularistic demands and are obstructed at lower levels by bureaucratic resistance or disarray. Deficiencies in macrolevel institutions have been aggravated by uncertainties in property rights and in the segmentation of local markets and social networks.

[60] The importance of policy credibility is stressed by Rodrik (fn. 43); and Weingast (fn. 16). At the macroeconomic level, Paul Collier has pointed to agencies of restraint as a crucial institutional support for growth. See "Africa's External Economic Relations, 1960–1990," *African Affairs* 90 (July 1991), 339. Problems of supply response and institutional change in one sector are discussed in Simon Commander, ed., *Structural Adjustment and Agriculture: Theory and Practice in Africa and Latin America* (London: James Currey for the Overseas Development Institute, 1989).

[61] Thomas J. Biersteker, "Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: A Conceptual Exploration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990); Young (fn. 7); and Brautigam (fn. 35).

[62] Chazan and Rothchild, "The Political Repercussions of Economic Malaise," in Callaghy and Ravenhill.

[63] Callaghy (fn. 34), 471–74, 506.

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A central consequence of institutional weakness has been an inability to move beyond the narrow goals of stabilization to a more enduring agenda of structural adjustment. Executive commitment and modest technocratic support have been sufficient to implement policies of spending restraint and price change. The effort to shift resources to productive sectors of the economy, however, entails better administrative coordination, budgetary control, information, and infrastructural development. We have yet to identify the critical minimum in legal guarantees or organizational supports for long-term growth in Africa, yet the shortcomings of existing institutions are evident in the postreform performance of the region's economies.[64]

In Ghana, where price incentives and macroeconomic targets were consistently administered, the expansion of exports remained modest into the late 1980s, and there was little diversification away from traditional commodities.[65] Although manufacturing and services rebounded considerably from the initial depression, the economy revealed clear limitations to growth, which cannot be attributed simply to shortages of foreign exchange or external investment. The ERP undeniably fostered a revival of institutional faculties, yet the contributors to Rothchild's volume note persistent challenges of state capacity. The government found it difficult to provide adequate social services, tax its citizenry, control smuggling, or elicit better performance from state enterprises.[66] The deficiencies of public institutions created an uncertain environment for investors, which discouraged response to price reforms and necessitated a continued reliance on external aid to support the balance of payments.

The institutional dilemma is rooted within the private economy as well as the state. For instance, Sara Berry has elaborated on the problems associated with rural accumulation strategies, observing both political and economic liabilities emerging from traditional coping methods.[67] She notes that agrarian producers diversify their social ties and income sources to hedge against insecurity. The resultant investment patterns are poorly adapted for rapid increases in productivity.

[64] Janine Aron, "The Institutional Foundations of Growth," in Stephen Ellis, ed., *Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions* (London: James Currey, 1996).

[65] Kraus (fn. 48), 129. Kwasi Anyemedu presents evidence of modest diversification away from cocoa in "Export Diversification under the Structural Adjustment Program," in Rothchild.

[66] See Kraus (fn. 48); Paul Nugent, "Educating Rawlings: The Evolution of Government Policy toward Smuggling"; and E. Gyimah-Boadi, "State Enterprises Divestiture: Recent Ghanaian Experiences." On challenges to state capacity in the process of economic reform, see Jeffrey Herbst, *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1983–1991* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

[67] Sara Berry, "Coping with Confusion: African Farmers' Responses to Economic Instability in the 1970s and 1980s," in Callaghy and Ravenhill.

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Moreover, diffuse social networks tend to undermine the political organization of agricultural interests.[68] Berry observes "a high degree of mobility of people and resources, but little tendency for institutions to develop into stable frameworks for collective action, resource management or the consolidation of capital and knowledge" (p. 271). Consequently, changes in relative prices are unlikely to elicit a dynamic supply response or an improved policy climate in most agrarian economies.

A Politics of Recovery?

If existing political arrangements have impeded growth or blocked reform altogether, can we identify changes in adjustment policies or governing structures that might engender lasting development? In a succinct and often astute book, Richard Sandbrook seeks to discern a political route to economic restructuring. His questions are apposite: What is the appropriate balance between state and market in the path to African recovery? Is there a plausible political trajectory for engendering developmental states in Africa? Does the recent spate of political reform suggest new opportunities for accountable, effective government in Africa? His answer to the first question is most compelling. Following on his earlier work, which depicted the political sources of economic failure in Africa, Sandbrook considers the promise and limitations of the orthodox vision. Africa's authoritarian neopatrimonial regimes have manifestly failed the challenges of economic development, and there is little question that a contraction and reorganization of state capacities are in order. Intrusive statism must give way to a wider role for markets and private entrepreneurship, freed from the depredations of self-interested military, bureaucratic, or party elites. Moreover, basic fiscal and monetary stability are requisite for long-term investment and growth. Yet untrammeled market forces are insufficient to produce a durable recovery in Africa. A judicious, though redefined role for the state is essential.

Drawing lessons from the history of European capitalism and the example of the East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs), Sandbrook stresses the need for capable developmental states as central agents of growth.[69] His portrait reflects the stylized qualities we know

[68] The collective action problems of peasants are also noted by Bates (fn. 28); and by Jennifer Widner, "The Discovery of Politics: Smallholder Reactions to the Cocoa Crisis of 1988–90 in Cote d'Ivoire," in Callaghy and Ravenhill.

[69] See, for example, Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery* (Ithaca, N.Y.:

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from comparative experience: such regimes embody autonomous, growth-oriented leaders, competent politically insulated technocratic circles, effective institutions for policy implementation, strategic linkages with key productive groups, and an ability to mitigate immediate distributive pressures on the state.[70] The course of African recovery hinges upon rehabilitating, or forging, state capabilities, rather than simply retrenching cumbersome, profligate governing structures. The orthodox agenda, while conveying necessary reform, also contains elements that may undermine long-term prospects for growth. Draconian cuts in government wages and employment, public agencies, and capital programs debilitate the very institutions necessary for basic economic management and administration. Unavoidable austerity should not give way to a wholesale repeal of state functions and collective goods.

When analyzing vectors of change, Sandbrook's conclusions are more equivocal. If it is possible to distinguish the institutional and policy architecture for African recovery, it is far more difficult to apprehend the route to transformation. In a brisk inventory of recent reforms, he notes the cumulative effects of civil service reductions, administrative reorganization, privatization, and governmental decentralization. These necessary alterations have helped to reduce fiscal drag, stultifying intervention in markets, and the pervasive rent-seeking proclivities of elites. There has been, however, far less attention to institutional development and the establishment of basic government capabilities. The more recent focus by donors on capacity building is insufficient in a broader context of public sector retrenchment, and it is misplaced since it fixes only on a narrow range of managerial functions such as statistical and policy analysis. Sandbrook calls for a strategic approach that is oriented toward the rehabilitation of state capacity in Africa. Donors must accept a more activist role for the state, and they should be more flexible in administering conditionality, especially in such areas as fiscal balance, debt service, and public sector reform. Moreover, African governments must be able to marshall the resources—through debt relief, concessional aid, or expenditure switching—to resume investment in basic infrastructure, human capital, and critical public agencies.

Cornell University Press, 1990); Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Ziya Onis, "The Logic of the Developmental State," *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 1 (1991); Adrian Leftwich, "Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State," *Journal of Development Studies* 31 (February 1995); and Evans (fn. 24).

[70] These elements are also cited by Callaghy (fn. 34).

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The challenges of state building in sub-Saharan Africa are more expansive than those encompassed by administrative and policy reform. Economic restructuring and institutional renewal entail significant shifts in social power, which inevitably suggest some degree of political conflict.[71] If African governments are to move toward developmentalism, changes in the composition of elites and a reordering of state-society relations are implied. The recent wave of political protest and democratic pressure has clearly eclipsed the old regime in numerous countries, but emergent coalitions have yet to crystallize around a clear economic and political program. Sandbrook views the democratic resurgence in Africa with ambivalence. Popular participation and political opposition have impelled welcome liberalization in many authoritarian states, and the ensuing political space opens the way to more inclusive politics. The grail of liberal democracy, however, may be fallacious as well as elusive since African political traditions and social structures offer weak foundations for stable competitive politics.

The author considers possible alternatives to the liberal vision, recounting the earlier promise of socialist and populist models, basic-needs approaches, and efforts toward collective self-reliance promoted by regional organizations. While acknowledging the dismal record of these strategies, Sandbrook resists abandoning the normative image of participatory grassroots development or the appealing notion of selective insulation from the international economy. In the end, he cautiously endorses the orthodox strategy as the sole viable option while intimating that liberal reform might somehow serve as a stepping-stone toward the eventual realization of a populist vision. Yet he readily concedes that the international economy offers few options for Africa's embattled economies, the socialist alternative is a disappointing relic, and the realities of state power preclude a more commanding economic presence for African regimes. He rightly concludes that the central weakness of alternative visions lies "in the politics of [their] implementation" (p. 150).

Revising Politics: Governance and Change

Political renovation in Africa involves modifying the institutions of government and revising relations between rulers and citizens. If the

[71] This is stressed, for example, by Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon, 1966); and in a different context by Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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political context of economic reform was belatedly recognized by donors, politics nonetheless proceeded apace. Among the most important dimensions of political change were the rising salience of independent associations and societal groups and the crystallization of formal political oppositions throughout sub-Saharan Africa. By the late 1980s the monotonous regional profile of authoritarian government and deteriorating economies had given way to a varied landscape of disputed polities and contentious economic reform.

The altered terrain of African politics has required new theoretical and analytical approaches. Inherited classifications of countries by ideology, civil or military rule, party system, or modes of personal domination have quickly lost their utility in recent years.[72] A political understanding of African development requires a more adaptable and discriminating model of the state as well as a framework for understanding variations in state-society relations.

The editors of *Governance and Politics in Africa* hope to inspire such a conceptual shift. Although the effort is not entirely successful, the volume contributes to broadening the analysis of political change in Africa. In the introductory chapter, Goran Hyden outlines a framework for conceptualizing and analyzing governance with particular reference to African states.[73] Defined essentially as the management of the political realm, governance embraces a diverse array of processes and relations. Effective governance, for Hyden, entails strengthening state authority, increasing public confidence in political institutions, and fortifying lateral bonds of solidarity within civil society. Broader than the apparatus of government or the stated goals of political elites, governance is intended to denote the essential qualities of rule and to define the traits of a viable political community. The term also includes an inescapable normative component. In elaborating the components of governance, Hyden stresses accountable and legitimate authority, common "rules of the game" to regulate political activity, and a viable social contract among citizens and rulers.

There are commendable features to this framework, notably its emphasis on contingency, choice, and the importance of balanced prerogatives between state and society. Yet, while recognizing the virtues of

[72] See, for example, Young (fn. 26); Jackson and Rosberg (fn. 20); Henry Bienen, *Armies and Parties in Africa* (New York: Africana Publishers, 1978); Ruth Berins Collier, *Regimes in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); and Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill, and Donald Rothchild, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, 2d. ed. (Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

[73] Hyden (fn. 30).

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the concept, it is also necessary to observe its flaws as a scheme of analysis. The framework is a daunting hybrid of structural and actor-oriented approaches to politics that are wedded to the ineffable goals of good government. As a heuristic notion, governance is often indistinguishable from "politics" writ large, leaving the observer uncertain as to what elements are important or how different factors are related. The encompassing definition leaves us without clear criteria for characterizing specific political systems or their changes over time. In a practical sense, there are few institutional guideposts to help distinguish variations in rules or authority.[74] While it may be possible to venture rough qualitative assessments, we lack standards to measure, rank, or compare the nature of governance. Moreover, there is no evident model of alterations or transitions in governance.

These shortcomings are clearly outlined in the concluding chapter, where Michael Bratton and Donald Rothchild seek to summarize the governance framework and advance a research agenda. They emphasize the qualitative (and contingent) aspects of political management and reciprocal state-society interactions, while reiterating the importance of democratic practices. Their subsequent discussion, however, reveals an essential problem, as they assign at least three disparate meanings to the term: "At one and the same time governance is supposed to be an analytic framework, a description of the substance of legitimate politics, and a desirable political value" (p. 267). In the process of unpacking the concept, the authors identify its innate weakness, notably the lack of specificity of its components and the nebulous relations among them. Moreover, the tension between analysis and prescription seems irreconcilable.

With such a diffuse organizing framework, it is often difficult to trace the thread among the generally good cases included in the book. Different levels of analysis and different conceptions of governance appear in separate contributions. While the editors group the cases by type of regime, a more revealing arrangement might distinguish among central political processes. Consequently we find discussions of legitimation and control, the dynamics of political opposition, and the organization of social groups.

Postcolonial African governments, regardless of regime, have struggled to balance the imperatives of central political control with efforts

[74] In this sense, Hyden offers a substantive view of governance that stresses general qualities of politics rather than a procedural definition that identifies institutions and formal rules. The distinction between substantive and procedural treatments of democracy is discussed by Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); and Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990).

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to build legitimate authority. This tension has been especially manifest in authoritarian systems, in which political elites have secured power through limited participation and webs of patronage. In more repressive and personalized regimes, such as Zaire or Kenya, the strategies of predatory rulers have eroded the public realm, fostering political and economic degeneration.[75] Populist regimes, including Ghana, Tanzania, Niger, and Burkina Faso, have attempted to encompass popular groups through corporatist formulas, yet they have found it difficult to restrict popular demands or to generate enduring legitimacy, especially as their economies have declined.[76] Even outwardly competitive systems, such as in Botswana and Senegal, have faced pressures to liberalize their polities, as societal groups demand greater political voice or redistributive policies.[77] Competitive regimes appear more flexible in adapting to such stresses, but in all governments, resources and statecraft have influenced political consolidation.

The tensions between state and society in Africa have increasingly given way to open political opposition, decisively altering the conditions of governance in recent years. In the book's most broadly comparative chapter, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle trace the regionwide genesis of societal protest and political liberalization after 1989.[78] Dissent was often rooted in deteriorating economic conditions, yet in most countries popular protest quickly took on a distinctly political cast and was channeled toward overt challenges to authoritarian rule. Incumbent leaders responded with a spectrum of tactics, from conciliatory reform, through cosmetic changes, to steadfast repression. In these uncertain struggles, the relative strategies and resources of the antagonists led to different outcomes. A few incumbents quickly ceded power to democratic challengers, while many others resisted or hijacked prospective transitions.

Political change has obviously been influenced by the relative strength of organizations within African societies. In a few countries

[75] Jackson and Rosberg (fn. 20); see, in Hyden and Bratton: Joel Barkan, "The Rise and Fall of a Governance Realm in Kenya"; and Janet MacGaffey, "Initiatives from Below: Zaire's Other Path to Social and Economic Restructuring." Nigeria has also moved in this direction in recent years. The process of decay is of course relative; neither Kenya nor Nigeria has approached Zaire's nadir.

[76] See, in Hyden and Bratton: Naomi Chazan, "Liberalization, Governance, and Political Space in Ghana"; Pearl Robinson, "Grassroots Legitimation of Military Governance in Burkina Faso and Niger: The Core Contradictions"; and Aili Mari Tripp, "Local Organizations, Participation and the State in Tanzania."

[77] Crawford Young and Babacar Kante, "Governance, Democracy, and the 1988 Senegalese Elections"; and John Holm and Patrick Molutsi, "State-Society Relations in Botswana: Beginning Liberalization"; in Hyden and Bratton.

[78] Bratton and van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses"; in Hyden and Bratton.

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where social groupings are clearly defined and formal interests are mobilized, politics reflect the interactions of state elites and a coherent civil society.[79] In many other settings, however, government repression has subdued societal interests, or else the state has become so enfeebled that major public goods are no longer rendered. In these circumstances, social groups usually seek independent means of providing basic economic and community functions. In a region where self-provisioning peasants make up a substantial part of the population and where parallel economies are pervasive, it is tempting to see in informal activities an alternative source of social power. Several authors in this collection suggest that the coping strategies of local communities have engendered organizations that can challenge state authority.[80] Janet MacGaffey takes this view further, arguing that autonomous economic and social networks comprise a form of countervailing power to Zaire's ramshackle authoritarian state.[81] There is reason, however, to question the contention that widespread alienation from the state is conducive to the formation of a new political community. Rather than a sign of redemption, informality can be a catalyst of decay, as is evident not only in Zaire but more starkly in the region's collapsed states.[82]

Political and Economic Transition

The struggles over political reform and regime change portend a new setting for economic policy, and the merging currents of liberalization have drawn attention to their interactions. Some analysts presume a reciprocal and mutually reinforcing dynamic between democratization and marketization, while others discern inherent contradictions.[83] Jennifer Widner's collection, *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, is chiefly concerned with the effects of economic malaise on political change and the prospects for consolidation of a liberal order in the region.

[79] For a general discussion of civil society in an African context, see John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); and Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics* 41 (April 1989).

[80] See especially Tripp (fn. 76); and Chazan (fn. 76). For a broader discussion, see Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

[81] MacGaffey (fn. 75).

[82] See Young (fn. 7), 242. On the genesis of state failure, see I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[83] These debates are discussed by Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and by Przeworski (fn. 71). See also Huntington (fn. 74).

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This effort to understand the region's dual transitions includes several important contributions, though here again we encounter a loose scheme of organization. A number of core themes are woven through the cases, including the sources of political change; the relation among initial crisis, attempted economic reform, and political liberalization; and the prospects for the consolidation of liberal polities in Africa. Most of the essays, written during the early moments of Africa's democratic wave, withhold speculation about the economic legacy of political reform.

Explanations of political change in Africa have been strongly influenced by the timing of transitions in the region. Coming after an extended period of economic failure, regime change was obviously linked to economic and social crisis. The spate of liberalization after 1989 was seemingly provoked by the examples of Eastern Europe and by the additional inducements of political conditionality from donors. Widner and her contributors focus mainly on the domestic sources of political change. External demonstration effects might have inspired activists, and pressures from donors swayed rulers in a few critical instances, yet these factors were tangential to the central struggles among political challengers and authoritarian incumbents.[84]

The evidence presented here makes it clear that pressures for reform were rooted in long-standing dilemmas of political and economic decline. By the late 1980s the region's postcolonial governments had widely exhausted their claims to legitimacy as their populations grew indigent and resentful. Their dwindling fiscal bases made it difficult to sustain the patronage and rents needed to uphold political support, as economic hardship began to "trickle up" to key constituencies such as civil servants, urban workers, or even the army.[85] In some instances, adversity was aggravated by stabilization and adjustment policies, although, in many countries, economic scarcities resulted mainly from a failure to enact reform.

The path from economic decline to political opposition, however, was neither uniform nor direct as the country studies in the volume clearly show. We are presented with alternate versions of events that suggest different popular responses to liberalization. An account of transition in Benin sees public protest as motivated by a clear rejection

[84] A cogent assessment of these views is offered by Jeffrey Herbst in "The Dilemmas of Explaining Political Upheaval: Ghana in Comparative Perspective."

[85] See, for example, Michael Bratton, "Economic Crisis and Political Realignment in Zambia"; and Herbst (fn. 84).

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of the rent-seeking associated with authoritarian rule, so that impulses toward political and economic liberalism were united.[86] Yet a contrasting discussion of Tanzania argues that political opposition was a manifestation of public restiveness generated by economic liberalization.[87] Several other authors stress the cumulative effects of economic decline and orthodox measures in fostering political change.[88] The onset of economic crisis created widespread popular discontent in many countries, yet erratic efforts at economic reform, which often increased privation without yielding recovery, fostered additional protest. The reduction of governmental largesse often prompted political defections by core elites, such as civil servants, party leaders, and business cronies.[89] As noted earlier, these tensions increasingly converged on incumbent regimes, as dissidents targeted leaders' corruption and mismanagement and called for fundamental political renewal.

The range of outcomes from these struggles are also considered here. Where a united opposition coalesced, as in Zambia and Benin, incumbents were often forced to concede to democratic pressures. In other circumstances, such as Cameroon or Ghana, democratic organizations were weak, allowing authoritarian rulers to manipulate transition schedules and electoral machinery to preserve their tenure. Jennifer Widner stresses that variations in liberalization are influenced by institutional factors, especially electoral arrangements and interest-group organization, and by the distributional patterns embodied in different patronage systems.[90] This is a suggestive argument, yet it does not yield persuasive conclusions about patterns of reform in different countries.

The sustainability of political reform and the implications of political opening for economic liberalization are, of course, the leading issues for the future. The uncertain prospects for democratization are captured in Claude Ake's remark that African countries are poised between a "discredited past" and "a future which refuses to arrive."[91] Democracy emerged as a default position in the region after the exhaustion of various authoritarian options. In many instances, however, liberalization has been precarious, and background conditions are not supportive of enduring democracy. Crawford Young cites several factors that are

[86] Westebbe (fn. 15).

[87] Mwesiga Baregu, "The Rise and Fall of the One-Party State in Tanzania."

[88] This is consistent with the analyses offered by Bratton (fn. 85); van de Walle (fn. 23); and Herbst (fn. 84).

[89] Bratton (fn. 85), 112.

[90] Widner, "Political Reform in Anglophone and Francophone Countries."

[91] Cited by Donald Rothchild, "Structuring State-Society Relations in Africa: Toward an Enabling Political Environment," 206. See also Young (fn. 7), 231.

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likely to be decisive for consolidation in the short term, including the character of the old regime, the depth of economic and social deterioration, the strength of civil society, the institutional framework for liberalization, and the relative weight of external influence.[92] Over the long term, the outlook is more ambiguous. Most African countries lack the social cohesion, cultural traditions, and levels of economic development that historically have been associated with stable democracies elsewhere in the world, and the establishment of competitive government in the region presents a tenuous outlook.[93]

Assuming that democratic politics can be sustained, it is not evident that this will provide a more favorable climate for economic management. Here we are on speculative ground, even several years after the region's earliest transitions. While there have been few reversals of economic liberalization measures in democratizing regimes, the facilitating conditions for sustained adjustment appear quite fragile. In a lengthy essay in *Hemmed In*, Thomas Callaghy ventures a skeptical assessment, observing that economic reform dictates restraint of the distributional pressures inherent in neopatrimonial rule and the ascendance of "economic logic" in policy-making.[94] Yet democratic regimes may be vulnerable to contrary pressures that could stymie decisive economic tutelage. His argument directs our attention to three aspects of political restructuring, which are contested in transitional regimes.

The first is the composition of state leaders. While democracy provides ostensible grounds for a transfer of elites, there is a sort of "democratic paradox" in Africa, as observed by Robert Bates.[95] Popular opposition has typically called for an overhaul of politics, yet reform has commonly been initiated by incumbent elites and veteran politicians. The top-down character of liberalization in many countries raises the possibility that traditional politics will be resurrected under new auspices. In addition, the appeals of distributive politics can coax new rulers into the same patterns as deposed patrons, and transition might yield a superficial circulation of elites with little change in the substance of economic management.[96] We have little basis for expecting a radical

[92] Young (fn. 7).

[93] A discussion of the diverse factors contributing to democratic consolidation is beyond the scope of this essay. For useful treatments see Huntington (fn. 74); Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," *American Behavioral Scientist* 35 (March–June 1992); and Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[94] Callaghy (fn. 34). See also his excellent comparative treatment, "Lost Between State and Market" (fn. 20).

[95] Bates, "The Impulse to Reform in Africa," in Widner, 14.

[96] Callaghy (fn. 34), 484.

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revision of policy or practice in new democracies. The charges of corruption assailing Frederick Chiluba's administration in Zambia, the latter-day inclinations of President (and candidate) Rawlings toward populist measures in Ghana, or the electoral return of deposed dictator Mathieu Kérékou in Benin should prompt caution about the economic effects of political reform.

The nature of popular constituencies is another crucial dimension of transition. Political opening provides new opportunities for organized interests to enter politics, raising the possibility that such groups will exercise greater influence in favor of responsible economic oversight. It is reasonable to suggest that political liberalization will change the context for economic policy-making, as increased participation and freer associational activity give rise to new outlets for the expression of popular interests. Nonetheless, many strata, including rural producers, urban workers, and even business groups, face organizational problems that limit their influence. Also, political inclusion may bring forward groups that are strongly opposed to economic reform, such as civil servants, students, or import-competing manufacturers. Consequently, democratization may easily give rise to populist lobbying rather than pressures for liberalization.[97]

Finally, the enhancement of institutions presents a formidable challenge to transitional governments. Crawford Young concurs with Callaghy that fledgling democracies confront the legacies of administrative weakness and societal alienation inherited from their autocratic predecessors.[98] In the final analysis, democratization cannot be viewed as a panacea for the reconstruction of historical coalitions or the establishment of an institutional framework for growth.

Toward an Understanding of African Reform

During the past decade, Africa has experienced a series of dramatic, interrelated changes in economy, society, and the state. Domestic and external influences compelled a substantial retreat from prevailing statist development strategies. Greater emphases on market forces and opening toward the world economy have been ensconced, however hesitantly, as tenets of economic policy. The increasing scope and coherence of societal organizations in many settings has produced concerted po-

[97] Young (fn. 7), 242.

[98] Ibid., 245; Callaghy (fn. 34), 481. Janine Aron has argued that constitutional reform, as embodied in democratic transition, can serve as a foundation for other levels of institutional change. See Aron (fn. 64).

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litical oppositions, posing basic challenges to the ruling status quo. The old regime has decidedly been eclipsed in numerous countries as democratic pressures, widespread regime change, and institutional reform have traversed the region. Most of these transformations, however, remain halting and uncertain.

The changing character of African political economies presents new challenges for comparative analysis. The books discussed here represent many of the leading contributions to our understanding of political and economic change in Africa. They embody several areas of consensus that frame our understanding of regional change. There is broad acceptance of the proposition that Africa's economic crisis is rooted in domestic political structures. There is equal insistence on the necessity of many elements of orthodox reform, offset by concerns about the limitations of structural adjustment packages and the problematic role of international donors in the region. Finally, there is a wary embrace of democratic beginnings in Africa, as enthusiasm over political liberalization is tempered by recognition of the hazards of regime change. Most authors would generally agree that institutional renovation and a reordering of social coalitions are the key political challenges to African recovery.

Within these broad outlines, however, there is little accord over the central concerns for structuring a research agenda or the relevant methods for analyzing the politics of reform in Africa.[99] Much of our present understanding is derived from andecdotal information along with conceptual models resting on weak empirical foundations. The tenacious problems of economic and political performance have reinforced a strong assumption of path dependence, leading many specialists to stress the sources of continuity in the region rather than the parameters of change.[100] What this suggests is a fruitful role for research focusing on the groups, motives, resources, and organizations that might transform African political economies over the long term.[101] There are also grounds for recommending a wider set of analytical tools in looking at the politics of reform. These approaches can be applied in a variety of substantive areas.

[99] Ernest J. Wilson III, "Creating a Research Agenda for the Study of Political Change in Africa," in Widner, 254.

[100] Aron (fn. 64). On path dependence more generally, see North (fn. 25). Crawford Young stresses the historical continuities of African regimes in *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). Ernest Wilson (fn. 99), in his methodological essay on analyzing Africa's transitions, argues for a "modified structuralist" approach, which balances background conditions with the motives and initiatives of political actors.

[101] Obviously, such a project does not imply a positive effect on outcomes in the region, any more than research into democratic consolidation guarantees the ascendance of democracy.

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The reciprocal relations between economic and political liberalization have become a central focus of comparative research in recent years. With the advent of regime transitions in much of Africa, these issues can be taken up in a regional setting. One important issue is the way in which political opening has affected configurations of domestic interests. Can we find evidence of emergent lobbies for better governance or for improved economic management in reforming African countries? Under what circumstances do such coalitions arise, who are their leading constituents, and what is their effect on policy choice or modes of rule? A related issue is the quality of economic administration in new democracies and the effects of economic performance on democratic consolidation. In short, does democracy matter for the economy? Will sluggish recovery, a near certainty in much of the region, undermine the democratic prospect?[102] These questions can obviously be examined in individual cases, but they also lend themselves to wider regional studies.

This agenda can be complemented by concentrating on the relation of coalitions to policy formation in African political economies. We have incomplete depictions of the interplay among group preferences, the motives and perceptions of policymakers, and policy outcomes. There have been few studies of bureaucracies or senior policymakers to fill in the general deductive pictures offered by rational-choice or rent-seeking models.[103] In addition, studies of specific interests, such as business groups, professionals, labor, and farmers, can significantly enhance our understanding of political change, particularly the distributive implications of liberalization. An especially important question, scarcely addressed in the studies covered here, is the effect of liberalization on domestic capitalist groups and the role of such groups in politics. Have reductions in the scope of state intervention fostered a wider arena of independent economic interests? Is there an emergent entrepreneurial class that might challenge or eclipse traditional rent-seeking elites? This is among the most consequential issues for the political economy of the region. We might equally draw greater attention to the role of politicians in transitional settings. The end of single-party rule in Africa has opened the way to more plural politics. The interests of

[102] These questions are addressed at a preliminary level by Nicolas van de Walle, "Crisis and Opportunity in Africa," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (April 1995).

[103] On the limitations of choice-theoretic approaches, see Merilee Grindle, "The New Political Economy: Positive Economics and Negative Politics," in Gerald M. Meier, ed., *Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries: Perspectives on the New Political Economy* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991). An important recent study of senior policymakers is David Leonard, *African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

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emergent political classes in many countries, and their evolving relations with executives and popular constituencies, are likely to be relevant for conflicts over policy.[104]

It is also time for Africanists to take institutions seriously once again. The rapid enfeeblement of central institutions in the early years of independence prompted many observers to focus instead on social structures and political processes in Africa. Largely for good reasons, there have been few studies in recent decades of constitutions, electoral arrangements, party systems, or legal orders. These structures have attained new relevance, however, and it has become possible to examine them in the field. Questions of institutional design and the effects of different institutional arrangements deserve closer attention. In the political realm, the alternative crafting of basic institutions and the role of transitional elections are consequential for the implantation of democracy. Issues such as federalism, decentralization, and legislative rules are likely to be especially important for democratic consolidation and for the conduct of economic affairs.

The effects of institutions on economic performance provide another area of inquiry. A crucial question for the future of African economies is how to develop arrangements for encouraging sustained investment in productive assets. Paul Collier has usefully framed a research agenda focusing on "agencies of restraint."[105] This refers to a diverse set of institutional arrangements for maintaining macroeconomic stability, protecting property rights, and guaranteeing contracts. Agencies of restraint include such crucial institutions as central banks and finance ministries, legal codes and judicial systems, regulatory bodies, and revenue authorities. There is much useful research to be done on the development of such agencies, their design and resources, and the political constituencies that can support them. In addition to these macrolevel institutions, it is also important to examine microlevel institutions affecting property, information, and exchange.[106]

Africa probably reflects more intraregional diversity in its current political arrangements and economic prospects than in any period since independence. Preliminary evidence suggests that marked differences

[104] In the Latin American context, see Barry Ames, *Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Barbara Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

[105] See Collier (fn. 60); Aron (fn. 64); and van de Walle (fn. 102).

[106] Important treatments are found in Jean Ensminger, *Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Sara Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).

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are emerging among subregions, with southern Africa emerging as a potential, though very fragile, zone of democratizing governments and economic recovery. These developments point to the increasing relevance of neighborhood effects in regional political economy. This notion, which has gained currency in recent years, highlights the economic linkages and policy influences among neighboring states.[107] Neighborhood effects include direct ties such as labor and capital markets, externalities from factors such as infrastructure or technology, and the diffusion of economic doctrine or policy ideas among proximate countries. These effects are fairly striking in Asia, where investment, trade, production linkages, and economic strategies have been widely complementary. Intraregional influences have been less closely examined in Africa not only because of the poverty and marginality of African economies but also because of the adverse impact of nationalist and statist creeds among policymakers. Yet the increasingly diverse fortunes of different countries imply that poles of growth, stability, disruption, or decay may influence development within subregions in years to come. Analysts should be attentive to these prospects.

It is equally important to include African countries in more cross-regional research.[108] There are grounds for reducing Africa's conceptual isolation and reincorporating the region into a broader comparative framework. A number of countries experiencing recent democratic transitions can reasonably be compared with liberalizing societies in other regions. In the economic realm, comparison with countries possessing similar historical or structural characteristics can yield insights about influence of institutions, governing elites, and policy doctrine on economic performance. In this vein, comparisons with Southeast Asia offer an especially promising outlet for investigation, as several countries in the region share features common to Africa. While recognizing Africa's unique experience and distinctive challenges, a broader vantage on questions of institutional development and social change can provide relevant insight into the region's constraints and possibilities.

[107] See, for example, William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies, Ethnic Divisions, and Neighbors" (Manuscript, World Bank, October 1995); and Thomas Callaghy, "Africa: Back to the Future?" in Diamond and Plattner (fn. 11), 140–41.

[108] Some recent research incorporating Africa into cross-regional perspectives include David Lindauer and Michael Roemer, eds., *Asia and Africa: Legacies and Opportunities in Development* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1994); Howard Stein, ed., *Asian Industrialization and Africa: Studies in Policy Alternatives to Structural Adjustment* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Anne Krueger and Robert Bates, eds. *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993); and Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, eds., *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1994). See also Nelson (fn. 16); and Grindle (fn. 35).

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THE NOT SO SILENT REVOLUTION
Postwar Migration to Western Europe

By ANTHONY M. MESSINA

Hans-Georg Betz. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 226 pp.

Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Guilford Press, 1993, 306 pp.

Sarah Collinson. *Beyond Borders: West European Migration Policy towards the Twenty-first Century*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, 116 pp.

James F. Hollifield. *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, 305 pp.

Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, 244 pp.

FEW, if any, trends or phenomena affecting Western Europe as a whole since 1945 appear to have been more far-reaching in their immediate effects or more potentially disruptive to society and politics in the long term than the cumulative experience of postwar immigration. Yet after a period of intense scrutiny from the early 1970s through the early 1980s,[1] the subject of postwar immigration was largely marginalized within the social sciences and its investigation eventually abandoned to single-country specialists.[2] By the beginning of the 1990s, however, this pattern of benign neglect suddenly yielded to a bevy of cross-national studies. The five volumes reviewed here typify what is both illuminating and wanting about this recent scholarship. Collectively these volumes explore the impact of postwar immigration on the economies, polities, and societies of Western Europe.

[1] See, for example, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Gary P. Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945–1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Mark J. Miller, *Foreign Workers in Western Europe: An Emerging Political Force* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

[2] Examples of this scholarship include Gary S. Cross, *Immigrant Workers in Industrial France* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); Anthony M. Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).

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Certainly, it is not inappropriate to consider postwar immigration as a single phenomenon, as Betz and others have done.[3] In analyzing its varying impact on the domestic economies, polities, and societies of Western Europe, however, one finds that in fact postwar immigration unfolded not in a single, seamless pattern but rather in waves, each of which was precipitated by a unique set of circumstances and governed by its own peculiar internal logic.

The first wave, which preoccupies Hollifield's analysis in *Immigrants, Markets, and States*, prevailed from the end of World War II until the early 1970s and was defined by the mass influx of surplus workers from the less developed countries of the Mediterranean, the Third World, and Eastern Europe. The primary catalyst of this initial wave was the postwar economic boom enjoyed by the advanced industrial states. This, the greatest production boom in history, created acute labor shortages and rigidities in domestic labor markets. In response, private employers and governments across Western Europe aggressively recruited legions of foreign workers. Castles et al. estimate that approximately thirty million people entered Western Europe as workers or dependents during this period, thus making the postwar migration "one of the greatest migratory movements in human history."[4]

The second wave, the starting point of Soysal's *Limits of Citizenship*, consisted of the secondary migration of family members and the dependents of the original postwar economic migrants. Although this wave also commenced during the early postwar period, it accelerated considerably when primary migration was severely curtailed by West European governments during the period of the first "oil shock" and the attendant economic recession of the early 1970s. Having crested by the mid-1980s or so, the second wave of migration has not ebbed entirely.

The third and latest great migration to Western Europe, a prominent concern of Collinson's *Beyond Borders*, began early in the 1980s and persists to this day. It consists primarily of legitimate and illegitimate refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal alien workers. The two major catalysts of this third migratory wave are the imposition of severe restrictions on legal immigration by West European governments during the 1970s and the economic, social, and political convulsions associated with the East European revolutions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although it is impossible to know the full scope of this latest migra-

[3] See, for example, Anthony H. Richmond, *Immigration and Ethnic Conflict* (London: Macmillan Press, 1988).

[4] Stephen Castles et al., *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities* (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 1.

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tion, it is estimated to be substantial. Collinson, for example, cites two million unauthorized immigrants resident in the European Community during the early 1990s (p. 49). Another source reports that some nine hundred thousand foreigners from the Third World legally entered the twelve states of the European Union in 1992.[5]

Scholarship on the multifaceted phenomenon of postwar immigration has generated at least four distinct but clearly interrelated literatures in this decade, each of which is well represented by one or more of the volumes under review. Sarah Collinson's *Beyond Borders*, for example, is representative of the *immigration policy studies* literature. Primarily descriptive and prescriptive, this literature as a whole and Collinson's book in particular eschew grand theory and instead aspire to inform and offer policy recommendations to elite decision makers in Western Europe. Both James Hollifield's *Immigrants, Markets, and States* and Stephen Castles and Mark Miller's *The Age of Migration* too seek to be relevant and accessible to policymakers. However, in contrast to the first literature, these volumes and the larger *political economy of migration* literature of which they are a part, are embedded within broad theoretical frameworks.[6] Specifically, the two volumes seek to situate the phenomenon of postwar migration to Western Europe within the context of the incremental liberalization of the international political economy.

The disruptive impact of postwar immigration on the domestic politics of Western Europe is more or less the exclusive focus of Hans-Georg Betz's *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, as well as the dominant concern of the broader *immigration fallout* literature. The primary concerns of this literature are the important cross-national political trends and events linked to and resulting from the process of permanent immigrant settlement.

In contrast to the three bodies of scholarship cited above, the *immigrant incorporation* literature focuses on how postwar immigration has transformed the core identity of West European societies and how the immigrants themselves have been changed by their collective act of migration. Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal's *Limits of Citizenship*, for example, argues that postwar immigration has facilitated a new, "postnational"

[5] Nino Falchi, *International Migration Pressures* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 1995), 23.

[6] Recent publications within the literature that surveys global migration patterns include Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); and Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner, eds., *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).

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model of citizenship in Western Europe, a model whose "organizing and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging" (p. 1).

What do these four literatures and, particularly, the five books under review have in common? Apart from their obvious shared concern with postwar immigration, all are organized to one degree or another around two central questions and guided by four interrelated assumptions or arguments. Two questions preoccupy the subfield of immigration studies in Western Europe. First, why did the major labor-importing states incrementally lose control over both immigration and immigrant policy during the postwar period? And second, what have been the domestic consequences of this unanticipated loss of control? Exploration of these questions has led scholars to advance four major arguments. First, in a liberal era of global economic markets, mass communications, transnational culture, and regional and cross-regional security networks, the capacity of West European states to govern their territorial borders has significantly eroded. Second, the widespread diffusion of liberal norms in the domestic and international contexts has severely inhibited the ability of governments to execute an economically and politically rational immigrant policy. Third, the experience of mass immigration has transformed the traditional boundaries and exercise of national citizenship. And finally, postwar immigration has fostered the post-1980 surge of radical right-wing populist movements and parties across Western Europe.

This review essay seeks to evaluate the above arguments in light of the evidence presented in the collected scholarship under review and other select works in the subfield of immigration studies. To this end, the essay is divided into three parts. First, it cites the contributions of the volumes under review to our understanding of economic, political, and social change in contemporary Western Europe. Within this context, the emphasis is placed on the important changes that have been facilitated or accelerated by postwar immigration.

In the second part each of the four arguments cited above is scrutinized in order to assess the validity of the core arguments/assumptions that have so thoroughly permeated the immigration studies subfield during the current decade. The third section distills the criticisms contained in the previous section for the purpose of identifying several common threads. Within this context, the essay briefly argues the case for new scholarly initiatives to synthesize and unify the separate literatures represented by the volumes considered here.

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Postwar Immigration Studies: Contributions

Perhaps the single most important contribution of the collected volumes under review and other, similar studies has been to expose the almost revolutionary change that has been visited upon Western Europe by postwar immigration. On this score, a close reading of the collected volumes and other prominent scholarship within the immigration studies subfield leads to the inescapable conclusion that few, if any, trends or phenomena affecting Western Europe as a whole since 1945 have been more transformative in their effects than the cumulative experience of postwar immigration. The effects have been profound.

First, as Castles and Miller (pp. 65–76), Collinson (pp. 8–10, 47–50), and Hollifield (pp. 45–73) acknowledge either explicitly or implicitly, early postwar immigration facilitated the rapid and sustained expansion of domestic economies, which fed the West European postwar economic boom. In this vein, postwar immigration was a necessary but insufficient factor in the revival of the war-torn economies of Western Europe. Once these economies were revived, however, immigration helped to sustain domestic and regional economic expansion (Betz, 90). Postwar immigration was able to perform these vital functions primarily because it was so well attuned to the changing demands of domestic economic markets. Postwar immigrants tended to enter the domestic economy when, and settle in regions where, the shortage of native labor was most acute (Castles and Miller, 188).[7] Moreover, by satisfying the domestic demand for labor in a noninflationary or low inflationary manner during the early to intermediate postwar period, immigration "resolved recruitment bottlenecks, thus permitting profitable production and growth."[8] Although these economic benefits could not be sustained indefinitely, especially as immigrant workers began to settle more permanently in their adopted countries, they were nevertheless crucial to the early recovery and success of postwar West European economies.

A second major change catalyzed by the cumulative experience of postwar immigration has been the incremental alteration of domestic immigration and citizenship regimes (Soysal, 26). In response to the successive waves of migration to Western Europe, most states have re-

[7] K. Jones and A. D. Smith, *The Economic Impact of Commonwealth Migration* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 92.

[8] Anthony Fielding, "Migration, Institutions, and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies," in Russell King, ed., *Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future* (London: Belhaven Press, 1993), 16.

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cast their immigration, citizenship, and nationality laws during the past two decades. Moreover, under the pressure of persisting immigration, the concept and boundaries of national citizenship and the core rules that govern the flow of people in and out of the traditional nation-state will continue to be substantially altered in the coming years (Castles and Miller, 14–15).

Third, the influx of tens of millions of nonwhite immigrants, refugees, asylees, and migrant workers into West European societies has profoundly altered the social and cultural bases of these societies. As Betz observes:

> Immigrants and refugees from the developing South . . . represent perhaps the most visible and "tangible" signs of the current social and cultural transformation of advanced Western democracies. They confront the indigenous population . . . with the social realities brought about by the new age of global economic, ecological and political interdependence and universal communication. (p. 97)

With each wave of migration hundreds of thousands of immigrants have permanently settled in Western Europe, bringing with them ethnicities, languages, religious practices, or cultural backgrounds that are less than completely compatible with those of their chosen host society. Much to the chagrin of many "native" citizens, West European societies have become increasingly multiethnic, multiracial, and multicultural (Castles and Miller, 195–230).

Of all the major impacts of postwar immigration, however, perhaps the most important, enduring, disruptive, and least appreciated has been its effects on the postwar political consensus, which for the better part of three decades informed and shaped public policy, defined the parameters of interparty competition, and largely reconciled the long-standing, entrenched antagonism between the forces of the political left and the political right across Western Europe (Hollifield, 211). The thesis here is that successive waves of immigration have conjoined to undermine the consensual foundations of the dominant postwar political paradigm in Western Europe. Until its demise in the 1970s and early 1980s, this paradigm was defined by three features. First, it meant that governments aggressively manipulated or regulated the macroeconomy in pursuing redistributive goals. In every country in Western Europe, government redistributed wealth and income from the upper to the middle and lower classes, in part through the mechanisms of the rapidly expanding social welfare system. A second feature of the postwar political paradigm was the substantial political cooperation that ex-

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isted among political parties aligned across the traditional ideological spectrum. With a few notable exceptions, the major political parties of Western Europe abandoned their traditional ideologies and allowed their policies to converge. And finally, the postwar political paradigm was defined by the "cooling" of ideological fervor among social and political actors associated with the old left and right. Trade unions and big business in particular found common cause in the progrowth strategies of economically interventionist governments, and the two often cooperated with one another in formal corporatist or tripartite arrangements.

What specific role has postwar immigration played in undermining consensual politics in Western Europe? As Betz's analysis of the emergence and expansion of right-wing populist groups reveals, postwar immigration has disturbed established party systems and raised the overall ideological temperature of domestic politics. Anti-immigrant sentiment, xenophobia, and blatant racism within the native working classes of Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and elsewhere, for example, are polarizing politics and accelerating the flight of fragments of this class away from political parties of the traditional left and toward the traditional and new right (Betz, 166–68). Racist working-class voters are defecting to the political right because the right has been more sympathetic than the left to their illiberal views, and because the left is fairly closely aligned politically, for ideological and electoral reasons, with the new ethnic and racial minorities. The defection of racist, working-class voters threatens further to erode the left's already declining electoral base, and in some countries this trend promises to exclude parties of the left from government indefinitely. The gradual political marginalization of the traditional left, in turn, reinforces existing social trends that underpin a more conservative domestic politics.

Moreover, since the early 1980s postwar immigration and the divisive politics and social conflict that it has exacerbated have reinforced the ascendancy of what can be labeled the "conservative project." At its core the project is an ongoing campaign by conservative forces in Western Europe to discredit the Keynesian social-welfare consensus so as to facilitate the modernization of the economy through the restructuring of state and society. Across Western Europe the conservative project has inspired governments to abandon an interventionist approach to economic policy-making and to adopt more market-oriented economic strategies.

Dissatisfaction and disillusion among the native "losers" of this project have been muted somewhat by the promotion of elites and the consumption by mass publics of a conservative political ideology em-

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phasizing individualism, self-initiative, reflexive loyalty to the state, and the potential threat posed to the "nation" by internal enemies, including immigrants. At its most benign, this conservative ideology distracts native losers of the conservative project from focusing on the primary sources of their distress: government economic policy and disruptive changes in the new international political economy. At its most malignant, this ideology inflames latent tensions between the various races and classes. At every point between the two poles of distraction and conflict instigation the consolidation of the goals of the conservative project is facilitated.

The most important influence of postwar immigration on domestic politics, then, has been subtle and indirect. In helping to undermine the consensual foundations of the postwar political order, immigration has reinforced and accelerated conservative political and economic change in Western Europe.

In addition to making the impacts of postwar immigration more transparent, the collected volumes and the immigration studies subfield as a whole in this decade have enhanced our understanding of the growing interdependence of states, economies, and societies within Western Europe, as well as the region's increasing openness and vulnerability to the international political economy. On this score, Castles and Miller, Collinson, and Hollifield in particular have heightened our awareness of three trends that are particularly salient for contemporary Western Europe: the globalization of migration; the acceleration of migration; and the differentiation of migration (Castles and Miller, 81). All three trends are currently converging to complicate the ability of West European governments to formulate an effective and durable domestic immigration policy and to cooperate with one another, either within or outside of the European Union, in forging a regional immigration regime (Collinson, 50–52). As I will argue later, these difficulties do not imply that the capacity of West European policymakers to control immigration has necessarily diminished. Rather, what they do imply is that as the sources, volume, and types of migration expand globally, so the response of governments in Western Europe to this challenge grows correspondingly more complicated and fraught with domestic political hazards.

The Arguments Scrutinized

As noted above, the five books considered here and the general subfield of immigration studies are preoccupied with two core questions: why

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the major labor-importing states of Western Europe incrementally lost control over both immigration and immigrant policy during the postwar period and what the domestic consequences of this unanticipated loss of control have been. With respect to the first question, Hollifield, Collinson, and Castles and Miller advance the argument that both the traditional frontiers and the internal decision-making authority and sovereignty of the nation-state "have been significantly weakened by a range of transnational and global economic, political, social, and cultural forces, including migration" (Collinson, 103). With respect to the second question, all of the authors of the volumes under review assume that mass immigration has transformed the traditional boundaries and exercise of national citizenship in Western Europe, an outcome that in turn has fed the popularity of radical right-wing populist movements and political parties.

Immigration, Immigrant Policy, and State Sovereignty: The Liberal Thesis

Back in the 1950s few policymakers in Western Europe were particularly concerned with the long-term economic and political repercussions of the initial wave of labor migration.[9] Most assumed that the flow of foreign labor could be manipulated by government and/or would be efficiently regulated by the impersonal mechanisms of the economic market. As countless scholars have observed, policymakers in Western Europe never expected foreign workers to settle permanently in their host country.[10] Moreover, neither political nor intellectual elites anticipated the recent surge of popular support for xenophobic parties of the extreme right across Western Europe.

How, then, did West European political elites seemingly lose control of both immigration and immigrant policy? The liberal thesis is advanced most eloquently by Hollifield in *Immigrants, Markets, and States*, and incorporated to one degree or another within all the volumes under review. The liberal explanation primarily focuses on the inherently and universally problematic nature of both immigration and immigrant policy, difficulties that arise from the fact that throughout most of the

[9] Contrary to the prevailing scholarly consensus, however, some political elites were extremely farsighted. A concise discussion of the British case is contained in Zig Layton-Henry, *The Politics of Immigration* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 23–36.

[10] See, among others, Castles et al. (fn. 4), 29; and Rosemarie Rogers, "Post-World War II European Labor Migration: An Introduction to the Issues," in Rosemarie Rogers, ed., *Guests Come to Stay: The Effects of European Labor Migration on Sending and Receiving Countries* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).

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postwar period the major immigrant-receiving states of Western Europe have been committed to increasingly open international economic markets, as well as to liberal political rights for all their permanent residents, regardless of their formal citizenship status (Hollifield, 216).

This explanation is "liberal" in two respects. First, it argues that the enormous expansion and growing integration of the international economy during the postwar period created—in addition to global markets for capital, raw materials, and services—an international labor market. Like other markets, the international market for labor, although initially regulated by national governments, increasingly developed a high degree of autonomy so that attempts by the state to manipulate it during the late 1970s became difficult and even counterproductive (Hollifield, 94). To put the matter simply: not only could individual states in Western Europe not adequately stem the flow of immigrants into their societies, but their heavy-handed attempts to do so often precipitated either illegal immigration or greater and/or more permanent immigration. Indeed, nowhere did this latter phenomenon seem more evident than in Britain, where the government's clumsy enactment of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, intended to reduce the growth of the nonwhite population in the country, inadvertently stimulated a rapid and massive influx of dependents of previously settled workers.[11] Hollifield reports similar problems of immigration control in France and Germany (p. 116).

Second, the liberal explanation emphasizes the unexpected difficulties the immigrant-receiving states encountered after 1970 in preventing the permanent settlement of immigrants into their societies, difficulties that grew out of the increasing liberalization of Western polities. As Hollifield argues:

> Under liberal constitutions foreigners have rights, and states (in their administrative guise) are constrained by constitutional norms and procedures. This was evident in France and Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, as restrictionist policies were thwarted by the courts. Such developments reflect the erosion of sovereignty and nationalist notions of citizenship. . . . In effect, we have been witnessing the convergence of immigration and citizenship policies and the de facto expansion of membership, if not political citizenship, for aliens in Europe. (pp. 222–23)

As national judiciaries have intervened to delay executive-issued deportation orders, as immigrant children have been legally compelled to

[11] Messina (fn. 2), 27–28.

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attend state schools, as immigrants as a group have gained greater access to state welfare benefits and have been permitted to join trade unions, voluntary associations, and even political parties, and as the adult foreign-born population has been granted voting rights in local elections in several countries, it is assumed that the immigrant-receiving states have lost control over the terms and length of residence of immigrant populations.[12] As a consequence, the once sharp divide between citizens and noncitizens and natives and immigrants in Western Europe has become extremely blurred, to the benefit of immigrants and the detriment of traditional state authority.

In addition to constitutional constraints, the diffusion and hegemony of liberal norms in West European societies are also believed to have diminished the prerogatives of the state in establishing the terms for the integration of immigrants. Hollifield perhaps makes the case most explicitly in arguing that "the primacy of rights leads states to exercise caution and restraint in dealing with migrants" (p. 29). Soysal makes the more general point that nation-states in Western Europe are "charged with expanding 'responsibilities,' on the basis of human rights, with respect to the foreign populations living within their borders" (p. 7). According to these and other, like-minded scholars, liberal values are *embedded* in the fabric of West European societies, as well as in the international system in which these societies interact (Hollifield, 230-31).[13] Thus, regardless of the national origin or citizenship status of immigrants, it is extremely difficult for West European states to treat them in a discriminatory manner or in ways that violate the fundamental tenets of political liberalism.

How persuasive is the liberal thesis in explaining the apparent erosion of state control of immigration and immigrant policy across Western Europe? Although constraints of space and time do not permit a comprehensive response, several problems with the liberal thesis are manifest and can be briefly summarized.

First, neither the collected volumes nor other scholarly works supply much hard evidence that the capacity of West European states to con-

[12] See, for example, Shirley Jenkins, ed., *Ethnic Associations and the Welfare State: Services to Immigrants in Five Countries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Zig Layton-Henry, ed., *The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe* (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Mark J. Miller, *Foreign Workers in Western Europe: An Emerging Political Force* (New York: Praeger, 1981); and Tomas Hammar, ed., *European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[13] See also Martin O. Heisler, "Transnational Migration as a Small Window on the Diminished Autonomy of the Modern Democratic State," in Martin O. Heisler and Barbara Schmitter Heisler, eds., "From Foreign Workers to Settlers?" *Annals* 485 (special issue) (May 1986), 153–66.

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trol immigration or immigrant policy has significantly waned. Indeed, recent scholarship by Gary Freeman and others has challenged the "loss of control" thesis on the following grounds: it is contradicted by the historical experience of more than one of the major labor-importing states;[14] it assumes a degree of state sovereignty and decision-making autonomy that is unrealistic and can never be achieved (Collinson, 56–57);[15] it erroneously assumes that all West European states wish to close their borders to immigration and discourage the permanent settlement of immigrants;[16] and it naïvely and erroneously presupposes the unity of the state as an administrative actor and, hence, the coherence of state purpose and policy.[17] In a nutshell, the liberal thesis accepts too hastily and without the necessary empirical verification that virtually all migration to Western Europe after the mid-1970s or so was unwanted, and thus, when it persisted and/or new streams of migration and immigrant settlement commenced, it was a sign that state autonomy and administrative control had necessarily declined. Obviously, to the extent that the "loss of control" argument is exaggerated or it is not a universal phenomenon, the explanatory power and the insight of the liberal thesis itself are correspondingly diminished.

A second conspicuous problem with the liberal school of thought is that it a priori excludes or neglects alternative hypotheses for the phenomenon it seeks to explain. Specifically, it overlooks an obvious alternative explanation for why West European states have experienced some difficulty in executing a rational immigration and immigrant policy; this can be designated the political-historical thesis.[18]

Although overlapping somewhat with the liberal argument, the political-historical explanation differs in that is has a longer perspective; nor is it based on the assumption that West European societies or the international economy have become increasingly liberal since 1945, although it does not challenge this assumption. It argues that the ap-

[14] On this point, see Gary P. Freeman, "Can Liberal States Control Unwanted Immigration?" *Annals* 534 (July 1994); and Zig Layton-Henry, "Britain: The Would-be Zero-Immigration Country," in Wayne Cornelius et al., eds., *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[15] Rogers Brubaker, "Are Immigration Control Efforts Really Failing?" in Cornelius et al. (fn. 14), 227–31.

[16] Gary P. Freeman, "Models of Immigration Politics in the Receiving States" (Paper presented at the Conference on Immigration into Western Societies: Implications and Policy Choices, Charleston, South Carolina, May 1994).

[17] This point is made by Patrick Weil in his review of Hollifield's *Immigrants, Markets and States* in *American Political Science Review* 88 (March 1994), 236.

[18] See Layton-Henry (fn. 9); and Paul Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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parent erosion of state control of immigration and immigrant policy in Western Europe is a consequence of long-established, political-historical relations between the immigrant-receiving and immigrant-sending states, ties that have precluded arbitrary and unilateral policy-making on the part of the former group. According to this viewpoint, the immigrant-receiving states of Western Europe have not lost control of *all* immigration and immigrant policy but rather have only been significantly constrained with regard to policy pertaining to immigration and immigrants originating from countries with which the immigrant-receiving states have had a long and special historical relationship. This important distinction implies two things about the apparent erosion of state decision-making autonomy. First, the loss of state control of immigration and immigrant policy, to the extent it is an objective phenomenon, is not necessarily permanent. Since relations between the immigrant-receiving and immigrant-sending states are fluid, so too the prerogatives of the immigrant-receiving states must be constantly changing. Indeed, in some cases according to Freeman, change at the moment may in fact be working in favor of *greater* state control of immigration and immigrant policy.[19] Second, to the extent that the immigrant-receiving states did lose control of immigration and immigrant policy, the erosion of state autonomy is a legacy of decisions and interstate relations forged in the distant past and not, as the liberal argument contends, so recently as the postwar period.

The political-historical explanation speaks most directly, of course, to the cases of historical ties between the former colonial powers of Western Europe, most notably Britain, France, and the Netherlands, and their respective former colonies. In all three cases the strict regulation of immigration and the economic exploitation of immigrants, to the degree they were attempted by these immigrant-receiving states before 1970, were very difficult to effect because of the interdependence of the former colonial powers and their colonies. In addition to the factor of nostalgic paternalism, the former colonial powers had numerous economic and political incentives to preserve close relations with their colonies. Britain, for example, was keen before 1964 to preserve its relationship with its New Commonwealth because its former colonies were a good source of cheap raw materials. Maintaining the concept of the commonwealth also compensated politically and psychologically for

[19] Freeman (fn. 14).

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Britain's loss of empire.[20] Similarly, France's commitment to unimpeded Algerian immigration, prior to decolonization, was motivated by important domestic economic and political considerations and was intended to accomplish several goals whose overarching objective was to preserve French influence in Algeria.[21]

What of the other major immigrant-receiving countries in Western Europe during the postwar period that were not colonial powers? For these countries, too, the political-historical argument seems to shed some light. The extremely liberal and politically conflicted asylum policy of postwar West Germany, for example, can be reasonably explained as a legacy of Nazism and its brutal exploitation of foreign labor during World War II. In an effort to expunge the memory of the slave labor camps and to rehabilitate Germany's reputation in the international community, the postwar West German constitution guaranteed that virtually all foreigners persecuted on political grounds could claim the right to asylum, a broad right that attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees to West Germany between 1953 and 1990 and to a reunified Germany from 1990 through July 1993. Political considerations and historical imperatives, not embedded liberalism, probably best explain the fact that West Germany had the least restrictive and least governable asylum regime in Western Europe during the postwar period.

How robust is the political-historical thesis? Although far from proven, there is sufficient empirical evidence to support its plausibility. Even a cursory survey of the major immigrant-receiving states indicates that postwar immigrants and refugees are not randomly distributed across Western Europe. Rather, the predominant trend appears to be that individual states are particularly "open" to immigration originating from a small, select group of countries with which they have had a long and special historical association, while, simultaneously, these same states are relatively "closed" to other immigration.

For example, despite recent pressures from a wide variety of new immigration sources, more than 70 percent of all foreign residents in France during the early 1990s were either European Community nationals, who by statute enjoy the right of free circulation throughout the EC, or citizens of one of the three North African labor-exporting

[20] Layton-Henry (fn. 9), 36.

[21] These motivations included the very survival of the French Fourth Republic. See Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) with which France has had close, postcolonial relations. In contrast, only 4 percent of total foreign residents in France in 1991 were citizens of the asylum and refugee-exporting East European countries.[22]

Much the same situation obtains in Britain, where over 75 percent of the total ethnic minority population originates from Britain's New Commonwealth and Pakistan, areas previously within the British historical empire. Even as recently as 1991 more than half of all the relatively small number of new immigrants accepted by the British government for permanent settlement in the U.K. originated in the New Commonwealth and Pakistan. Moreover, despite considerable political pressure from Germany and other European Union countries, Britain has accepted only a trickle of refugees and asylum seekers from Eastern Europe or elsewhere in this decade. In 1992, for example, only 1,115 persons were granted formal refugee status by the British government, while a further, select group of 15,325 applicants was given indefinite, "exceptional leave."[23]

The German case, too, lends some support to the political-historical thesis, although the pertinent population in that country is the large pool of asylum seekers originating from countries, especially Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, that were historically within Germany's economic sphere of influence and not, as in Britain and France, postcolonial immigrants. In an attempt to circumvent post-1973 restrictions on legal economic migration and join previously established immigrant communities, increasing numbers of potential immigrants from traditional labor-exporting countries have been arriving in Germany since the 1980s seeking formal asylum. In 1980, for example, over half of all new asylum seekers were Turkish, not so coincidentally the biggest groups of previously recruited, legal guest workers in postwar West Germany. Similarly, in 1995 the single largest group of asylum seekers (thirty-three thousand) were citizens of one of the states of the former Yugoslavia. This population was followed closely in size by the more than twenty-five thousand Turkish citizens seeking asylum.[24]

From a political-historical perspective, then, the obligations and associations of the past and their influence on the present may best ex-

[22] Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Immigrants as Political Actors in France," in Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin A. Schain, eds., *The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe* (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1994), 94.

[23] Eurostat, *Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: A Statistical Report* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of European Communities, 1994), 153.

[24] *Week in Germany* (January 12, 1996), 2.

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plain the perceived erosion of the state's capacity to execute a rational immigration and immigrant policy in Western Europe. Although this explanation is certainly not comprehensive (it does not, for example, adequately account for West Germany's apparent loss of control of its postwar guest-worker program), it does seem to speak to a number of important cases.

The Emergence of a Postnational Citizenship Regime

In contrast to its implications for the state's external policy-making autonomy, implications that have been mostly lost on ordinary citizens or tangential to their core concerns, the impact of postwar immigration on the immediate cultural and social environment in Western Europe has been highly transparent to mass publics and, in most countries, a subject of popular debate and political conflict. Most significantly, it is often argued, postwar immigration has expanded and blurred the boundaries of national citizenship (Soysal, 139).

Potentially thorny for the state and for ordinary citizens alike is the seeming reality described by Soysal that, as a result of the external and internal pressures associated with postwar immigration, "the scope and inventory of noncitizens' rights [within West European societies] do not [now] differ significantly from those of citizens" (p. 119). In this vein Hollifield argues that an expansive interpretation of national membership currently obtains across Western Europe, one "which derives its meaning from new ideals of social justice and human rights, rather than from narrow definitions of sovereignty and the national interest" (p. 226). According to Soysal, in this "postnational" citizenship regime

> universal human rights replace national rights. The justification for the state's obligations to foreign populations goes beyond the nation-state itself. The rights and claims of the individual are legitimated by ideologies grounded in a transnational community, through international codes and conventions, and laws on human rights, independent of their citizenship in a nation-state. (p. 142)

Soysal and Hollifield disagree somewhat on the implications of the new postnational citizenship regime in Western Europe. Soysal, for example, is skeptical that its emergence has necessarily eroded the traditional sovereignty of West European states (p. 145), whereas Hollifield explicitly embraces this thesis (p. 171). However, both authors concur that external and internal forces during the postwar period have progressively pressured West European states to extend most of the basic rights of citizenship to large groups of immigrants with little or no

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claim or previous right to formal citizenship. In Soysal's view, national citizenship has become "reconfigured" in the process and is therefore no longer a useful or significant construction (p. 163).

Does the argument that postwar immigration has facilitated the emergence of a new postnational citizenship regime in Western Europe stand up to scrutiny? As with the liberal thesis of immigration to which it is closely linked, the postnational citizenship argument appears to have several conspicuous weaknesses.

First of all, such ideals as liberalism, social justice, and human rights, which Soysal, Hollifield, and others hold to be the bedrock of the new postnational citizenship regime, are largely Western constructs— constructs invented, promoted, and defended by the very nation-states whose immigrant policies are purportedly burdened by their tenets. This reality raises the intriguing possibility that to the extent a postnational citizenship regime objectively exists, it is mostly self-imposed on the advanced West European states and, hence, less rigid and politically and legally confining than Soysal and Hollifield acknowledge. Indeed, one need only consider the Italian government's forced repatriation of Albanian refugees in 1991, Germany's radical overhaul of its permissive asylum policy in 1993 and its repatriation of Vietnamese immigrants in the mid-1990s, and France's redefinition of its liberal citizenship rules in 1993 to see how swiftly and illiberally the immigrant-receiving states can alter their immigrant policy whenever they so desire. In these and other cases the assumption that *all* immigrants are more or less automatically included in and protected by a postnational citizenship regime is simply contradicted by events.

A second problem with the postnational citizenship argument is that it is contradicted by postwar trends in Britain. Of the seven major immigrant-receiving states, Britain is the most liberal. Respect for individual and human rights permeates British political culture, and, partly as a result, Britain has one of the largest and most active pressure-group networks working to promote the interests of both recent and long-settled immigrants.[25] Despite this liberal backdrop, however, the overwhelming reality of British citizenship and immigrant policy since 1971 has been to restrict the rights of immigrants to live and work in Britain.[26] Moreover, contrary to the expectations of the postnational citizenship thesis, British citizenship policy since 1971 has been trans-

[25] In this regard, see Commission for Racial Equality, "Racial Equality Councils" (London: CRE, November 1994).

[26] Layton-Henry (fn. 14).

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parently discriminatory. Specifically, it has privileged white over nonwhite immigrants and wealthy immigrants over poorer ones.[27]

The British case would not be so damaging to the postnational citizenship thesis if the latter were underpinned by an abundance of hard empirical evidence drawn from other cases. Unfortunately for its proponents, it is not. This is not to imply that the postnational thesis is without merit. Clearly it describes a process and a degree of immigrant incorporation into West European societies that are otherwise difficult to explain. Obviously the major immigrant-receiving states have never fully exploited the economic potential of postwar immigration,[28] and most immigrants do, in fact, enjoy many of the major benefits of national citizenship without formally possessing it (Soysal, 122–30). Yet is it the postnational thesis that primarily explains these realities, or is the generosity of state immigrant policy in Western Europe primarily a function of mundane foreign policy considerations and/or government anxieties about preserving domestic social peace and harmonious race relations? At this juncture this question cannot be satisfactorily answered because it has never been seriously investigated. Rather, Soysal, Hollifield, and other scholars have merely presumed the virtues of the postnational citizenship thesis and chosen not to consider alternative explanations. As a result, the postnational citizenship thesis has not, for the moment, been adequately demonstrated; nor has it been falsified.

The Surge and Scourge of Right-Wing Populist Parties

In contrast to the postnational citizenship thesis, the argument that postwar immigration reinforced the post-1980 surge of radical, right-wing populist movements and political parties in Western Europe is persuasive and well documented.[29] Betz summarizes the essence of this linkage in arguing that what unites the various radical right-wing populist parties and their supporters in Western Europe "is their pronounced hostility toward immigrants and refugees" (p. 172). Betz does not claim that postwar immigration precipitated the emergence of right-wing populist groups. On the contrary, in most West European countries, these groups do, in fact, trace their origins to the period be-

[27] Kaushika Amin and Robin Richardson, *Politics for All: Equality, Culture and the General Election 1992* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1992), 55.

[28] On this point, see Gary P. Freeman, "The Consequences of Immigration Policies for Immigrant States: A British and French Comparison," in Anthony M. Messina et al., eds., *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992).

[29] See, for example, Hans-Joachim Veen, Norbert Lepszy, and Peter Mnich, *The Republikaner Party in Germany: Right-Wing Menace or Protest Catchall?* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 47–54; and Richard Stöss, *Die Republikaner* (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1990).

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fore the Second World War, or, alternatively, they emerged during the postwar period but before the issue of immigration had become politically salient among mass publics. However, there is little doubt that each wave of postwar immigration has fertilized the political soil in which right-wing populist groups in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland have grown and flourished. The increasing presence of immigrants in these West European societies, and especially those from the developing countries, has inflated the popularity and swelled the electoral support of right-wing populist groups during the 1980s and 1990s.

According to Betz, however, the linkage between postwar immigration and increased popular support for right-wing groups is not a direct one. Rather, he argues, it is mediated by the shift from industrial to postindustrial capitalism in Western Europe, a transition that has profoundly transformed the "socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies" (p. 27). As an inevitable and direct consequence of this transformation, West European societies and polities have become more fragmented and feelings of resentment and alienation have significantly increased among a large minority of the population that feels ill equipped to comprehend the new postindustrial order, let alone compete and prosper in it. According to Betz's research, "The typical right-wing voter [during the late 1980s] more often than not came from the lower classes, had only a low to moderate level of education, and tended to live in disadvantaged areas of Western Europe's large and medium-sized cities" (p. 166). Diffuse sentiments of resentment and alienation within this constituency have been exploited by right-wing populist groups who validate, articulate, and aggregate anti-immigrant popular opinion. Such groups are particularly skilled at painting immigrants as both a general threat to the sociocultural order of West European societies and a direct employment threat to those native workers who are mired at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.

Acknowledging that postwar immigration has provided an important boost to right-wing populist groups in Western Europe, it is nevertheless the case that not all of the major immigrant-receiving states have been plagued by such groups. Indeed, in this respect, Britain again stands out as an illuminating and potentially critical exception.[30] And it is perhaps not surprising given the potential complications it raises for Betz's analysis that he all but ignores it in *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*.

[30] On this point, see Christopher T. Husbands, "Extreme Right-Wing Politics in Great Britain: The Recent Marginalisation of the National Front," *West European Politics* 11 (April 1988), 65–79.

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The British experience with postwar, right-wing populism can be briefly summarized. After the influx into Britain of more than two hundred thousand migrant workers and permanent settlers from India, Pakistan, and the West Indies between 1955 and 1960, significant pressure began to build within the polity for restricting immigration from these countries and from Britain's New Commonwealth as a whole.[31] These political pressures ultimately motivated a series of British governments to impose significant restrictions on New Commonwealth immigration between 1962 and 1971 and to redefine Britain's citizenship regime so as to prevent as many settled or potential immigrants as politically possible from obtaining or exercising the rights of formal citizenship. Unfortunately for Britain's political class, however, these illiberal measures did little, at least in the short and medium term, to allay the xenophobia of many British voters. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of citizens explicitly or implicitly supported the populist Conservative Party maverick Enoch Powell and his overtly racist campaign between 1968 and 1974 to halt all new, nonwhite immigration and to repatriate settled immigrants.[32] When Powell voluntarily withdrew from English politics in 1974 to advance the cause of Protestant unionism in Northern Ireland, the National Front, an extreme-right populist group, stepped into the political void created by his departure and during the mid- to late 1970s enjoyed some modest political and electoral successes. By 1981, however, the National Front was in organizational disarray and its conventional political activities and ambitions had been all but abandoned. Since 1981 neither the National Front nor any other group or movement of its ilk has exercised significant political voice or influence on any major issue in British politics, including state immigration and immigrant policy.

What accounts for British exceptionalism? Why is Britain the only major immigrant-receiving country in Western Europe without a politically significant right-wing populist party in the 1990s? Unfortunately, there is little in the analysis or empirical evidence contained in *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* that answers this question, despite the puzzle obviously posed by the British case. Not only did Britain have one of the earliest experiences with postwar right-wing populism in Western Europe, but, given its entrenched economic problems, its stubbornly high unemployment rate, its relatively large nonwhite immigrant population, and the measurable decline of public

[31] See Messina (fn. 2), 53–78.

[32] At one point or another, at least 75 percent of the British electorate endorsed Powell's views on immigration and 20 percent hoped that he would become prime minister. See Messina (fn. 2), 104–9.

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faith in its established political institutions in recent years,[33] it would appear to be an excellent breeding ground for right-wing political extremism during the 1990s. Why, then, is Britain now apparently immune from Austrian, French, or German-style radical right-wing populism?

The conventional wisdom, to which Betz only briefly alludes (p. 71), is that the Conservative Party successfully co-opted anti-immigrant public opinion in Britain from the late 1970s forward, thus seizing the ideological ground upon which Powellism and the National Front were initially established. In other words, the British Conservative Party staked out an explicitly hostile posture toward nonwhite immigration and immigrants, a public posture that undercut the allure of those on the radical, populist right.[34] The strengths of this argument are self-evident but, unfortunately for Betz, it does not validate, indeed it partially invalidates, his thesis that radical right-wing populism is more or less an inevitable consequence of systemic economic dislocation, pervasive public disaffection with established political parties and mass xenophobia. To put the issue simply, post-1980 Britain has experienced all these phenomena in spades, yet it has spawned no politically significant right-wing populist parties. Moreover, established political parties in other countries have tried to co-opt anti-immigrant popular sentiment, much like the Conservative Party did in Britain, but none to date has achieved measurable success.[35]

One possible explanation for British exceptionalism may spring from the fact that the overwhelming majority of nonwhite migrants to Britain during the postwar period entered the country as formal citizens, with all the rights and privileges of citizens, including the right to vote. Unlike most of their counterparts in the other immigrant-receiving countries, nonwhite immigrants in Britain were never really perceived as guest workers by either the state or ordinary citizens.[36] This reality most likely had several important implications. First, it made the principal cost of British immigration policy, that is, permanent nonwhite settlement, abundantly evident to government and citizens alike.

[33] See Anthony M. Messina, "Are West European Parties in Crisis? Select Evidence from the British and German Cases" (Paper presented at the conference Party Politics in the Year 2000, Manchester, U.K., January 1995).

[34] Messina (fn. 2), 126–49.

[35] See, for example, Anthony M. Messina, "Political Impediments to the Resumption of Labour Migration to Western Europe," *West European Politics* 13 (January 1990).

[36] Layton-Henry (fn. 9), 28–41.

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Second, the transparency of permanent settlement mobilized public opposition to nonwhite immigration and stimulated a nativist backlash early in the postwar period. And finally, both these developments precipitated a political response and then a coherent policy response by Britain's political class relatively quickly, certainly sooner than elsewhere in Western Europe. The end result was that by 1971 British policymakers had harmonized their immigration and immigrant policy by subordinating the economic imperatives of immigration to political ones and by officially acknowledging, through the passage of several race relations acts, the permanent presence of nonwhite immigrants.[37] In short, Britain may be relatively insulated against the scourge of radical right-wing populism during the 1990s because it is well ahead of its European counterparts in coping with the contradictions of the first and second waves of migration and because it has effectively closed its borders to the third wave.[38] If so, Britain is exceptional not because it is unaffected by the general trends that Betz cites as feeding right-wing populism in Western Europe but because these trends may be less comprehensive as explanations for the aforementioned phenomenon than Betz supposes.

Conclusions: Constructing a New Research Agenda

To this point, I have examined the four central arguments that pervade the recent scholarship on postwar migration to Western Europe. In so doing, I have advanced a number of significant, but I hope also fair, criticisms of these arguments and some of the assumptions upon which they rest. I now distill the above criticisms in hopes of identifying some common threads and pointing the way to some new and potentially fruitful research directions for the immigration studies subfield as a whole.

While, as I argued earlier, there is much that is insightful about the collected scholarship under review, these volumes nevertheless suffer from several shared problems, problems that appear to be endemic to the entire subfield. Perhaps most pervasive is the propensity of scholars to stake out exaggerated or inadequately substantiated claims. The origins of the problem are not difficult to fathom. They stem in part from a tendency of scholars within the subfield to compromise objectivity

[37] Messina (fn. 2), 42–44.
[38] Layton-Henry (fn. 14).

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and empirical rigor in the cause of constructing "middle-level" theory, certainly a worthy effort, but one that is difficult to pursue and yet even more problematic to execute successfully.[39] The problem undoubtedly also results from the very nature of the subject. The topic of postwar immigration has, of course, sparked enormous controversy within the societies and polities of Western Europe, as well as stimulated intense interest within intellectual circles during the 1990s. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps understandable that scholars within the subfield of immigration studies, and especially those wishing to contribute to current political and policy debates, would be prone to hyperbole and exaggeration.

A more serious problem, however, is the growing specialization within the subfield and the concomitant increasing insularity of scholarly inquiry. These trends fragment our understanding of the overall phenomenon of postwar immigration.

Juxtapose, for example, *Immigrants, Markets, and States* and *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, two exemplary books within their respective literatures. In the first Hollifield implies, not unreasonably, that migration to Western Europe will persist indefinitely and even accelerate in the future and, moreover, that there is little that governments and the European Union can do to stem the tide (pp. 230–31). According to this interpretation of reality, right-wing groups, illiberal politicians, and mass publics are only background actors who are subordinate to the superior authority of economic markets and an international human rights–based regime. In the latter book, by contrast, Betz offers a wealth of electoral and public-opinion survey data that suggest the considerable political potency of right-wing groups and increasingly angry, anti-immigrant voters across Western Europe. Indeed, Betz pessimistically concludes that right-wing groups "might well succeed in securing a permanent niche in Western Europe's emerging political market" (p. 189).

After considering these two perspectives, the alert reader could perhaps walk away somewhat perplexed. If right-wing populist groups are as disruptive to the domestic social and political order as Betz believes, why is Hollifield so confident that these and other anti-immigrant forces in Western Europe will ultimately not prevail politically to bring a halt to all significant new immigration, as has already occurred in Britain? Similarly, if the economic and political imperatives of liberal-

[39] Joseph LaPalombara, "Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics: An Anti-Scholastic View," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, eds., *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York: Free Press, 1970).

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ism are as powerful, and liberal values as pervasive, in the domestic context as Hollifield argues, why is Betz so alarmed about the appearance of right-wing groups? Will not the forces of right-wing populism inevitably dissipate under the pressures of liberal hegemony?

There is little point in searching for answers to these and other, similar questions within the pages of the volumes under review because, except for the overlapping themes contained in *Immigrants, Markets, and States* and *Limits of Citizenship*, these works essentially speak past one another. Indeed, so self-contained are they and so deeply immersed in their respective literatures that their authors scarcely acknowledge the contributions of the others to the immigration studies subfield as a whole.

The problem of the fragmentation of knowledge within the subfield during the current decade suggests the need for new scholarly initiatives to synthesize and unify the separate literatures. An especially useful end goal would be the construction of a comprehensive paradigm of postwar immigration that built upon previous theories that are grounded in political economy but that also addressed the obvious problems and lack of universality of the existing models. In conjunction with this ambitious objective, a new research agenda should satisfactorily answer a number of salient questions that have been implicitly or explicitly raised in this review.

The most important question pertains to the widely held assumption that the capacity of West European states to control both immigration and immigrant policy has significantly eroded during the postwar period. The task here is challenging but relatively straightforward: to identify the specific circumstances under which West European states enjoy greater or lesser autonomy in conceiving and implementing a domestic immigration and immigrant policy. These investigations should commence by assuming that the liberal thesis, affirming that West European states have substantially lost control of policy, has not yet been satisfactorily verified.

A second question pertains to the possible linkages between state immigration and immigrant policy.[40] Here the pertinent question is how the content, strictures, and goals of the former influence those of the latter, and vice versa? This investigation should assume that in order to comprehend the shape of state immigrant policy or explain the configuration of right-wing populist forces in a given country, for example, one must first discover how state immigration policy evolved, what its

[40] This issue is partly addressed by Freeman (fn. 28).

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primary objectives were, and which nonnative groups or populations were its objects. Conversely, in order to understand fully the content and trajectory of contemporary state immigration policy, it may be necessary to consider the experience of state immigrant policy as well as its ultimate social and political repercussions.

Yet a final set of questions springs from the widely embraced thesis that a postnational citizenship regime currently prevails in Western Europe. Questions inevitably raised by this argument include: How stable is this regime? How is it specifically enforced? How is it influenced, if at all, by changing currents in global migration patterns? How has it been affected by the recent surge of domestic right-wing groups?

The above agenda will not benefit only the growing legion of scholars within the immigration studies subfield. Indeed, many of its central concerns—including the alleged erosion of traditional state sovereignty and the rise of right-wing populist groups—are also pertinent to other subfields and of growing interest to a wide variety of academic disciplines. At a minimum, it is now apparent that the recent proliferation of cross-national scholarship on postwar migration to Western Europe has contributed less to our understanding of this phenomenon than might have reasonably been expected given its volume. It is thus time to step back, deliberate about both what we know and what we comprehend less well, and stitch together the various strands of scholarship on postwar immigration in a manner that better illuminates the whole of this phenomenon.

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

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

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